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This thesis traces the origins of Canada’s cultural diplomacy by analyzing the role of music in 
Canadian-Brazilian relations from the early 1940s to the late 1960s. Brazil was the only country 
with which Canada had a cultural agreement at the time. Lacking experience in that realm, the 
Department of External Affairs let state and non-state actors on the ground lead the show. Those 
individuals (diplomats, artists, broadcasters, and Canadian capitalists, among others) had 
considerable leeway to put forward their own vision of Canada with the knowledge that national 
projection and national self-representation were part of the same feedback loop. Because they 
were conceived with both foreign and domestic audiences in mind, their experiments in musical 
diplomacy placed Canadians’ simultaneous search for a national and an international identity 
within a transnational context. Improvised as it was, this musical nation branding exercise was 
intertwined with a broad range of individual and collective agendas that cut across various 
combinations of political, business, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and even family ties. Latinity and 
Catholicism, but also métissage and family, were some of the dominant tropes that official and 
impromptu ambassadors employed to engage Brazilian publics. This process involved a 
reckoning with Brazil’s cultural and ‘racial’ difference that used musical genres (for example, 
‘serious music’ as opposed to samba and jazz) to foreground ‘whiteness’ as the normative link 
between Canadians and Brazilians. As such, Canada’s plunge into the realm of musical 
diplomacy reflected and shaped where ‘white’ Canadians – whether francophones or 
anglophones – situated themselves vis-à-vis ‘others’ at home and abroad. ‘Race’ and empire, but 
also religion and gender, informed the musical nation branding efforts of this story’s 
protagonists. According to them, Brazil’s location on the periphery of the industrialized North 
made it an ideal place to experiment with the projection of Canada’s image abroad. It was the 
distant stage upon which internal (identity) politics and aspirations could be played out. 
Borrowing from Benedict Anderson’s work on nationalism and Georgina Born’s research on the 
mediating potential of music, this thesis is based on a broad range of sources (textual, audio, and 
visual) collected through multisite research: from Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília to 
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In June of 1943, French-Canadian pianist Jean Dansereau and his wife, soprano Muriel 
Dansereau, arrived in Rio de Janeiro for a series of concerts organized under the auspices of the 
Canadian legation in Brazil. This official visit by two Canadian artists had no precedent in the 
history of the two countries’ relations, which led Brazilian journalist H. Coutinho to underline 
the significance of this “art offer” from a distant neighbour: “The Dansereau couple, with their 
artistic prestige, is one more link in the strong chain of friendship that unites the two sister 
nations.”1 This musical event occurred in the midst of a wartime cultural rapprochement between 
Canada and Brazil. With the conflict disrupting their respective trans-Atlantic trade networks, the 
two aspiring middle powers hoped to accumulate goodwill and consolidate their economic ties 
with each other while also trying to subtly offset the United States’ political and cultural 
dominance of the hemisphere.2 Opened in 1941, the Canadian legation in Rio de Janeiro was 
upgraded to an embassy three years later with Jean Désy overseeing the transition. The 
ambassador and Oswaldo Aranha, Brazil’s foreign minister, cemented the rapprochement with a 
pioneering bilateral cultural agreement – the first of its kind for Canada – aimed at facilitating 
“the organisation and presentation of artistic exhibitions, concerts, lectures, radio programmes, 
films, and other activities” so as to further “the understanding of one country by the other.”3 
Cultural relations, Désy insisted, could help members of both nations understand “le sens 
                                                          
1 H. Coutinho, “Uma Oferta de Arte do Canadá ao Brasil,” Jornal do Brasil, July 18, 1943, 2, 
http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/030015_06/23100. Unless otherwise noted, all translations are my own. The 
original quotations in Portuguese have been reproduced in the footnotes for reference purposes: “… oferta de arte” 
and “O casal Dansereau, com o seu prestigio artístico, é mais um elo na forte corrente de amizade que une as duas 
nações irmãs.” 
2 Adam Chapnick defines middlepowerhood in Canadian international history as a “myth” associated with a 
“subtle process of nationalist self-promotion,” which began during the Second World War when Canada sought to 
position itself advantageously within the postwar international order envisioned through the United Nations project. 
Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” International Journal 55, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 188. See also 
Adam Chapnick, “Middle Power No More? Canada in World Affairs Since 2006,” Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy 
and International Relations 14, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2013): 101-110. For a discussion of Brazil’s similarly uncertain 
claims to middlepowerhood, see Sean Burges, “Mistaking Brazil for a Middle Power,” Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American Research 19, no. 2 (2013): 286-302; and Annette Baker Fox, The Politics of Attraction: Four Middle 
Powers and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).  
3 Exchange of Notes Between Canada and Brazil Constituting an Agreement for the Promotion of Cultural 




profond et permanent de nos vies, apparemment séparées, mais que relient tant d’impondérables 
et d’invisibles courants.”4 
Of all the arts, music was favoured as the most potent means of imagining this Canadian-
Brazilian community. The Dansereau couple’s performances provided impetus to Canada’s first 
official foray into the realm of musical diplomacy. Quatuor alouette, a French-Canadian folkloric 
vocal ensemble, followed in their footsteps with a two-month tour of Brazil in 1945. The 
following year, composer Ernest MacMillan travelled south to direct a series of folk-infused 
programs with the Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira [Brazilian Symphony Orchestra] (OSB). He 
was accompanied by Claude Champagne who, in addition to conducting, gave lectures at the 
Escola Nacional de Música [National School of Music]. Champagne was no stranger to Brazil. In 
1942, he had revisited a Marajó Island folk melody and composed a musical homage to Brazil at 
the request of Désy, who was planning Dominion Day celebrations in Rio de Janeiro. Acclaimed 
pianist Arnaldo Estrella premiered the work, titled “Quadrilha Brasileira,” while Champagne 
listened from afar. The year 1946 saw another musical exchange when Ellen Ballon premiered 
renowned composer Heitor Villa-Lobos’s “Concerto de Piano e Orquestra No. 1,” a defining 
work composed for – and dedicated to – the Montreal-born pianist. The International Service of 
the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS) had by then inaugurated its weekly shortwave 
transmissions in Portuguese with daily broadcasts planned for April of 1948. In 1952, it invited 
Villa-Lobos to Canada to conduct the Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal 
(OCSM) for a performance destined for broadcast to Latin America. The CBC-IS’s 
programming was consistent with the tone set by Désy’s musical diplomacy: ‘serious music’ and 
folk music – representing Canada’s French/English and Latin/British dualities – were the chosen 
vehicles for the projection of the country’s image in Brazil. 
The Dansereau couple, Quatuor alouette, MacMillan, Champagne, and those who followed 
their example in subsequent decades played leading roles as impromptu ambassadors for Canada. 
They embraced the idea that musical performances (on stage, on record, or on radio airwaves) 
were effective means of engaging foreign publics to foster international dialogue and cooperation 
while promoting Canada and enriching its musical life. Music’s seemingly apolitical and 
                                                          
4 Jean Désy, “Fondation de l’Institut Brésil-Canada,” June 14, 1944, MG32-E2, Vol. 1, Discours au Brésil (1942-




universal qualities, its affective and mediating potential, as well as its ability to travel, made it a 
compelling instrument of diplomacy for Désy, his successors, and the non-state actors they 
mobilized. Damien Mahiet and his coeditors, in their introduction to Music and Diplomacy, write 
that music “provides scripted relations that actors can build upon to share experiences, generate 
new identities, and imagine new configurations of international relations.”5 They add: “From this 
perspective, experiencing sonorous coexistence, and perhaps even establishing a sonorous 
community in the moment of a musical performance serves as a starting point for a wider 
process.”6 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht concurs although she also pertinently notes that it is 
difficult to assess or measure the effectiveness of musical diplomacy since it is a multifarious 
and diffused object in international relations.7 Its payoffs may therefore not be readily apparent. 
Rather than focusing on the link between actions and outcomes, she urges scholars to “consider 
the term ‘nation branding’ as a creative way to investigate how state and non-state actors have 
collaborated in an effort to address, project, or activate music and the nation as a metaphor for 
political, including diplomatic action.”8 She argues, in other words, that one can more 
constructively “make sense of music’s meaning in international relations” by focusing on the 
practices of national projection and national self-representation.9 
The argument that musical diplomacy can best be examined through the prism of nation 
branding is a cogent one when looked at from the perspective of Canadian international history. 
Nation branding is when countries borrow strategies from the world of corporate marketing to 
enhance their image overseas and (hopefully) positively engage foreign interlocutors; be they 
from the public, private, or voluntary sectors. It is about constructing and disseminating a 
narrative, often through cultural channels, to achieve desired political, economic, or cultural 
ends. Evan H. Potter contends that nation branding is at the heart of Canada’s efforts to achieve 
                                                          
5 Damien Mahiet, Mark Ferraguto, and Rebekah Ahrendt, “Introduction,” in Music and Diplomacy from the Early 
Modern Era to the Present, eds. Damien Mahiet, Mark Ferraguto, and Rebekah Ahrendt (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 10.   
6 Ibid. 
7 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Of Dreams and Desire: Diplomacy and Musical Nation Branding Since the Early 
Modern Period,” in International Relations, Music, and Diplomacy: Sounds and Voices on the International Stage, 
eds. Frédéric Ramel and Cécile Prévost-Thomas (Cham: Springer/Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 272. 
8 Ibid., 264. 




its national interest objectives.10 It is about giving “people an exciting story about Canada that 
they are interested in and to prove it over and over again in a variety of ways, thus creating 
accumulated recognition.”11 But what do these stories tell us about their authors and the 
assumptions that are made regarding audiences? What do they reveal about Canadians’ self-
perception and their relationship to the rest of the world? As my dissertation shows, Canadians 
conveyed many of their stories through music in the 1940s, 1950, and 1960s. It was a difficult 
process marked by competing nationalisms and differing views regarding Canada’s place within 
the North Atlantic Triangle.12 Canadians also lacked “a self-confident tradition of transmitting 
particular values to other countries,” writes Andrew Fenton Cooper.13 Improvisation thus 
prevailed in Brazil, which allowed the protagonists of Canada’s first experiments in musical 
diplomacy to exercise considerable agency in the making and positioning of their country’s 
international image.14 The history of Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations presents, as a result, 
many opportunities to examine the mechanics of – and representations interlaced within – 
“musical [n]ation branding.”15     
In my dissertation, I explore the multipronged musical diplomacy briefly introduced above. 
I argue that individuals on the ground (diplomats, artists, and representatives of Canadian 
business interests in Brazil, among others) had considerable leeway to put forward their own 
vision of Canada with the knowledge that national projection and national self-representation 
                                                          
10 Although Canadians held competing and evolving views regarding what constituted the national interest from 
the 1940s onward, they tended to focus on issues of sovereignty, economic growth, hemispheric stability, national 
unity, and liberal democracy. For a detailed discussion of these views, see Greg Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll, 
eds., In the National Interest: Canadian Foreign Policy and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade, 1909-2009 (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2011).  
11 Evan H. Potter, Branding Canada: Projecting Canada’s Soft Power Through Public Diplomacy (Montreal & 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 279. 
12 The concept of a North Atlantic Triangle is used here to highlight the influence that the United States and Great 
Britain had on Canada’s external relations (and thus on Canadians’ views on the world) rather than to overstate 
Ottawa’s importance in the triangular interplays first analyzed by John Bartlet Brebner in 1945. Tony McCulloch 
explains: “Before 1945 the triangle was essentially isosceles—with two equal powers (Britain and the US) and a 
much weaker third. But since 1945, the North Atlantic triangle has become increasingly obtuse, with three very 
unequal powers—the US as the world’s only superpower; Britain, still a great power, even now; and Canada, a 
middling power in most respects.” Tony McCulloch, “The North Atlantic Triangle: A Canadian Myth?,” 
International Journal 66, no. 1 (Winter 2010-11): 206. See also John Bartlet Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The 
Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain (New York: Columbia University Press, 1945).      
13 Andrew Fenton Cooper, “Canadian Cultural Diplomacy: An Introduction,” in Canadian Culture: International 
Dimension, ed. Andrew Fenton Cooper (Toronto: Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism, University of 
Waterloo/Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1985), 3.  
14 On the topic of improvisation and Canada’s approach to cultural diplomacy, see Sean Rushton, “The Origins 
and Development of Canada’s Public Diplomacy,” in Potter, Branding Canada, 92. 




were part of the same feedback loop. Because they were conceived with both foreign and 
domestic audiences in mind, their experiments in musical diplomacy placed Canadians’ 
simultaneous search for a national and an international identity within a transnational context. 
Improvised as it was, this musical nation branding exercise was intertwined with a broad range 
of both individual and collective agendas that cut across various combinations of political, 
business, professional, religious, ethnic, linguistic, and even family ties. Latinity and 
Catholicism, but also métissage and family, were some of the dominant tropes that official and 
impromptu ambassadors employed to engage their Brazilian interlocutors. This process involved 
a reckoning with Brazil’s cultural and ‘racial’ difference that used musical genres (for example, 
‘serious music’ as opposed to samba and jazz) to foreground ‘whiteness’ as the normative link 
between Canadians and Brazilians.16 As such, Canada’s plunge into the realm of musical 
diplomacy reflected and shaped where ‘white’ Canadians – whether francophones or 
anglophones – situated themselves vis-à-vis ‘others’ at home and abroad. In the eyes and ears of 
this story’s protagonists, Brazil’s location on the periphery of the industrialized North made it an 
ideal place to experiment with the projection of Canada’s image abroad. It was the distant stage 
upon which Canadian internal (identity) politics and aspirations could be played out.  
My research renders audible the voices and sounds of both state and non-state actors who 
championed musical nation branding through the construction of a musically imagined 
Canadian-Brazilian community from the turn of the 1940s through the 1960s. In the late 1930s, 
Canada and Brazil began formal talks regarding diplomatic representation and trade. This was a 
formative period for the Department of External Affairs (DEA), which saw its diplomatic corps 
expand in conjunction with the adoption of an increasingly liberal nationalist posture in 
international affairs. At the same time, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Radio 
                                                          
16 The protagonists discussed in this dissertation often used the term ‘serious music’ to refer to the works of classical 
and modern composers. Although not a musical genre, they often juxtaposed it against other categories to reinforce 
cultural hierarchies and to align themselves with European cultural centres in their search for legitimacy and power. 
As an ideology, ‘serious music’ was a response to the “status anxiety” felt by intellectual and cultural elites who 
grappled with the social and structural changes that accompanied modernity and nation building in late eighteenth- 
and early nineteenth century Europe. By making ‘serious music’ one of the pillars of an emerging national culture, 
these elites claimed – as did Jean Désy and his cultural ambassadors – that only they had the “technical, intellectual, 
and emotional resources” to consolidate the nation and give it both shape and direction. Celia Applegate, “How 
German Is It? Nationalism and the Idea of Serious Music in the Early Nineteenth Century,” 19th-Century Music 21, 
no. 3 (Spring 1998): 287, 295. See also Tia DeNora, “Musical Patronage and Social Change in Beethoven’s 
Vienna,” American Journal of Sociology 97, no. 2 (September 1991): 310-346; and Lawrence W. Levine, 




Broadcasting listened attentively to calls for the creation of an international service that would be 
managed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC), financed through direct 
parliamentary grants, and overseen by the DEA: the CBC-IS was established shortly after along 
those lines. These developments – combined with efforts to establish a national culture in 
Canada – created opportunities for musical diplomacy pioneers such as Désy, MacMillan, and 
Quatuor alouette leader Roger Filiatrault who eagerly embraced the challenge of projecting 
Canada abroad. The politico-cultural landscape changed considerably in the following thirty 
years. The mid-to-late 1960s saw the collapse of democracy and the consolidation of military 
rule in Brazil while Canadians increasingly focused their attention on the Cold War as well as on 
the impact of decolonization and Québec nationalism on Canada’s international relations. The 
year 1968 also marked the end of the DEA’s oversight of the CBC-IS. The CBC finally assumed 
full control of its international service by which time broadcasts in Portuguese had been reduced 
to a trickle.   
Music as Mediation 
Mark M. Smith, in his introduction to Hearing History, notes that “historians are listening to the 
past with an intensity, frequency, keenness, and acuity unprecedented in scope and magnitude.”17 
Like Gienow-Hecht, he remarks that historians are best positioned to contribute an “explicitly 
historical dimension” to research inspired by developments in musicology and 
ethnomusicology.18 My dissertation makes one such contribution by examining the history of 
Canada’s musical diplomacy using a theoretical model developed by Georgina Born as part of 
her work on music and anthropology at University of Cambridge and University of Oxford: the 
‘four planes of social mediation.’ The model’s premise is that music is best understood as a 
‘constellation of mediations’ since it engenders relationships between and among artists, 
audiences, producers, and media. Born writes: “[M]ore obviously than visual and literary media, 
music has no material essence but a plural and distributed material being.”19 She adds: 
                                                          
17 Mark M. Smith, “Introduction: Onward to Audible Pasts,” in Hearing History: A Reader, ed. Mark M. Smith 
(Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 2004), X. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Georgina Born, “After Relational Aesthetics: Improvised Music, the Social, and (Re)Theorizing the Aesthetic,” 
in Improvisation and Social Aesthetics, eds. Georgina Born, Eric Lewis, and Will Straw (Durham: Duke University 




[Its] multiple simultaneous forms of existence – as sound, score, discourse, site, 
performance, social relations, technological media – indicate the necessity of conceiving of 
the musical object as a constellation. Compared with the visual and literary arts, then, music 
has to be grasped as an extraordinarily complex kind of cultural object – as an aggregation of 
sonic, visual, discursive, social, corporeal, technological, and temporal mediations.20 
As a constellation of mediations, music participates in – and is subjected to – the same 
socioeconomic and politico-cultural processes that shape all human experiences. It is not an 
autonomous text. 
Born’s model is based on Gilles Deleuze’s theory of the assemblage. It is a systems 
analysis model that attempts to delineate the form, content, and multilayered processes of 
musical mediations that occur in the moment of a performance. Born’s assemblage is comprised 
of: (Plane 1) socialities engendered among artists at the micro-level through the acts of 
composing, rehearsing, and performing; (Plane 2) socialities established among audiences 
through the experience of listening to – and/or reading about – music; (Plane 3) hierarchies of 
identities (class, gender, ethnicity, religion, etc.) refracted through music in ways that either 
consolidate or destabilize the socialities established in planes 1 and 2; (Plane 4) the broader 
structural forces that enable or limit the production, dissemination, and reception of music. 
Born’s approach consists of exploring each of the four planes and their relations to one another – 
attending to both their “autonomy” and “mutual interference” – through the lens of musical 
genres in order to better understand how musical experiences inform people’s self-perception 
and sense of belonging.21     
My dissertation approaches the use of music in Canadian-Brazilian relations as an 
assemblage characterized by a constellation of mediations occurring across eight thousand 
kilometres (on stage, in studios, via radio airwaves, and in the press) among a diverse cast of 
protagonists with an equally diverge range of agendas: for example, (Plane 1) the personal and 
professional context of the 1946 musical encounter between Champagne and Villa-Lobos; (Plane 
2) the constitution of audiences, in both Canada and Brazil, around the live performances, radio 
broadcasts, and newspaper reviews of the two composers’ works; (Plane 3) the interplay between 
                                                          
20 Ibid. 





‘race’ and nation as embodied in the ‘whiteness’ of two male composers whose folk-inspired 
‘serious music’ straddled the fence between universalism and nationalism; (Plane 4) the efforts 
deployed by the DEA and the CBC-IS, in coordination with their Brazilian counterparts and the 
mass media in both countries, to conceptualize, define, coordinate, and promote the works of the 
two composers. As Born explains, this approach consists in developing “a position based on a 
kind of maximum exposure to everything that is out there discursively.”22 In other words, it 
requires making audible the multiple voices and sounds, which gave the assemblage its singular 
structure throughout the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.    
In a parallel way, my dissertation underlines the capacity of the protagonists of this 
assemblage to enact what amounts to an imagined community. The concept is, of course, a 
familiar one for scholars of musical diplomacy. Born writes about “aggregations of the affected” 
and “musically imagined communities” whereas Mahiet and his colleagues discuss how 
“sonorous coexistence” generates “sonorous community.”23 All are indebted to Benedict 
Anderson who demonstrated the centrality of cultural works in the constitution and endurance, 
across time and space, of collective identities. On the topic of music, he writes:  
Take national anthems, for example, sung on national holidays. No matter how banal the 
words and mediocre the tunes, there is in this singing an experience of simultaneity. At 
precisely such moments, people wholly unknown to each other utter the same verses to the 
same melody. The image: unisonance. … How selfless this unisonance feels! If we are aware 
that others are singing these songs precisely when and as we are, we have no idea who they 
may be, or even where, out of earshot, they are singing. Nothing connects us all but imagined 
sound.24  
Although it illustrates musical nationalism, the above example is in many ways similar to the 
‘sameness-embracing’ that Carol A. Hess examines in Representing the Good Neighbor, a study 
on American hegemony, musical pan-Americanism, and the erasure of difference.25 As Anderson 
                                                          
22 Cited in Petr Szczepanik, “On the Ethnography of Media Production: An Interview with Georgina Born,” 
Iluminace 25, no. 3 (2013): 108.  
23 Born, “Music and the Materialization of Identities,” 383-384; Mahiet, Ferraguto, and Ahrendt, “Introduction,” 
10.  
24 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 2006), 145.  
25 Carol A. Hess, Representing the Good Neighbor: Music, Difference, and the Pan American Dream (New York: 





argues, what should capture our attention as scholars is not the question of authenticity versus 
inauthenticity, but rather the forms that imagined communities take. This means shedding light 
on the boundaries, zones of exclusion, and normative discourses that accompany processes of 
collective identity formation, be they national or transnational. 
With respect to musically imagined communities, it is important to note that they, too, “can 
only function if they define their own margins.”26 Encounters with musical ‘others’ are never 
unproblematic in that generally asymmetrical power dynamics are always at play when Western 
music appropriates, sublimates, erases, or engages (in one way or another) its non-Western 
counterparts. On the question of this binary opposition and its impact on composition, Timothy 
D. Taylor insists:  
[P]olitical and geographical margins are peculiarly energetic sites where meanings are made, 
remade, altered, transformed, altered again. … It becomes clear that marginality – either as 
positionality or in representation – plays a pivotal role in forming and altering worldviews 
and thus, among other things, aesthetic processes.27  
Edward Said, in Culture and Imperialism, demonstrates through contrapuntal analysis that 
artistic works (both what they say and what they leave unsaid) are often windows into the 
overlapping histories of power and resistance to it.28 Borrowed from music theory, the concept of 
counterpoint invites listeners to pay attention to the ways in which apparently independent voices 
interweave along and through both space and time, like musical lines merging into a polyphonic 
whole. Born’s ‘four planes of social mediation’ makes it possible to isolate and amplify some of 
these voices to reveal what was at stake for all the parties concerned.          
The concert hall is typically the preferred site for the type of encounters that musical 
diplomacy seeks to provoke. Yet the symbolic importance and connotative meanings of a work 
performed on any specific night are not found exclusively in the immediate experience of the 
performance and its musical attributes. For one, the concert hall itself is a Western construction 
                                                          
26 Magdalena Waligorska, “Music and Imagined Communities. Articulations of the Self and the Other in the 
Musical Realm,” H-Net Reviews (February 2012): http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35409. 
27 Timothy D. Taylor, Beyond Exoticism: Western Music and the World (Durham: Duke University Press, 2007), 
70-71. 




that purports to discipline bodies into listening and viewing performances in specific ways.29 The 
affective and discursive components that precede and follow the concert are equally important in 
harnessing, to one’s advantage, the assumed friendly disposition of foreign audiences. The 
alignment of musical and extra-musical coordinates upon which musical diplomacy depends 
occurs at the nexus of information and communication technologies (the press, radio, and sound 
recordings, which help frame – and set expectations vis-à-vis – the performance). The sense of 
propinquity that music amplifies operates in ways analogous to those described by Anderson in 
his discussion of print capitalism’s circulation of discourse and image. Danielle Fosler-Lussier 
explains: 
Cultural diplomacy relies on a similar trick of mediation, providing people in many places 
with shared information and experience – but even as it reinforces linguistic and national 
borders by showing what is characteristic of a nation, it also crosses those borders by inviting 
broader participation. The form of globalization we see in cultural diplomacy is not primarily 
about mobility or even direct communication but about altering local contexts and changing 
the frame of reference in which people think about themselves and others.30  
This transformation arises in and around ‘mediated events,’ that is, events designed for 
maximum engagement and widespread diffusion through various media to solicit attention, 
inform, and influence the targeted audiences.31 They are the pivots around which much of 
musical diplomacy operates. That said, mediated events – irrespective of the planning, control, 
and surveillance involved – afford protagonists considerable agency. This particularity is what 
distinguishes musical diplomacy from propaganda and it is what makes it an effective vector for 
establishing connections among individuals, groups, organizations, and institutions. All parties 
concerned, including those who, at one time or another, find themselves on the receiving end of a 
particular initiative, have the prerogative to embrace, interpret, debate, or resist the messages and 
representations conveyed through music.  
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My dissertation approaches the musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community 
described above through sources that speak to all four planes of the assemblage. Audio 
recordings for the period under consideration are not abundant, but what is there is relevant 
nonetheless: for example, sound bites of Ondas Musicais, a Rádio Nacional show sponsored by 
the Canadian-owned Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light); a 
commercially available 78 rpm disc by Quatuor alouette; a CBC-IS transcription record of Villa-
Lobos’s 1952 concert at Montreal’s Plateau Hall; and Paul Anka’s televised performance during 
the 1968 edition of the Festival Internacional da Canção Popular [International Festival of 
Popular Song] (FICP). However, one does not listen to the past exclusively through sound 
objects. Equally important, if not more, is the larger context within which ‘musicking’ takes 
place, to use a term coined by Christopher Small.32 He explains: 
The essence of music lies not in musical works but in taking part in performance, in social 
action. Music is thus not so much a noun as a verb, ‘to music.’ To music is to take part in any 
capacity in a musical performance, and the meaning of musicking lies in the relationships 
that are established between the participants by the performance. Musicking is part of that 
iconic, gestural process of giving and receiving information about relationships which unites 
the living world, and it is in fact a ritual by means of which the participants not only learn 
about, but directly experience, their concepts of how they relate, and how they ought to 
relate, to other human beings and to the rest of the world.33 
Musicking is mediation and it leaves traces. As Barbara Lorenzkowski points out, listening to the 
past is an “exercise in eavesdropping”34 in the sense that it is about attentively examining the 
multiple sites where music is made, packaged, heard, and discussed.  
Although my dissertation examines musical diplomacy primarily from a Canadian 
perspective, it also recognizes the paramount importance of the bidirectional connections that 
Canadians and Brazilians established with each other through music. In addition to operating in 
three languages (French, English, and Portuguese), I travelled to the three Brazilian cities – Rio 
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de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília – that served as politico-cultural hubs during the 1940s, 
1950s, and 1960s. In all three places, I found a wealth of archival documents, which 
complemented – and provided a necessary counterpoint to – the materials I had already 
unearthed in Ottawa, Montreal, Toronto, Quebec City, and Halifax. A sample of the sources 
analyzed here include, among others: the tour diaries of MacMillan and Filiatrault (or the 
personal papers of their Brazilian counterparts Villa-Lobos and José Siqueira); CBC-IS 
transcripts, reports, programming schedules, and listeners’ letters (Rio de Janeiro’s Rádio 
Nacional performed a somewhat similar role in the Southern Hemisphere); concert 
advertisements and reviews in Canadian newspapers and magazines (notable Brazilian 
publications include Brasil Musical and O Jornal); DEA despatches, internal correspondence, 
and reports (the archives of Brazil’s Ministério das Relações Exteriores [Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs], the Itamaraty, are comparable in terms of scope). Overlooked by diplomatic historians, 
the above categories of sources provide multiple entry points into the assemblage upon which 
state and non-state actors constructed their musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community 
from the early 1940s to the late 1960s. 
Accordingly, each of my dissertation’s five chapters has as one of its focal points a 
mediated event that reveals the power dynamics at play in the practice of musical nation 
branding. Chapter 1 analyzes the Dansereau couple’s 1943 visit of Rio de Janeiro to show how 
the tropes of family and Latinity helped advance the project of a distinct, musically imagined 
Canadian-Brazilian community in response to the hegemonic ‘sameness-embracing’ that 
characterized the musical pan-Americanism championed by the United States. Chapter 2 further 
explores this affirmation of difference by following Quatuor alouette on its 1945 tour, which 
foregrounded narratives of colonial exceptionalism and placed French-speaking, Catholic 
Québec at the centre of Canada’s image in Brazil. In chapter 3, I examine the tension between 
the process of ‘othering’ and the appropriation of the discourse of métissage during the 1946 
joint cultural mission of Champagne and MacMillan, whose folk-infused ‘serious music’ 
straddled the fence between nationalism and universalism. Chapter 4 discusses Villa-Lobos’s 
1952 CBC-IS-sponsored performance in Montreal to highlight the limits of the metaphors and 
technologies deployed to project an engaging image of Canada that audiences, at both ends of the 
hemisphere, could agree on. Finally, chapter 5 focuses on Canadian participation in the first four 




that both transcended politico-cultural boundaries and pointed at alternate ways of imagining a 
Canadian-Brazilian community.  
Brazil and Québec in Canadian International History  
My dissertation engages with recent trends in Canadian international history by decentering the 
North Atlantic Triangle and investigating how Canada’s paradoxical postcoloniality shaped 
Canadians’ relations with the Global South. On the one hand, it seeks to destabilize the liberal 
nationalist and neo-continentalist views that have dominated the field of diplomatic history for 
most of the twentieth century. On the other hand, it aims to complicate whiggish colony-to-
nation narratives that emphasize Canada’s so-called exceptionalism (as a former Dominion 
turned helpful fixer and model international citizen) and focus exclusively on state responses to 
the economics and geopolitics of the country’s relations with both of its former imperial 
metropoles and the United States. The field’s preoccupation with continental and trans-Atlantic 
questions has contributed to a neglect of hemispheric affairs until recently.35 The publication of 
works of business history dealing with The Light did little to change that.36 The international 
activity of cosmopolitan capitalists was deemed too peripheral, even inconsequential, to 
Canada’s diplomatic history due to their status as non-state actors whose professional 
connections extended beyond the nation.37 Likewise, liberal nationalist and neo-continentalist 
paradigms informed the numerous works dealing with Ottawa’s ambivalence regarding the issue 
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of membership in the Pan-American Union (PAU) and the Organization of American States 
(OAS).38 More recently, Rosana Barbosa published a survey of Canadian-Brazilian relations in 
which she argues that the two countries’ “position as satellite economies” determined the nature 
of their interactions.39 To a great degree, her synthesis of the relationship between the two 
aspiring middle powers reproduces the motifs that characterize dominant narratives in Canadian 
diplomatic history although it also successfully brings to the fore a neglected history worth 
pursuing.       
My research approaches Canadian-Brazilian relations in ways that recognize the 
structuring weight of ‘race’ and empire in Canadian international history.40 Indeed, both 
continued to matter from the 1930s, when Canadians acquainted themselves with their newfound 
autonomy in foreign affairs, through the 1960s, when they substituted the Maple Leaf flag for the 
Red Ensign. Among others, Phillip Buckner shows how Britishness lingered on as a marker of 
identity in English Canada up to the Centennial decade while David Meren demonstrates that 
decolonization provided French Canadians with a framework with which to rethink their place 
within Confederation as well as their relations with France.41 In both cases, how these French- 
and English-speaking descendants of ‘white’ colonizers situated themselves – in relation to their 
former imperial metropoles – influenced their views on racialized ‘others’ within and beyond 
Canada’s borders. Numerous recent studies substantiate the argument that imperialist mindsets 
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and racialized constructs informed attitudes and perceptions in both the foreign policy apparatus 
and civil society throughout the twentieth century.42 “[R]ace has been a constant in Canada’s 
international relations, shaping policy, practice, identity, and alignment in both obvious and 
subtle ways,” write Laura Madokoro and Francine McKenzie. They add that understanding its 
impact “requires a comprehensive and critical exploration of empire as a structuring agent.”43 
This historiographical shift – in its effort to tackle head-on what John Price calls the “avoidance 
syndrome,” that is “[a] deep-seated reluctance … to openly identify racism in Canada as a 
problem, past or present” – is accompanied by a greater focus on non-state actors and a shifting 
of the gaze away from the North Atlantic Triangle and towards the Global South.44 It reexamines 
Canada’s multilayered histories by bringing into focus the extent to which they overlap, 
interconnect, and intertwine with those of non-Western societies.     
The integration of Québec within the framework of Canadian international history is 
another objective of this project. Magda Fahrni, Sean Mills, and Meren have each made the case 
for an “entangled history” that would “put Canada’s own fractured historiographies into dialogue 
with each other, allowing us to better understand the shared cultural and political space and 
asymmetrical relations between English and French Canada, as well as their entanglements with 
other societies around the world.”45 Mills’s A Place in the Sun and Maurice Demers’s Connected 
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Struggles constitute recent efforts to write this entangled history within the broader framework of 
hemispheric relations. Whereas the former places ‘race’ front and centre in his study of Haitian 
migrants and their contributions to political and cultural life in Québec, the latter abstains from 
racializing the concept of Latinity deployed by French-Canadian nationalists to disassociate 
themselves from English Canadians and establish wartime relations with Mexican Catholics. My 
dissertation engages with Demers’s discussion of Canada-Québec rivalries in the Global South, 
expanding it to factor in the notions of ‘race’ and empire.46 It also builds on Mills’s assertion that 
narratives produced by state and non-state actors in the context of transnational relations 
informed “cultural attitudes” in Canada and Québec regarding “non-Western peoples.”47 
The approach proposed here requires an examination of Canada’s paradoxical 
postcoloniality and the ways it shaped Canadians’ engagement with Brazil, another settler colony 
with its own convoluted history of ‘race’ relations. Postcolonialism, Stephen Howe explains 
humorously, is an “elastic” term used either as an “all-purpose label for the entire state of the 
contemporary world” or as a “tag for a few Professors of English literature, their books, and 
courses.”48 The term is most closely associated with the field of critical theory although 
historians have been using it, with a hyphen separating the word ‘colonialism’ from its prefix, to 
describe the reconfiguration of the world following the wave of decolonization that swept across 
European empires after the Second World War. Postcolonialism, without the hyphen, “deals with 
the effects of colonization on cultures and societies.”49 Its investigative scope therefore extends 
beyond the 1940s to attend to the experiences of diverse peoples (both colonizers and colonized) 
dispersed throughout the globe. The authors of The Empire Writes Back delimit the postcolonial 
to a period that begins with European colonialism and continues into the present.50 Sanjay Seth 
concurs when he writes that the prefix ‘post’ essentially “signifies the entire historical period 
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after the beginnings of colonialism.”51 This periodization follows from the observation that the 
transition from colonial rule to self-government was marked by continued subservience to (in 
other cases, resistance to or complicity with) hegemonic forces emanating from a consortium of 
former imperial powers.52 Hence Peter Childs and Patrick Williams’s assertion that 
postcolonialism as a “historical period is best understood as a phase of imperialism, in turn best 
understood as the globalizing of capitalism.”53  
But is Canada postcolonial? This is the question Laura Moss asks in her edited collection 
on Canadian literature.54 She answers affirmatively by noting that scholars must approach 
Canada as “both colonial subject and agent” if they wish to “highlight the distinctiveness and 
specificity of colonial legacies.”55 Robert J. C. Young, in Postcolonialism: An Historical 
Introduction, briefly mentions Canada in his discussion of settler colonialism. By emphasizing 
the country’s “[n]ationalist constitutional moves towards decolonization”56 and its “[a]ssertion of 
political rights to self-determination,”57 Young seeks to highlight power asymmetries between 
settler colonies and exploitation colonies such as India in their relations with the metropole.58 
Antony G. Hopkins, however, argues that Canada’s experience with decolonization continued 
well into the twentieth century until a series of “ceremonial exchanges,” such as the adoption of 
a new flag in 1964, brought about the “destruction of the core concept of Britishness.”59 Not only 
are historians studying more intensely than ever before Canada’s “participatory role in empire,” 
they are also bringing into focus the ways in which the experience of empire influenced how 
English Canadians understood themselves and their place in the world.60 Canada’s paradoxical 
postcoloniality, then, is partly a function of its Dominion status within the British Empire. It is 
also about French Canadians’ experience as settler colonists, as a people conquered by the 
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British, as one of Canada’s so-called ‘two founding races,’ and as nationalists with evolving 
views regarding Québec’s place within – or outside – Confederation. More importantly, it is 
about the two groups’ history of violence against (and resistance from) racialized ‘others,’ 
including indigenous peoples as well as individuals or groups connected to the African and Asian 
diasporas in Canada.     
As a settler colony that developed into a kingdom and then an empire, Brazil has a history 
that, like Canada, distinguishes it from other republics in the hemisphere. During three centuries 
(1500 to 1815), the architects of Colonial Brazil sought to subjugate the semi-nomadic 
indigenous peoples they encountered while exploiting the vast resources they discovered on the 
continent, namely brazilwood followed by sugar, gold, diamonds, and coffee. The colony’s 
fortunes were dependent on slave labour. By the middle of the nineteenth century, four million 
slaves had been brought to Brazil – a jarring number that surpassed that of the United States. 
Throughout much of the country’s history, predominantly ‘white’ governing authorities fought 
back numerous political challenges to impose their rule over a scattered free population made 
increasingly diverse through manumission, interracial marriage, and immigration from both 
Europe and Asia. The colonial venture held together initially with the arrival of King João VI 
who relocated to Rio de Janeiro following Napoléon Bonaparte’s invasion of Portugal in 1807. 
Returning to Europe in 1821, the monarch left behind his elder son Pedro to act as regent of the 
colony. The latter led Brazilians to their independence a year later by declaring himself Emperor 
Pedro I of Brazil. His son, Pedro II, eventually took over and headed the constitutional monarchy 
until he was deposed in 1889, a year after the abolition of slavery. The country’s passage from 
colony to nation was therefore a relatively peaceful one. Likewise, the transition from empire to 
republic occurred without bloodshed. Still, tensions continued to simmer among Brazil’s various 
ethnic groups and social classes (including between landed and urban elites) as the country – the 
fifth largest in the world – grappled with the shifting power dynamics that accompanied 
industrialization and urbanization.61  
The Brazilian political and cultural elite tackled these challenges with racial theories that 
were informed by its colonial past and its admiration of industrialized European powers. At the 
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turn of the twentieth century, proponents of scientific racism in Brazil continued to postulate that 
human beings could be categorized based on phenotypes and that Caucasians possessed superior 
qualities as evidenced by the size and scope of their imperial ventures. However, whereas their 
European and American counterparts opposed interracial mixing on the ground that such practice 
would contaminate the ‘white race,’ Brazilians advanced the idea that ‘white genes’ would 
prevail over those of ‘inferior races.’ The theory of ‘racial whitening’ constituted an effort to put 
Brazil, a country with an ethnically diverse population, on par with Europe and the United States. 
“Whitening,” Thomas E. Skidmore explains, rested on the assumption “that miscegenation did 
not inevitably produce ‘degenerates,’ but could forge a healthy mixed population growing 
steadily whiter, both culturally and physically.”62 By the 1930s, the rebuttal of scientific racism 
and Brazilians’ growing sense of nationhood led to the abandonment of the theory of ‘racial 
whitening.’ Instead, the country’s elite began promoting the idea that métissage preserved and 
enriched – rather than weeded out and sublimated – the traits and qualities of the population’s 
three key ethnic groups (indigenous peoples, Afro-Brazilians, and ‘white’ Brazilians). 
Brasilidade [Brazilianness], became a positive marker of differentiation. Yet a colour line, albeit 
a fluid one, continued to exist in Brazil with pardos (Brazilians of mixed ethnic origins) enjoying 
greater social and economic mobility than their Afro-Brazilian and indigenous counterparts.63 
Brazil branded itself nonetheless as a ‘racial democracy’ to promote internal cohesion and 
enhance its international image. Although the Canadians who travelled to Brazil, from the 1930s 
onward, interacted primarily with Brazilians who defined themselves as ‘white’ by virtue of their 
skin colour or their socioeconomic status, they still had to engage with their hosts’ discourse 
regarding métissage and Brasilidade.  
The belief that English Canadians’ Britishness and French Canadians’ Latinity constituted 
valid racialized group identities, as well as the claim that racism was largely non-existent in 
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Canada, provided a befitting framework with which to approach the making of a musically 
imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.64 In this context, the projection of Canada as the 
product of a harmonious compact between ‘two founding races’ allowed Désy and his fellow 
musical ambassadors to define ‘Canadianness,’ so to speak, as a form of métissage. Their 
musical nation branding thus put forward the idea that Brazil and Canada were exceptional in 
sharing the ideal of ‘racial democracy.’ This exceptionalism was reminiscent of colonial 
worldviews, notably with respect to its foregrounding of ‘whiteness’ and its silencing of 
Canada’s indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities. Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, in 
Drawing the Global Colour Line, write that ‘whiteness’ emerged at imperial crossroads “as a 
transnational form of racial identification.”65 It fostered an “imagined community of white men,” 
which helped sustain – both globally and domestically – the subjugating and excluding practices 
of settler societies, including Canada and Brazil.66 Warwick Anderson further explains: 
Whiteness functioned at sites of corporeal unease and conflict with others to consolidate and 
justify claims of privilege and possession. It was a manoeuvre along perceived borders that 
betrayed anxiety, even as it displayed pride or confidence or solidarity. Whiteness became 
linked intimately to estimates of civic status, intellectual achievement, and moral standards. 
A form of registration and communicability, it was additionally a measure of sovereignty and 
a proxy for self-government. In this sense, the category worked as a gate-keeping 
mechanism, as a means of assessing and surveying white and non-white populations.67 
That métissage served as a conduit for ‘whiteness’ in Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations is 
certainly paradoxical. As my dissertation shows, it is also indicative of how important metaphors 
were for Canadians in their national projection and national self-representation efforts.  
In addition to foregrounding racialized identities, the musical nation branding that is the 
focus of my dissertation was very much a gendered affair. Its protagonists were predominantly 
‘white’ men who operated in male-dominated, elite spaces where androcentric discourses and 
                                                          
64 On this topic, see José E. Igartua, The Other Quiet Revolution: National Identities in English Canada, 1945-71 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2008), 22-23; and Constance Backhouse, Colour-Coded: A Legal History of Racism in 
Canada, 1900-1950 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 5-14.  
65 Marilyn Lake and Henry Reynolds, Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the 
International Challenge of Racial Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 3. 
66 Ibid., 4.  
67 Warwick Anderson, “Traveling White,” in Re-Orienting Whiteness, eds. Leigh Boucher, Jane Carey, and 




practices prevailed. They were well-travelled individuals who channelled their cosmopolitan 
sensibility and emotive disposition through the disciplined execution (or informed appreciation) 
of musical works.68 They were husbands or crooners, some were fathers, whose task was to 
embody the nation so as to elicit feelings of friendship, family, and community. Although Désy, 
Filiatrault, MacMillan, and Anka, among others, embodied alternate forms of masculinity, they 
all performed the nation in ways that were coded male and that underpinned the normativity of 
‘whiteness.’ As such, they embraced what scholars have called ‘national manhood,’ that is the 
idea that one’s masculine identity is intrinsically linked to his national identity in the pursuit of 
political, economic, and cultural power.69 Yet the above musical ambassadors did not completely 
subsume themselves within the nation when thinking about their roles as men in the world. 
Indeed, they embraced other constructions of masculinity that had to be reconciled with both 
national manhood and the transnational racialized male identity referred to in the above 
paragraph.70 Like ‘race,’ gender is a social construct liable to change depending on time and 
place. It is a fluid marker of identity constantly performed, renegotiated, and contested. As a 
category of historical analysis, masculinity constitutes an additional tool for understanding how 
music works as a form of mediation in an assemblage such as the one deployed in the context of 
Canadian-Brazilian relations.     
The Cultural Turn in International History 
By focusing on the discursive and performative aspects of musical nation branding, my 
dissertation also explores what lies beyond the cultural turn in international history. Justin Hart 
defines cultural diplomacy as “the deliberate attempt to deploy cultural affairs in pursuit of 
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foreign policy objectives.”71 Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried contend, however, that 
international cultural relations are not always “subordinate to the foreign policy making 
process.”72 Regardless of how cultural resources are employed, they constitute a form of “soft 
power” that can help shape elite or mass public opinions in other countries to create, “through 
attraction rather than coercion,” a climate conducive to reciprocal understanding and productive 
exchanges.73 Frank A. Ninkovich and Emily S. Rosenberg pioneered the field in the early 1980s 
by shedding light on the strategies developed by philanthropists, private entrepreneurs, and state 
actors to export American culture in the defence of the national interest during the first half of 
the twentieth century.74 Writing in a post-Détente context, the two scholars provided the 
backstory to the state-centric propaganda campaigns conceived by Americans to stop 
communism in its tracks. From then on, the Cold War came to occupy a central place in the 
historiography as demonstrated by the abundance of works dealing with the importance of 
cultural productions (from abstract art to ballet and jazz, among others) in the ideological rivalry 
that pitted the United States against the Soviet Union.75 
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As general editor of a multivolume series titled Explorations in Culture and International 
History, Gienow-Hecht has been encouraging researchers to widen the geographical and 
temporal scope with which they approach cultural diplomacy. Her call for the 
“internationalization” of the field is concurrent with her effort to “decenter America” by 
deepening our understanding of how individuals or groups from – or sometimes representing – 
different nations perceived and engaged with one another.76 This has led to a growing corpus of 
transnational scholarship on cultural diplomacy.77 Among these are numerous studies dealing 
with the Brazilian experience in the context of regional geopolitics, including Brazilian-
American relations, Brazilian-French cultural exchanges, and the internationalism of 
organizations such as the International Committee on Intellectual Cooperation and the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).78 
Similarly, Canadian historians are also contributing to a realignment of the field although 
their focus is mainly on the Cold War and the United States. Cooper locates the origins of 
Canada’s cultural diplomacy in 1951 with the Royal Commission on National Development in 
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the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka the Massey Commission), noting that its recommendations 
regarding the projection of Canada abroad reflected, above all, a defensive posture vis-à-vis the 
pervasive influence of American cultural exports.79 “Culture as an expression of Canada’s own 
foreign policy remained an afterthought,” he argues.80 Recent studies on the curatorial dimension 
of cultural diplomacy and theatre complicate this state-centric approach and its chronology by 
attending to the complementary – and at times competing – agendas of state and non-state actors 
who had a stake in how Canada was displayed overseas: from the Europe-bound Canadian 
Eskimo Art exhibition to the Michael Snow showcase at New York’s 49th Parallel, among 
others.81 As Lynda Jessup and Sarah E.K. Smith point out, these exhibitions did “function as 
diplomatic envoys” even if they rested on “complicated partnerships” that often made it difficult 
for the stakeholders, including audiences, to assimilate the ideologies and meanings built into 
curatorial activities.82 Deciphering these modes of production and their reception is no less a 
challenge for historians interested in revisiting the multivalent sites of encounter where cultural 
exchanges took place. Graham Carr and Kayley Miller tackle this in their respective studies by 
bringing into focus the importance of public-private partnerships and the agency of non-state 
actors in pursuing foreign policy interests, both in the communist world and at home.83 In light of 
the importance accorded to the cultural Cold War in the historiography, the absence of scholarly 
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monographs dealing with the international mission of institutions like the CBC and the National 
Film Board of Canada (NFB) is glaring.84 My dissertation writes the CBC-IS into that story, 
shifting the focus beyond the Massey Commission and the Cold War, while also paying attention 
to the interplay between internationalism and nationalism within the context of a contested 
federalism.       
Approaching the past through its soundscapes is an effective means of accomplishing the 
above and answering Gienow-Hecht’s call for a redrawing of the boundaries within which one 
examines the importance of culture in international relations. In the last ten years, scholars of 
international history have turned to music in growing numbers. Gienow-Hecht set the tempo in 
2009 with her Sound Diplomacy, a study of German orchestral music in the United States 
between 1850 and 1920.85 In 2012, she followed Leonard Bernstein and the New York 
Philharmonic on their 1959 world tour “to challenge the dichotomy and hierarchy between a 
somehow ‘good’ soft (and subdued) diplomacy and ‘hard’ or ‘real’ politics on the other.”86 Her 
most recent edited collection of essays, Music and International History in the Twentieth 
Century, invites researchers “to consider music … as an instrument of hegemony and resistance; 
a reflection of identity and protest; a means of communication; a forum of encounter; but most of 
all, as a transporter for atmosphere, mood and emotion in the making of international affairs.”87 
Scholars from a variety of disciplines have followed suit with studies on genres ranging from 
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with the National Film Board of Canada, see Zoë Druick, Projecting Canada: Government Policy and Documentary 
Film at the National Film Board (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2014); and Gary Evans, 
In the National Interest: A Chronicle of the National Film Board of Canada from 1949 to 1989 (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1991).  
85 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, Sound Diplomacy: Music and Emotions in Transatlantic Relations, 1850-1920 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
86 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “The World is Ready to Listen: Symphony Orchestras and the Global Performance 
of America,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 19. 
87 Jessica C.E. Gienow-Hecht, “Sonic History or Why Music Matters in International History,” in Music and 





classical music to jazz and rock-and-roll.88 The winter 2009 issue of the Journal of Musicology 
and the January 2012 issue of Diplomatic History suggest that musicologists, 
ethnomusicologists, and historians alike are taking part in this acoustic turn.89 “Who can dispute 
the power of music,” asks Kathryn C. Statler while Peter J. Schmelz writes enthusiastically about 
the “dismantling of old conceptual barriers about music and its meanings—or rather old 
stereotypes about music’s lack of meaning and its disconnection from worldly concerns.”90 The 
consensus is that music matters as a form of soft power and that its mediating potential offers 
myriad channels with which to approach the practices of national projection and national self-
representation. 
Canadian-Brazilian Relations at the Turn of the 1940s 
Désy might have been confident in his ability to orchestrate a Canadian-Brazilian cultural 
rapprochement using music, but the reality was that the two countries were worlds apart – 
geographically, but also politically in the early 1940s. Brazil’s europhile elite had come to doubt 
the assumed superiority of liberal democracies after having witnessed the destruction brought 
about by the First World War and the collapse of Western economies caused by the Stock 
Market Crash of 1929. The industrializing cities of the Southeast were shaken by the crisis 
although not as much as the hinterland coffee exporting regions that saw international prices for 
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their product drop by fifty percent in the closing months of the decade. Getúlio Vargas rose to 
power in 1930 following a bloodless military coup, which ended the four-decade-old hegemony 
of the increasingly ailing landed oligarchies from the states of São Paulo and Minas Gerais. 
Three years sufficed to secure the support he needed to be legitimately elected on a populist and 
corporatist reform program. A native of Rio Grande do Sul, Vargas experimented with a 
centralizing model of governance to abate regional discontent and neutralize the various 
factionalisms that threatened the country’s political and economic stability. A failed communist-
sponsored coup to overthrow his presidency in 1935 allowed him to take his fascist-inspired 
national reconstruction experiment to its logical conclusion: Vargas assumed full dictatorial 
powers in 1937 with the establishment of the Estado Novo [New State].  
The new regime did away with the Congresso Nacional [National Congress] and political 
parties while setting forth a new constitution that centralized legislative and executive powers in 
Rio de Janeiro where Vargas governed with the support of the military and an expanding 
technocracy. His top-down pervasive corporatist paternalism earned him praises as the “father of 
the poor.”91 The metaphor of the family deployed in this way sought to instill in the populace a 
commitment to social harmony and the idea of moral responsibility. Vargas himself cultivated 
this impression, perfecting “the mannerisms and turns of phrases that contributed to his image of 
paternalistic competency.”92 Through propaganda and censorship, the regime depicted itself as 
the ultimate arbitrator and primary provider for Brazilians while deploying culture – both ‘high’ 
and ‘low’ art forms as well as the ever-popular soccer – to rally the population around the idea of 
Brasilidade.  
The Estado Novo’s cultural project was not so much about co-opting Brazilian artists and 
intellectuals as it was about channelling their “confidence in their ability to articulate their own 
vision of Brazil’s identity and future.”93 Vargas adroitly solicited the assistance of members of 
the country’s cultural and intellectual elite. As Darién J. Davis points out, they were apt 
candidates for the president’s own revolution and many accepted positions on various 
committees or in federal institutions and ministries due to their “unequivocal faith in Brazilian 
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nationhood coupled with a sense of duty.”94 In their capacity as cultural producers, policy 
makers, and administrators, they found a niche for themselves in the state apparatus while 
helping promote Brasilidade. Among them, Villa-Lobos who advocated for the democratization 
of music education as a means of promoting patriotism among the youths.95 The claim that an 
exemplary Brazilian ‘race’ was emerging through métissage served the dual purpose of 
advancing Vargas’s national project and projecting an engaging image of Brazil abroad, one that 
compared favourably with those of Nazi Germany and Jim-Crow-era United States.96 It did not 
matter that Brasilidade was a construct and that the regime’s paternalistic initiatives privileged 
urban ‘white’ middle-class Brazilians: the belief that a “Brazilian essence” existed was both 
reassuring and empowering in 1930s and 1940s Brazil.97     
The continuance of the Estado Novo depended on a pervasive propaganda machine that 
made extensive use of the modern mass media. Vargas first experimented with information 
control in the early 1930s with the Departamento Oficial de Publicidade [Official Department of 
Publicity] and its successor, the Departamento de Propaganda e Difusão Cultural [Department of 
Propaganda and Cultural Diffusion]. In 1934, Luiz Simões Lopes, Brazil’s representative at the 
Rome-based International Institute of Agriculture, travelled to Berlin where he experienced first-
hand the reach of Nazi propaganda. Fascinated by what he witnessed, he extended his stay with 
the intent of better understanding the mechanics behind the German government’s total control 
and systematic use of media and imagery. “The organization of the Ministry of Propaganda 
fascinates me so much that I allow myself to suggest that we create a miniature version of it in 
Brazil,” he wrote to Vargas.98 The advent of the Estado Novo removed all constraints to such a 
project. Created on December 27, 1939, the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda 
[Department of Press and Propaganda] (DIP) became one of the cornerstones of the dictatorship. 
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Its founding director, Lourival Fontes, oversaw its various divisions – information, radio, theatre 
and cinema, press, and tourism – with the mandate of shaping public opinion regarding the 
“regime’s doctrinal guidelines, in defence of culture, spiritual unity, and Brazilian civilization.”99  
Vargas’s outright control of the press (sixty percent of newspaper articles were reportedly 
DIP circulars at the turn of the 1940s) was only surpassed by his astute use of radio.100 The 
Ministério do Trabalho [Ministry of Work] and the Ministério da Educação e Saúde [Ministry of 
Education and Health] (MES) each had their own stations (Rádio Mauá and Rádio MES) while 
the DIP handled A Hora do Brasil, a mandatory daily national broadcast that combined carefully 
scripted cultural programming with speeches from – and news regarding – the presidency. The 
1940 takeover of Rádio Nacional, Brazil’s highly popular and most powerful station, completed 
the dictatorship’s incursion into broadcasting, a move that “offered the hope of linking far-flung 
territories into a single network of instantaneous communication, and of bridging the gaps of 
culture and class that divided Brazilians.”101  
Brazil’s proclivities to fascism were inevitably worrisome when looked at from the 
perspective of Great Britain or the United States. This was especially true of the British who had 
kept a firm grip on the Brazilian economy up to the First World War, at which point the empire 
began to decline while the Americans and Germans stepped up their efforts to pull the South 
American giant into their respective spheres of interest. Brazil initially adopted a policy of 
pragmatic equilibrium in its dealings with the three major powers, trying to preserve ‘autonomia 
na dependência’ [autonomy in dependency], but Vargas’s ascent to power marked the beginning 
of an intuitive and aggressive pursuit of national interest objectives: among others, a more evenly 
distributed economic growth through industrialization and modernization, national unity, 
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the accumulation of international goodwill so as to 
consolidate Brazil’s status as both a regional power and an important player on the international 
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stage.102 The country’s vast resources (coffee, cotton, cacao, but also iron ore, rubber, and 
quartz), not to mention its eight thousand-kilometre coastline, made it an increasingly valued 
partner as war clouds began to hover once again on the horizon. Vargas understood that his 
national reconstruction project was intrinsically tied to his foreign policy and so his ‘políticas de 
barganhas’ [bargaining policies] consisted of extracting the greatest possible benefits from the 
growing ideological rivalry in Latin America between the United States and Germany.103              
The latter was somewhat advantaged since Brazil was home to growing colonies of 
German immigrants, most of them settling in the urbanized South where their economic and 
cultural impact was felt most strongly. The two countries were tied to each other through an 
uncommon agreement whereby goods were exchanged using a special currency that could only 
be redeemed through bilateral trade. The agreement worked well for Brazilians who traded 
agricultural and mineral resources for industrial goods and arms without having to empty their 
already depleted foreign exchange and gold reserves.104 By 1938, German exports to Brazil had 
surpassed those of the United States. Brazilians, especially military officers, many of whom had 
received training in Germany, were amazed by the rate at which the Nazi economy was growing. 
Pro-German sentiments thus ran deep in some circles of Brazilian society. To those who 
perceived American economic and cultural penetration of Latin America as a form of 
imperialism, German fascism represented an appealing “alternative paradigm,” contends Antonio 
Pedro Tota.105          
The other paradigm was, of course, Americanization. The State Department had been hard 
at work trying to assert the hegemony of liberal developmentalism over other ideologies in Latin 
America. According to Rosenberg, this approach had five dimensions, namely the: 
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(1) belief that other nations could and should replicate America’s own developmental 
experience; (2) faith in private free enterprise; (3) support for free or open access for trade 
and investment; (4) promotion of free flow of information and culture; and (5) growing 
acceptance of governmental activity to protect free enterprise and to stimulate and regulate 
American participation in international economic and cultural exchange.106 
Conscious of the fact that the use of economic sanctions and military intervention to defend 
economic interests was detrimental to the United States’ image, President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt announced in 1933 that his administration would adopt a ‘Good Neighbor’ policy vis-
à-vis the Southern Hemisphere.107 In other words, rather than intervening in the domestic affairs 
of other countries, the United States would nurture friendly relations to promote bilateral 
exchanges. Because of its geopolitical importance, Brazil found itself the target of a cultural 
offensive meant to steer the country into the orbit of liberal developmentalism. Visiting Rio de 
Janeiro in 1936, Roosevelt praised Vargas for his industrialization program, even crediting him 
as one of the inventors of the New Deal.108 Brazil’s economic arrangement with Germany and its 
slide towards dictatorship were causes for concern, but the State Department – not wanting to 
encourage a further Brazilian-German rapprochement – kept a friendly disposition while Vargas 
continued to champion his ‘políticas de barganhas’ to advance his country’s national interests.              
Brazilians, however, could not afford to disregard their bilateral relations with the 
Americans considering the latter’s overshadowing presence throughout the hemisphere. The 
prospect of another war in Europe made that all the more apparent. The 1934 nomination of 
Aranha as Brazilian ambassador to the United States was indicative of the two countries’ 
proximity. A loyal friend, confidant, and associate of Vargas, he was an earnest advocate for 
closer relations with the Roosevelt administration although he also kept a critical eye on its 
policies vis-à-vis Latin America.109 The outbreak of war in 1939 did not initially impair Vargas’s 
ability to pursue his ‘políticas de barganhas’ since the State Department understood how critical 
it was to secure Brazilians’ support in the event that the hemisphere needed to be defended. In 
1940, Brazil finally obtained arms and financial support from the United States in exchange for 
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raw materials and access to both naval and air bases. The two countries also laid plans for the 
financing and construction of the government-owned Volta Redonda steel mill. Brazil then 
obtained more than $350 million in Lend-Lease aid while signing into a Joint Brazil–US Defense 
Commission. However, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the subsequent entry of the 
Americans into the conflict forced Brazilians to abandon their neutral stance. In the summer of 
1942, Brazil declared war against Germany. With its ties to Europe cut-off, the South American 
giant now found itself dependent on the North American hegemon.110       
By 1940, Brazil urgently needed another partner that could help it fulfill its domestic and 
international aspirations while offsetting the United States’ preponderant power in the 
hemisphere. Now was the time to strive more aggressively towards developing a meaningful 
relationship with Canada. The first significant breakthrough between the two countries had 
occurred in 1931 when a trade mission visited Brazil and successfully advocated for closer 
economic relations. Signed on December 4 of that year, the Exchange of Notes Regarding 
Commercial Relations Between Canada and Brazil had minimal impact since it maintained 
preferential treatment for the British Commonwealth. Aranha was quick to denounce the 
agreement as an “idiotic treaty.”111 From his position in Washington, the Brazilian diplomat 
followed Canadian politics closely with the hope that opportunities to correct the imbalance – 
and to diversify Brazil’s hemispheric trade – would arise. The return to power of William Lyon 
Mackenzie King’s Liberals was one such opportunity. In a letter to Vargas, Aranha expressed 
satisfaction at the defeat of Richard B. Bennett’s pro-Empire Conservatives, encouraging 
Brazil’s president to take advantage of the new Canadian government’s disposition towards 
liberalized trade.112 The resulting 1937 exchange of notes, by removing trade restrictions on 
goods circulating between the two countries, was a step in the right direction although both 
Brazilian and Canadian businesses were slow to reorient the flow of their activities, especially 
since no direct merchant route linked the two groups who were still reeling from the Crash of 
1929. Trade actually declined throughout the 1930s until the war disrupted both Canada’s and 
Brazil’s economic ties to Europe, at which point Brazilian exports to Canada increased by 
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ninefold.113 Seizing the moment, Vargas welcomed Minister of Trade and Commerce James 
MacKinnon whose 1941 trade mission resulted in the signing of a new trade agreement that 
extended “unconditional and unrestricted most-favoured-nation treatment” to Brazil.114  
Vargas and the Itamaraty complemented their trade policy with concerted efforts to engage 
their Canadian counterparts on the topic of diplomatic representation. In 1937, Lester S. Glass, 
Canadian trade commissioner in Rio de Janeiro, reported to Leolyn Dana Wilgress (known as 
Dana Wilgress), his superior in the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC), that he had 
twice been approached to inform his government that Brazil wished to exchange ministers. His 
latest encounter with Silvio Rangel de Castro, an ascending member of the Itamaraty, had left 
him perplexed, noting that he had not realized that “the question was so important to Brazil” and 
that his interlocutor “would accept no refusal.”115 “Personally, I am at a loss to know what steps 
to take, because actually it is none of my business,” he added.116 Wilgress forwarded the letter to 
Oscar Douglas Skelton (commonly referred to as O.D. Skelton), under-secretary of state for 
External Affairs. He immediately informed King, but no follow-up ensued.117 Aranha, who had 
returned from the United States to become minister of Foreign Affairs, then reached out to the 
British ambassador in Rio de Janeiro.118 When this did not work, the Itamaraty went through its 
ambassador in London to convince Vincent Massey, high commissioner for Canada in Great 
Britain, to bring up the issue with his superiors in the DEA. The message conveyed was that 
“Brazil is most desirous of establishing diplomatic relations with Canada, and hope[s] that such a 
proposal made by a leading South American country would commend itself to the Canadian 
government.”119 Aranha even contacted Kenneth H. McCrimmon, head of The Light’s legal 
department, to deliver a message to the Canadian government: 
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Pan America in general did not recognize the importance of Canada’s continental position 
either politically or economically and … a more intimate association of Canada in Latin 
American affairs would be of political value not only to Canada itself but to the United 
States in its endeavour to hold the South American countries more or less in line with 
democratic institutions.120  
Aside from the irony of a dictatorship claiming to have liberal democracy at heart, it is revealing 
that Aranha thought it pertinent to reassure Canadians that the Americans would welcome their 
growing involvement in Latin America as model international citizens.  
Canada, it is true, was a newcomer in international affairs and its place in the North 
Atlantic Triangle presented both constraints and possibilities. Established in 1909, the DEA had 
yet to blossom into a full-fledged agency in the early 1920s. At its head was Joseph Pope, a 
competent public servant whose imperialist leanings prevented the articulation of a coherent 
forward-thinking vision for Canada’s external affairs. “Tory to the core and convinced that 
Canada’s national interests were best served within the comforting embrace of the British 
Empire, Sir Joseph Pope … had only modest ambitions for his new ministry,” explain Greg 
Donaghy and Michael K. Carroll.121 The Liberals’ return to power in 1921 signalled a new 
departure since King understood the importance of managing the interplay between domestic 
policies and foreign affairs, particularly with respect to core issues such as economic 
development and national unity. Skelton, a Queen’s University scholar with a PhD from 
University of Chicago, was brought in to inject life into the DEA. “More subtle and more 
resolute than an Anglophobe or an ideologue, Skelton … posited a new way of calculating and a 
new direction for Canadian foreign policy based on the logic of Canada’s material and political 
self-interests,” explains Barry Ferguson.122 Skelton assumed the title of under-secretary of state 
for External Affairs in 1925. One of his primary goals was to expand the DEA’s personnel 
through a thorough recruitment process that did away with patronage in favour of a merit-based 
system. Potential recruits had to demonstrate aptitudes in history, political economy, and/or 
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international law. Skelton hired forty-three men (twelve of them francophones) between 1926 
and 1941. They were “young officers that resembled him – academically trained, versatile 
professional men … who could write fluently and reason critically; and rock hard nationalists 
who were skeptical of hegemonic outreach, whether it emanated from London or Washington,” 
contends Norman Hillmer.123  
The expansion of the DEA’s diplomatic corps was part of the effort to develop Canada’s 
international identity through overseas posts. By the end of the 1920s, the country had legations 
in Washington, Paris, and Tokyo, but more were needed to project and consolidate nationhood 
vis-à-vis Great Britain and the United States. Establishing a distinct Canadian presence in Latin 
America could help advance this project in light of the fact that one could hardly expect the 
British to prioritize Canada when its interests conflicted with those of the metropole. Already in 
1930, Skelton made the case for establishing legations in other countries, including Brazil, to 
make Canada’s voice heard on the international stage.124 He had been to Rio de Janeiro in 1922 
at the request of King who thought it advisable to send a Canadian representative to the 
International Congress of the History of America, which took place while Brazilians celebrated 
the centenary of their independence. Skelton had been struck by the similarities – in both 
economic potential and political evolution – between Canada and Brazil, noting that this “great 
southern counterpart” could teach “the exploitative ‘white man’ to the north” a thing or two 
about “racial tolerance.”125 Having witnessed the British and Americans at work in Brazil, he had 
also gained a further appreciation of the “practical advantages that would flow from Canada’s 
control of its own international existence.”126  
Hopeful that the worst of the depression had passed, Skelton tried again – unsuccessfully – 
to secure support for new overseas posts in 1937. The opening of a joint legation for Belgium 
and the Netherlands the following year proved encouraging. In his 1939-40 budget, Skelton 
allocated funds for diplomatic representation in both Argentina and Brazil with the rationale that 
                                                          
123 Norman Hillmer, “O.D. Skelton: Innovating for Independence,” in Architects and Innovators: Building the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1909-2009, eds. Greg Donaghy and Kim Richard Nossal 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009), 65.  
124 Norman Hillmer, O.D. Skelton: A Portrait of Canadian Ambition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015), 
189. 





the establishment of legations in Catholic and francophile Latin American countries would 
counterbalance the high commissioner posts planned for Commonwealth nations. The project 
most certainly flowed from concerns regarding national unity, especially since anti-imperial 
sentiments in Québec were driving French-Canadian intellectuals to initiate dialogue with fellow 
Catholics in the hemisphere.127 Developments in war-torn Europe finally motivated King to 
accede to the DEA’s recommendations in light of “problems of markets for Canadian products, 
Pan-American developments in the economic and political spheres, and the added emphasis 
which both Great Britain and the United States were according to South American countries.”128 
Skelton now had to find a suitable diplomat able and willing to relocate to Rio de Janeiro. Désy, 
as we will see, was an apt candidate for the post.  
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 
This short history of Canada’s rapprochement with Brazil up to the turn of the 1940s has been 
told here to set the stage for the case studies that follow; not to call attention to the paramountcy 
of the relationship between the two countries. If the broader context of international events 
appears as a backdrop to the actions of individuals on the ground, it is because it rarely – if ever 
– markedly dictated the choices that state and non-state actors made when taking part in the act 
of musical nation branding in Brazil. Removed as it was from the Pacific and European theatres 
of war, the country was never a pressing matter for the DEA who, as we will see, also displayed 
a lukewarm interest for cultural matters. The same was true during the Cold War. The resulting 
hands-off approach to cultural relations with the South American giant thus afforded protagonists 
abundant opportunities to experiment and perform their multifaceted individual and social 
identities. As such, this dissertation is less concerned with the effectiveness of musical 
diplomacy than it is with the dynamic, relational messiness of musical nation branding. The two 
neglected histories explored here – that of Canadian-Brazilian relations and that of music’s role 
in Canadian international history – help bring into focus the many ways in which ‘race’ and 
empire, but also religion and gender, shaped how Canadians have understood themselves and 
their relationship to the rest of the world from the early 1940s to the late 1960s. 
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CHAPTER 1: CULTURAL CROSSROADS 
 
The Dominion of Canada demonstrated a rare genius when it sent to Brazil a new kind of 
ambassador – Dr. Jean Désy.1 
– Mary Newton, Brazilian American, 1945 
 
Jean Désy arrived in Brazil on September 10, 1941, in “glorious weather, with sunshine and clear 
skies,” accompanied by his wife, Corinne de Boucherville, and two children, Mariel and Jean 
Louis, both of whom waved tiny Brazilian flags, much to the delight of journalists who had 
assembled at the docks to meet Canada’s first minister plenipotentiary to Brazil.2 The British 
ambassador Sir Geoffrey Knox and Lester S. Glass, Canadian trade commissioner in Rio de 
Janeiro, joined representatives from Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The 
Light) in welcoming Désy and his family, accompanying them to the luxurious seashore 
Copacabana Palace Hotel where temporary offices had been set up until proper accommodations 
could be found.3 The Brazilian press took note of the Canadian envoy’s impressive pedigree: a 
Doctor of Law and university professor turned diplomat with considerable overseas experience 
as well as intimate connections to elite cultural and social circles in Canada. Confident in 
Brazil’s standing on the international stage, journalists reported that Désy’s appointment was 
either an indication of his stature at home or a testament to the two countries’ deepening 
friendship.4 Désy was immediately flattered. “[T]here is every evidence of pleasure at the 
opening of diplomatic relations, and a manifest esteem for Canada and high expectation of 
further bonds, cultural and economic, between Brazil and the Dominion,” he wrote to Prime 
Minister – and then Secretary of State for External Affairs – William Lyon Mackenzie King.5 
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This was expected, of course, as Brazilians had been pushing tenaciously for reciprocal 
diplomatic exchanges.             
Désy’s assessment of Brazilians’ friendly disposition was validated on his first interview 
with President Getúlio Vargas on September 30. He had waited almost three weeks to present his 
credentials, in part, because the military band – the Banda do Batalhão de Guardas – needed 
more time to orchestrate and master the Canadian national anthem. Vargas spoke to him “using 
French with great accuracy,” noting that Canada’s “heterogeneous national components” 
somewhat resembled Brazil’s own ethnic makeup.6 “We are going to do something new together: 
something outside of the usual practice,” the president told Désy.7 The latter listened attentively, 
perplexed by this cryptic message, which he hypothesized meant that his interlocutor envisioned 
Canada taking a creative path distinct from those championed by the United States and Great 
Britain. “Both of these latter Powers had created a certain degree of irritation in Brazil; whereas 
Canada came with clean hands and a pure heart,” Désy remarked the following day in a dispatch 
to the Department of External Affairs (DEA).8 The French-Canadian diplomat was well suited to 
bring this Canadian-Brazilian rapprochement to fruition, driven, as he was, to reinvent himself as 
(1) a new kind of pioneer for the Canadian diplomatic corps and (2) an eminent cosmopolitan 
ambassador of the Canadian cultural elite.  
In both roles, Désy pursued an autonomist course that placed French Canada centre stage 
in the projection of the country’s image abroad. Whereas Canadian business interests on the 
ground had foregrounded Britishness as a marker of their identity, Désy emphasized Latinity as a 
distinguishing attribute that both Canada and Brazil shared. This differentiation made it possible 
to think outside the homogenizing frame of pan-Americanism that the United States was 
promoting through its Good Neighbor policy. More importantly, it did so without destabilizing 
‘whiteness.’ Désy engaged Brazil’s political and cultural elite with the proposition that closer 
Canadian-Brazilian relations could be, if not embodied, at least experienced in ways that 
conjured up feelings of fraternity and family. By inviting his pianist friend Jean Dansereau and 
his wife to perform in Rio de Janeiro, Désy set in motion a musical diplomacy that reflected both 
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his astute reading of Brazil’s politico-cultural landscape and his willingness to take advantage of 
the opportunities afforded by Vargas’s cultural infrastructure. This musical nation branding 
straddled the fence between tradition and modernity as well as between difference and sameness. 
It demonstrated the extent to which Canada’s international image was malleable in the hands of 
individual actors eager to conflate personal and national identities. This chapter begins with a 
discussion of the larger context within which Désy and the Dansereau couple sketched out their 
musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community:  it examines the emergence of musical pan-
Americanism and then traces the development of musical nationalism in Brazil. Next, it shows 
how Britishness and Latinity shaped perceptions of Canada in Brazil in the early 1940s. The 
chapter’s final part provides a detailed analysis of the Dansereau couple’s cultural mission in Rio 
de Janeiro.     
Musical Pan-Americanism and ‘Sameness Embracing’ 
Lasting for the greater part of the 1930s and 1940s, the Good Neighbor era was a period during 
which the United States wished to break with its practice of intervening – or interfering – in the 
affairs of Latin America.9 President Franklin Delano Roosevelt first articulated the policy in his 
1933 inaugural address to reassure its southern neighbours that he desired to build bridges 
through trust and understanding, not coercion, and that commercial and cultural exchanges 
would henceforth take place in true friendship, such as the one shared by the two nations located 
alongside the 49th parallel: “The noblest monument to peace and to neighborly economic and 
social friendship in all the world is not a monument in bronze or stone, but the boundary which 
unites the United States and Canada.”10 The rise of fascism and the threat of communism 
rendered more urgent the cultural outreach of the Good Neighbor policy. In 1938, the Roosevelt 
administration created the Division of Cultural Relations in the State Department with the hope 
of promoting both hemispheric stability and goodwill through artistic exchanges. Two years 
later, it established the Office of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Affairs – renamed 
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Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) in 1941 – with businessman and 
philanthropist Nelson Rockefeller at its head.  
Music was one of the preferred instruments in the deployment of the Good Neighbor 
policy. Departmental Order 768, to which the Division of Cultural Relations owed its existence, 
considered musical diplomacy to be a potentially potent means of advancing American interests 
through peaceful means.11 A Music Sub-Committee was thus created within the State 
Department to provide policy recommendations. In 1939, the United States hosted the first Inter-
American Music Conference to foster dialogue among musicians, producers, and agencies while 
also accumulating knowledge about cultural networks and infrastructure in Latin America. 
Rockefeller’s OCIAA had its own Cultural Relations Division. Operating independently from the 
State Department, its Music Committee offered both advisory and operational expertise.12 As a 
component of an innovative propaganda machine, it had as its mandate to improve the United 
States’ image to facilitate acceptance of – and support for – the country’s goals in the Southern 
Hemisphere. It sought to achieve this by using music to “bolster American cultural prestige” and 
create opportunities for people-to-people interactions, most notably within elite milieux where 
decision makers and people of influence congregated.13 Hence the Music Committee’s 
preference for exporting educational and artistic projects that championed ‘serious music.’14 
These initiatives aimed to help the United States exert authority in that its state agents, in 
conjunction with their non-state associates, positioned themselves as cultural producers and 
critics as well as patrons and officiators.15 Increasingly, this Good Neighbor cultural outreach 
took the form of a “cultural offensive.”16 As Nicholas J. Cull explains, Rockefeller championed a 
“heavily ideological and emphatically one-way approach to information work” that occasionally 
made foreign audiences uneasy.17 According to Darlene J. Sadlier, it was a seduction enterprise 
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that evolved from “economic and psychological defence” to “economic and psychological 
warfare.”18 
But what made ‘serious music’ such an appealing instrument of diplomacy? Jessica C.E. 
Gienow-Hecht explains that its antimodernist undertones initially appealed to those who 
gravitated around elite circles in turn of the century United States. “Classical music, many 
believed, had the potential to represent a ‘language of emotions,’ and thus form a powerful 
counterweight to rationalism, industrialization, and international wars,” she writes.19 The shared 
emotions that music was thought to convey suggested that those who partook in musicking made 
connections and discovered affinities with each other. As a language, it seemed to require no 
translation. It was therefore portable and could serve as a symbol of cosmopolitanism and 
universalism. This was particularly convenient for Americans who initially lacked a noteworthy 
repertoire of homegrown works to pull from.20  
The mastery of ‘high’ art forms signified a country’s maturity, which was a quality 
expected of those in leadership positions. By the 1940s, the United States branded itself as “the 
global center of music, highbrow included.”21 It did so in part by placing emphasis on 
performance rather than repertory. In other words, it dominated the stage by mastering canons 
and setting standards for how they were to be performed. More importantly, it shaped audience 
tastes through investments in musical education, the expansion of orchestras, the development of 
sound reproduction technologies, and the construction of concert halls. Performance thus served 
as a means of displaying resources, expertise, leadership, and authority with the stage offering a 
mise en scène of the nation and its relationship to the rest of the world: the leader conducted, the 
orchestra performed, and the audience listened.22 Gienow-Hecht further explains:  
The prolonged conservation of the nineteenth-century canon, the simultaneous expansion of 
the symphony scene, and the increasing cult of the performer during the interwar period 
dampened artistic visions of cultural internationalism. It also gave a decisive native twist to 
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the production and dissemination of symphony music in the United States: works and artists 
might be international, but the setting, the sponsorship, and the culture of performance was 
not. As such, symphony concerts became increasingly American affairs, celebrating the stage 
and its actors more so than the works performed. Rather than highlighting the United States’ 
openness to outside imports, symphony orchestras were now supposed to export a specific 
segment of U.S. culture – highbrow performance – unknown to foreign audiences. Instead of 
reflecting the internationalism of the U.S. culture, they reflected U.S. ambitions to score 
points in the international arena by highlighting American cosmopolitanism and, hence, its 
qualification for world leadership.  
This “trial of cultural strength,” to borrow David Caute’s expression, was also one of 
economic strength.23           
During the early- and mid-1940s, the State Department’s and the OCIAA’s cultural 
offensives were less about fighting communism than they were about advancing American 
interests in Latin America. Up to the end of the war, this also meant encouraging countries to 
remain neutral or, once the United States entered the conflict, to take position on the side of the 
Allies. Musical pan-Americanism provided the framework within which state and non-state 
actors discussed culture as well as its intersection with politics and economics. The discourse and 
practice of ‘sameness-embracing’ put forward through American-sponsored initiatives promoted 
the idea that the hemisphere’s republics shared a common ‘high’ art language – and thus, a 
common political culture and set of values – despite variations in their national musical cultures. 
As a form of soft power, musical diplomacy helped promote liberal developmentalism by 
resisting nationalisms in the cultural sphere and purporting to erase differences among American 
nations. In other words, it advanced the idea that music’s ostensibly universal qualities, 
particularly ‘serious music’ as opposed to folk music and popular music, could help the nations 
of the hemisphere feel as if they belonged to the same musically imagined community.24  
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The establishment of a musically imagined pan-American community rested in part on the 
use of metaphors. One of them was sublimation. Carol A. Hess explains that it provided a means 
for music critics to address the presence – and attenuate the potency – of nationalist undertones 
in musical works. She writes: 
Borrowed from chemistry, this term denotes change … or purification …, as explained in 
two roughly contemporaneous texts, one in chemistry and one in the burgeoning field of 
psychoanalysis. Such evocative explanations extended handily to the presumably ‘base 
qualities’ of musical nationalism and a host of related discourses. … Although subtle hints of 
difference might surface, the unitary framework of the Western Hemisphere would prevail, 
in accordance with Pan Americanist ideology. Thus, in embracing sameness through 
sublimation, critics endowed the time-tested discourse of cosmopolitan universalism with a 
variety of New World tropes, often with Europe lurking in the background.25   
Yet the fact that non-state actors (critics, but also composers and promoters), north and south of 
the Rio Grande, participated in ‘sameness-embracing’ does not mean that sublimation was a 
benign process. As Gienow-Hecht points out, musical universalism had become closely 
associated with ‘high’ culture in the United States by the 1940s.26  It thus tended to strengthen 
American hegemony.27  
Brazil’s Difference 
Brazilians were not novices when came the time to modulate the tension between nationalism 
and universalism in music. Throughout much of the nineteenth century, Carioca elites immersed 
themselves in the ‘high’ culture of Europe to define themselves outside the core-periphery 
binary. This process acquired its initial momentum in 1807 when Napoléon Bonaparte’s troops 
forced King João VI of Portugal to temporarily relocate to Brazil. The monarch’s presence in Rio 
de Janeiro transformed the colony’s sense of place vis-à-vis Europe. Through marriage, João 
VI’s son (Pedro) and grandson (Pedro II) maintained ties with Europe’s cultural centres – most 
notably Germany, Italy, and France. Increasingly, Carioca elites turned to classical and operatic 
music to elevate Brazilian society and place it on the path of progress. Cristina Magaldi explains:    
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By attending an opera or a concert in which European music prevailed, or by composing or 
performing homemade European-style music, Rio de Janeiro residents could share with those 
in European centres ... the ownership of something that for them represented “civilization” 
and “modernity.” At the same time, by immersing themselves in the music arriving from 
Europe, Cariocas avoided the general feeling of being left out on the periphery, and shunned 
the prospect of “not being” European. In sum, European music served some Cariocas well in 
their attempt to disguise the sharp, local distinctions between “here” and “there.”28 
More than a “culture of imitation,” the musical life of imperial Rio de Janeiro denoted an effort 
to reimagine Imperial Brazil as a centre of culture in its own right rather than a settler colony 
with no artistic voice of its own.29 
Brazil’s most accomplished composer at the time was Antônio Carlos Gomes. Born in 
1836 in the town of Campinas, in the state of São Paulo, the aspiring artist moved to Rio de 
Janeiro in his early twenties. In the imperial capital, he discovered the great works of French and 
Italian composers. He participated in efforts to enrich the city’s cultural life by juxtaposing 
European operatic music with Portuguese-language librettos dealing with Brazilian subjects. 
Adept at mixing musical and spoken languages, he achieved consecration with the premiere of 
“Il Guarany” in Milan, Italy, on 19 March 1870. Based on a Brazilian novel, the opera employs 
the Italian language to tell the story of an interracial relationship between the daughter of a 
Portuguese colonist and an indigenous man from Brazil’s interior. Through “Il Guarany,” Gomes 
negotiated the tension between the ‘here’ and ‘there’ that preoccupied Carioca elites. In evoking 
interracial intimacies in positive, romantic terms, within the framework of European ‘high’ 
culture, he helped Brazilians situate themselves vis-à-vis their European counterparts. Supported 
by Pedro II, the composer gained international recognition during the ‘golden age’ of opera. He 
thus served as a sort of “music ambassador” for the Empire of Brazil in the late nineteenth 
century.30 Although not a nationalistic work per se, “Il Guarany” reflected “Brazil’s early 
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attempt to define itself as a nation, exactly by aligning its culture with that of Europe,” writes 
Magaldi.31 
The passage from empire to republic did not dramatically alter the cultural preferences of 
Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo’s growing europhile bourgeoisie. It continued to look towards 
France and Germany even though a landed oligarchy, whose fortunes were based on dairy 
farming and coffee, now governed Brazil. The country’s urban elites, their numbers swelling 
with the expansion of the merchant and rentier class, continued the tradition of salons that had 
become a hallmark of Pedro II’s reign. Originating from Italy, these cultural events were integral 
part of the Parisian soundscape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They were now part 
of Brazil’s ‘tropical belle époque.’32 Brazilians first embraced salons as opportunities to affirm 
their elite status. In the early years of the republic, these gatherings served as emerging centres of 
power as hosts and guests exchanged ideas on how to best steer their country on the path of 
modernity and growth. ‘Serious music’ continued to be a marker of intellectual sophistication 
and of a liberal mindset – key attributes in the eyes of those who saw themselves destined to lead 
their country into the twentieth century. Salons were “cultural oases” where patrons and artists 
met.33 They were the informal stages where people of influence articulated their vision of Brazil 
as a nation on par with the rest of the civilized world. By constituting themselves as a high 
society, urban elites “adopted practices in their homes that identified them not just with 
aristocratic status, but, ipso facto, with Europe,” explains Jeffrey D. Needell. It was a process of 
national self-definition characterized by “metropolitan identification within a neo-colonial 
context.”34  
The ‘in-betweenness’ of salons, the place they occupied between the ‘here’ and ‘there,’ 
represented a source of inspiration for artists eager to exert their agency by creating original, 
hybrid works that evoked Brazil’s multilayered histories and modernist inclinations. It was there 
that many of those who organized and participated in the 1922 São Paulo Semana de Arte 
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Moderna first witnessed the potency and limitations of transplanted European art forms – among 
others, Emiliano Augusto Cavalcanti, Graça Aranha, Mário de Andrade, Oswald de Andrade, 
Víctor Brecheret, Anita Malfatti, and Heitor Villa-Lobos. The landmark event – with its 
combination of poetry, music, theatre, and painting – launched a nationalist cultural revolution 
centred on the quest for a distinctive Brazilian essence that spoke of the country’s indigenous 
past and ethnic diversity. Rejecting the rigidness of academic art, the modernists also broke with 
those who advocated ‘whitening’ as a solution to the so-called ‘racial problem,’ championing 
instead Brasilidade, the notion that Brazilians’ national identity was a composite of its 
indigenous, Afro-Brazilian, and ‘white’ European roots. Although their discourse of Brasilidade 
did not completely displace ‘white’ normativity (it continued to marginalize “black images in 
favour of whitened forms of the mestizo or mulatto,” argues Darién J. Davis), it helped foster 
new experimental practices that were increasingly focused inward and thus attentive to the 
multitude of expressive cultures found in Brazil.35  
Villa-Lobos, one of the protagonists of the Semana de Arte Moderna, came to play an 
important role in the “gradual process of decolonization” that characterized Brazilian music in 
the first half of the twentieth century.36 Gomes’s oeuvre, which belonged to the distant – not to 
mention foreign – romantic era of classical music, was somewhat of an embarrassment to 
Brazilian modernists. In the spirit of Brasilidade, Villa-Lobos sought to find his own musical 
language by looking for inspiration in the musical innovations of impressionist and avant-garde 
European composers.37 The artists he chose to feature during the Semana de Arte Moderna 
included Erik Satie, Achille-Claude Debussy, and Francis Poulenc. They provided templates for 
Villa-Lobos’s own inward explorations. Magaldi explains:   
Polytonality, unstable tonal centers, new timbers, unconventional use of instrument 
combinations, and varied orchestral colors were among the ‘new’ characteristics of the 
works presented during the week. But it was Villa-Lobos’[s] attentive use of native materials 
to achieve those results that allowed him to creatively renew the exhausted European tonal 
system. In his “Danças africanas,” Villa-Lobos used stylized rhythmic patterns derived from 
Afro-Brazilian music as a means to explore new harmonies, and thus he achieved the most 
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coveted goals of Brazilian modernists: the conciliation of the local, native tradition with the 
European model of modernity.38  
Whereas European modernists emphasized rupture and invention, Villa-Lobos and his 
contemporaries in Brazil championed (re)discovery and memory as a path forward.39 
Born in Rio de Janeiro on March 5, 1887, Villa-Lobos developed his appreciation of music 
at an early age. His father, a writer and civil servant at Biblioteca Nacional [National Library], 
was an amateur musician who enjoyed attending salons and operas. Early on, Villa-Lobos 
showed resistance to the formal traditional training that music schools offered. Primarily self-
taught, he picked up the guitar as well as the cello and began performing with various ensembles 
(street bands and orchestras) in his search for new musical languages. The young musician 
developed a deep appreciation for both ‘serious music’ and popular sounds rooted in Afro-
Brazilian culture. He gravitated around different music scenes prior to undertaking a series of 
research trips to Brazil’s interior: through the Northeast as well as to the states of Mato Grosso, 
Goiás, and Minas Gerais.40 He also sought out recordings of indigenous music as he transitioned 
from performing to composing.41 His early works – among others, “Danças Africanas” and 
“Choros 1” – revealed a keen disposition for hybrid musical languages. His enlarged sound 
palette, inventive use of traditional instruments, and innovative rhythmic patterns aimed to make 
audible a cross-section of Brazil’s geography and cultural life.42 By the early 1920s, Villa-Lobos 
had begun establishing his reputation as the champion of Brazil’s “musical mosaic.”43 
Villa-Lobos’s two trips to France – in 1923 and 1927 – helped consolidate his status at 
home. Partially funded by the Brazilian government, the composer’s overseas excursions were 
greeted with acclaim in Paris. The concerts fulfilled French desires for a musical ‘other’ while 
advancing Villa-Lobos’s own career interests.44 At the same time, the young maestro developed 
and tested new compositional ideas while acting as a music ambassador by helping disseminate 
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Brasilidade.45 The professional connections that Villa-Lobos made in France and the press he 
received won him celebrity status, which gave added legitimacy and urgency to the project of a 
Brazilian modernismo musical [musical modernism]. “By aligning himself with European 
composers, he made native music acceptable as art by [the] Brazilian elite,” writes Magaldi.46 
Villa-Lobos was essentially helping his contemporaries resolve the tension between the ‘here’ 
and ‘there’ that characterized their predecessors’ musical practices. His approach demonstrated 
that “liberation comes from facing and matching, not from retreating.”47    
Such a posture inevitably shaped Villa-Lobos’s works and their reception in the United 
States. The 1939-40 New York World’s Fair provided an exceptional venue to feature Brazil’s 
contributions to the recent history of ‘serious music.’ The country’s musical program included 
compositions by Villa-Lobos, Gomes, Francisco Mignone, and Burle Marx (the latter acted as 
music director of the Brazilian pavilion). This was Villa-Lobos’s first real opportunity to have 
his compositions heard and written about in the United States.48 They made a dramatic impact 
because of their hybrid nature – more so than other Brazilian works. With its “density of texture, 
sheer volume, and array of primitive percussion instruments,” the composer’s “Choros 8” proved 
especially destabilizing.49 It evaded sublimation and foregrounded Brasilidade in ways that were 
difficult to reconcile with musical pan-Americanism. It was a “poor vehicle for sameness-
embracing,” writes Hess. She adds: “Acknowledging difference so blatantly had little place in 
the Pan Americanist project.”50 The following year, Villa-Lobos’s works were once again played 
in New York as part of a Brazilian music festival held at the Museum of Modern Art. Critics 
were no less perplexed by Villa-Lobos.51  
By the early- and mid-1940s, the name Villa-Lobos had become closely associated with 
the idea of a national musical culture in Brazil. “There cannot be the slightest doubt about Villa-
Lobos’[s] adherence to musical nationalism as an aesthetic,” argues Gerard Béhague.52 The 
composer was a staunch supporter of the Vargas regime because of the opportunities it afforded 
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him and the ways in which the government’s national project aligned with that of the modernist 
artists of his generation. Upon his return from Paris in 1930, Villa-Lobos met João Alberto Lins 
de Barros, provisional governor of São Paulo and amateur musician, with whom he discussed 
some of his ideas about music education. The Brazilian politician encouraged the composer to 
tour the state to test aspects of his project and to “proclaim the power of Brazilian artistic will ... 
a thunder burst, formidable, unisonous and frightening BRAZILIAN ARTISTIC 
INDEPENDENCE.”53 The venture caught the attention of Vargas who named Villa-Lobos 
superintendência de educação musical e artística [superintendent of musical and artistic 
education]. In his capacity as an administrator and composer-educator, he handled the “musical 
fitness” of Brazilian children, instilling in them nationalism and patriotism, discipline and civic 
pride, through a demanding countrywide singing curriculum.54 Vargas and Villa-Lobos both 
understood the importance of music and personality in unifying the country around a shared 
sense of identity.55 Their respective visions of Brazil converged in the 1930s and 1940s, which 
allowed Villa-Lobos to occupy centre stage in these pivotal years of the country’s musical life.56        
Mario de Andrade, a contemporary of Villa-Lobos and a central figure of the Semana de 
Arte Moderna, had a term for the kind of composer that Villa-Lobos embodied: “artist-
worker.”57 This kind of artist advocated and championed a utilitarian and moralizing conception 
of art. His or her artistic mission was also a social mission in that its value was dependent on 
how it contributed to the national project. Andrade and Villa-Lobos did not always see eye to 
eye, but both men “stressed the social value and educational usefulness of music, but primarily 
art music nationalized through the invigoration of rural folk music.”58 By ‘invigoration,’ they 
meant revisiting traditional forms using methods associated with erudite compositional 
approaches. Andrade and Villa-Lobos rejected exoticism and sublimation. Their preferred 
musical forms were those that travelled horizontally (throughout Brazil’s diverse cultural 
geographies) and transcended vertical barriers (across class lines). Andrade referred to this kind 
of music as “engaged art” although it remained associated primarily with the country’s political 
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and cultural elite.59 That Villa-Lobos was one of its chief evangelists is unquestionable, even if it 
was at times difficult to dissociate the composer’s career-building undertakings from his search 
for Brazil’s musical soul.    
Canada’s Difference 
Canadians on the ground in Brazil were not deaf to the musical life of their hosts and the surge of 
music in Good Neighbor era hemispheric relations. Nor were they passive spectators when 
opportunities to shape Canada’s image abroad presented themselves. The Light’s Kenneth H. 
McCrimmon is a pertinent example. Born in 1890 on the shores of Lake Huron, in the Scottish 
Presbyterian town of Kincardine, Ontario, McCrimmon studied law and then served in the 18th 
Battalion of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, earning a Distinguished Service Order and 
ascending to the rank of major before an injury forced him to return home. His uncle – Sir 
Alexander Mackenzie, railway magnate and president of The Light – invited him to relocate to 
Brazil in 1920. Established in 1912 through the merger of two similar companies in São Paulo 
and Rio de Janeiro (founded respectively in 1899 and 1904), Brazilian Traction, Light, and 
Power Company was known as ‘A Luz’ [The Light], or less affectionately so as ‘o Polvo 
Canadense’ [the Canadian Octopus], by Brazilians who used its public transport, electricity, and 
telephone services.60 The company’s virtual monopoly in these areas made it “Canada’s largest 
overseas corporation.”61 Pointing to the fact that its financing and mind power came from 
various parts of the English-speaking world, Christopher Armstrong and H.V. Nelles argue that 
the company was the product of a metropolitan finance capitalism rather than the “financial 
incarnation of Canadian imperialism.”62 Although it is true that The Light’s “initial 
Canadianness was a function of a highly developed and concentrated capital market that could 
readily mobilize savings for domestic or foreign investment,” its administrators – McCrimmon 
among them – remained profoundly attached to their Britishness.63 They also did not fail to 
understand that Canada’s image, as a friendly country, could be an asset in times of trouble such 
as when Vargas raised the spectre of nationalization as a possible component of the Estado Novo. 
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A nationalist in the Canadian imperialist tradition, McCrimmon willingly served as a 
facilitator between Brazil and Canada.64 In the summer of 1937, he wrote to Oswaldo Aranha, 
Brazilian ambassador to the United States, to encourage him to take a vacation from Washington 
and visit Toronto. The invitation to travel north came from him and the “Polvo Canadense,” he 
wrote in a friendly and humorous way.65 The diplomat could not free himself before his recall to 
Brazil where he accepted the offer to lead the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (aka the Itamaraty). 
The news of Aranha’s return to Rio de Janeiro and his nomination as minister was welcomed 
favourably at The Light since he had made clear to Vargas that he was “very much against the 
policy of extreme nationalization.”66 McCrimmon could therefore hardly refuse Aranha’s verbal 
request, in 1940, to communicate to the DEA Brazil’s wish for reciprocal diplomatic 
representation, especially since his “personal relations with him” were of a “somewhat intimate 
nature.”67 It is unclear how much of what was conveyed was Aranha’s, but officials in Ottawa 
did take note that McCrimmon, who was known as a “very strong imperialist,” now strongly 
advocated for “direct Canadian representation in Brazil” if Canada was to take its place “in the 
future commercial and political relations of this hemisphere.”68  
What appeared as an about-face was an effort to find a place and a role for the Dominion 
within the Americas without the need for Canadians on the ground to shed their Britishness. 
McCrimmon sought to accomplish this using the tropes of pan-Americanism and Good 
Neighborism. Speaking with reporters in Brazil, he underlined Canada’s “spirit of Americanism” 
and discussed his fellow compatriots’ desire “to live in the happy and harmonious communion 
which is one of the bases of tranquility and of progress” in the hemisphere.69 McCrimmon added: 
“Canada, although belonging, with pride, to the British Commonwealth, is an American nation, 
sensitive to the influence and spirit of Panamericanism and which tends, in an ever increasing 
manner to become part of the same fellowship and to reciprocate the same affection which binds 
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all the nations of this continent.”70 The Canada he described was resolutely British in its origins 
and its destiny even if it was realigning itself along pan-American ideals such as those 
championed by the Pan-American Union (PAU). Founded in 1890, the organization sought to 
promote mutual understanding and unity of purpose among the hemisphere’s republics, primarily 
with respect to economic and juridical matters, while also serving as the channel through which 
the United States promoted its liberal developmentalist agenda. Although Canada had yet to join 
the PAU (its Dominion status and constitutional monarchy were obvious impediments), reporters 
welcomed the news that the DEA and the Itamaraty had agreed to reciprocal diplomatic 
representation, noting that the country’s communion with the “American family” was long 
overdue.71 As for McCrimmon, he described the two countries’ rapprochement as “a happy 
moment in the good-neighbour policy which must predominate in the evolution of culture and 
civilization of America.”72  
The Light was an early proponent of musical pan-Americanism as demonstrated by its 
incursion in the realm of broadcasting. In 1940, it launched Ondas Musicais, a Rio de Janeiro-
based program dedicated to “all the radio listeners who prefer the works of classical and modern 
composers who have already been consecrated by good musical taste.”73 Organized and financed 
by the company, Ondas Musicais premiered on April 2, 1940, airing on six radio frequencies for 
an hour every Tuesday and the last two Fridays of each month. Brazilians were treated to fifty-
five minutes of music with a short break in the middle during which The Light offered advice on 
how to best take advantage of electricity’s potential.74 The inaugural show featured the 
Ferdinand Strack Orchestra performing works by a variety of composers, including Pyotr Ilyich 
Tchaikovsky, Henry K. Hadley, and Brazil’s own Gomes.75 The local press celebrated the 
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initiative for helping improve the musical culture of Brazilians while enhancing the artistic 
prestige of the city’s broadcasting.76 Ondas Musicais was as much about marketing The Light to 
middle-class audiences most likely to require the company’s services as it was about serving as a 
conduit for liberal developmentalism. Attuned to the United States’ growing interest in the 
potency of music, the company branded itself according to pan-American and Good Neighbor 
ideals while helping shape Brazil’s soundscape so that it echoed that of its English-speaking 
neighbours to the north.    
McCrimmon’s endorsement of pan-Americanism and Good Neighborism was part 
opportunism and part public relations since his sense of Britishness continued to shape his 
reactions to events unfolding on the ground. For example, he was profoundly upset to learn that 
the Americans had refused to allow Canadians to attend, even only as observers, the PAU 
conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1942. The Monroe Doctrine continued to limit Canada’s 
presence south of the Rio Grande and, as a result, its ability to advance Canadian and 
Commonwealth interests in the hemisphere. In a letter to the company’s president, Sir Herbert 
Couzens, McCrimmon decried the fact that Canada’s efforts to attend the conference had been 
“torpedoed by the United States” whose objectionable Latin American policy was: “Great Britain 
and the British Empire – hands off!”77 He denounced the “sweeping anti-British remarks” of 
Import-Export Bank President Warren Lee Pierson and reserved his most severe criticism for 
Jefferson Caffery, American ambassador to Brazil, who considered “himself a sort of emperor” 
and acted dismissively towards both Canadian and British diplomats.78 Yet McCrimmon 
concluded on a positive note by remarking that the United States’ self-serving policies in Latin 
America were bound to enhance “Brazilian sympathy for Great Britain.”79      
The Light’s deep connections to the British world shaped Brazilians’ perception of Canada 
in the opening years of the 1940s. It was an essentialized image that centred on the country’s 
Britishness and its so-called exceptionalism as a settler colony turned Dominion. The “English 
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race,” a reporter noted, was responsible for the moral and material progress of the “great 
Canadian nation.”80 More specifically: “Canadians perfectly portray all the British beauties and 
virtues, and in their blood predominates, substantially, that imperishable principle of love of 
freedom, human dignity, distinctiveness of manners and clothing that make the ‘homo 
britannicus’ a unique being.”81 Such generous and flattering comments were likely intended for 
Canadian expatriates and their associates in Canada and Great Britain. At the same time, they 
demonstrated the ease with which Brazilians navigated between biological and cultural 
understandings of ‘race.’ They also denoted continued admiration, if not adherence, to the 
normative project of the West as deployed through its former settler colonies. More importantly, 
the above characterization suggested that Brazilians knew either very little about the Dominion 
and its diverse population or that their knowledge of Canada centred mostly on the country’s 
connections to the Commonwealth and to London, the metropole that had fascinated and inspired 
Brazil’s political and cultural elite during the ‘tropical belle époque.’              
As the first minister plenipotentiary to Brazil, Désy nuanced – even challenged – that 
image of Canada. He was an all-around exceptional candidate for the job because of his aptitude 
for languages as well as the fifteen years of experience he had amassed with the DEA in Ottawa, 
London, Geneva, Paris, and Brussels. Born in Montreal in 1893, he attended the Jesuits’ Collège 
Sainte-Marie before earning a degree in law at Université Laval satellite campus in Montreal. He 
then studied economics at École libre des sciences politiques in Paris, returning home to practice 
law between 1915 and 1917. Shortly after, he joined the faculty of his alma mater, which had in 
the meantime obtained its autonomy as Université de Montréal. A founding member of the 
institution’s Faculté des sciences sociales, Désy taught political history as well as institutional 
and constitutional law. A short, indefatigable man with an air of nobility about him, he was a 
lover of the arts, literature, painting, and especially music, which he discovered at a young age 
through his cousin, Sister Marie-Stéphane, who later became director of École supérieure de 
musique d’Outremont (ESMO). In the words of Radio-Canada journalist A.-J. Sarrazin, Désy 
was “[r]acé, élégant, avec des manières de grand seigneur, sans manquer à la simplicité, il sait 
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faire sentir les distances qui s’imposent, tout en restant familier. Il n’est pas très grand …, l’œil 
vif, les plus belles mains qui soient. On l’imagine fort bien à la cour de Louis XIV.”82 Désy’s 
wife, a descendant of ennobled aristocrat Pierre Boucher, founder and seigneur of Boucherville, 
provided additional substance to his grand aura.83        
A student – and later a colleague – of economist Édouard Montpetit, Désy participated in 
the making of the modern university in Québec, acquiring in the process an appreciation for the 
professionalization of knowledge and the accumulation of cultural capital, both of which could 
be mobilized for the collective good of the nation. Like his mentor, he believed in the possibility 
of bonne entente between French Canadians and English Canadians, placing emphasis on the 
French fact and its contributions – past, present, and future – to Canada’s national project.84 As 
such, he straddled the fence between tradition and modernity, following the lead of Montpetit 
who “formed part of a French-speaking Catholic elite that was looking for ways of living with 
feet in both the older and the newer worlds.”85 In a similar way, Désy found himself travelling 
back and forth between Montreal and Paris, first to study and then to teach history at Université 
de Sorbonne. Following in the footsteps of Montpetit, he acquired a taste for international 
cultural relations by taking part in the networks that emerged through Québec-France intellectual 
exchanges in the 1920s.86 Indebted to his mentor, he wrote: “Tout le contraire du technocrate, 
vous représentiez le type à peu près inconnu chez nous du spécialiste qui est en même temps un 
amateur éclairé, prompt à tirer des êtres les virtuosités qu’ils recèlent.”87 It is this commitment to 
intellectual curiosity – combined with an attachment to nationhood and a love for culture – that 
Désy brought to the DEA.     
Désy was O.D. Skelton’s first recruit in 1925 and he did not disappoint. King had given his 
under-secretary of state for External Affairs the go ahead to hire a counselor, a post that required 
a “law degree or membership in a professional bar association, two years of post-graduate 
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studies in international affairs, practical experience in legal work, and good knowledge of both 
English and French.”88 Although he apparently was the sole applicant, Désy got the job because 
he was evidently qualified to handle the tasks Skelton had reserved for him: “legal matters, 
protocol, treaties, the League [of Nations (LON)], and, when time permitted, commercial 
subjects.”89 In addition to these, he occasionally chaired the committee responsible for evaluating 
potential recruits.90 Désy subsequently held the posts of counselor to the delegate at the LON, 
assistant to the permanent delegate at the LON, and counselor at the Paris legation. He was also 
part of the DEA delegation at the 1929 Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation 
and Merchant Shipping Legislation in London and represented Canada at the Conference for the 
Codification of International Law held in Hague the following year. This experience equipped 
him to assume the title of minister plenipotentiary at the joint Belgium-Netherlands legation 
when it opened in 1938. Désy was pleased with the appointment and he might have stayed in 
Europe longer if war had not broken out.  
Désy’s debut as minister became the source of considerable anxieties for him. On May 10, 
1940, German forces invaded Belgium. Eighteen days later, the country capitulated. At the sound 
of the first bombs, Désy’s wife and children fled through France to Portugal where they safely 
boarded a ship headed to North America. The Canadian diplomat stayed behind with his staff, 
relocating first to Ostend, Belgium, before fleeing to Paris then Lisbon. From there, they 
travelled to London where they shared their time between the Park Lane Hotel and bomb 
shelters. Exhausted after a long journey, all suffered sleepless nights while the Battle of Britain 
raged on. Writing to Skelton and King, Désy inquired about the future of the joint Belgium-
Netherlands legation and the possibility of being relocated to a new post. Told to stay put, Désy 
replied that a home leave ought to be considered if he and his staff were not to be reappointed 
elsewhere. He added: “I beg respectfully to submit that I consider myself as responsible for the 
life of my personnel and that responsibility or mine rests with you.” The tone and content of the 
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letter displeased King. Désy apologized profusely, noting that he was under tremendous stress, 
had been ill, and felt helpless in not being able to do something productive for Canada. In a 
separate, private letter to Skelton, Désy wrote in a “confidential and private manner,” not to his 
“chief,” but to “the man who has … honoured me with his friendly confidence.” He emphasized 
the hardship he had experienced since arriving in Europe, his wife’s difficult pregnancy, the pain 
of being separated from family, and his recent illness. Désy added:  
I did suffer very deeply and I do continue to suffer from the separation both as a father and 
as a husband. So much the more because day after day I have the acute and persistent 
sensation that my presence here is worthless, that my mission has practically come to an end, 
and that I can render no service of any value either to my country or to my own family.  
Whether the DEA sent Désy to Brazil to give him a much-needed break or to keep him away 
from Ottawa is difficult to say. The opening of a legation in an exotic city located practically 
next to the distant Tropic of Capricorn was certainly good timing.  
The timeliness of this Canadian-Brazilian rapprochement was also due to the fact that non-
state actors in Québec had begun using the province’s Latin and Catholic heritage as leverage to 
advocate for a distinctive French-Canadian voice in the hemisphere. This manoeuvre doubled as 
a strategy for defending the province’s autonomy while advancing the interests of French 
Canadians both within and outside Canada’s borders. The O’Leary brothers, Émile-Dostaler and 
Walter-Patrice, were political dissenters who had honed their organizing skills with Jeunesses 
patriotes du Canada français, a conservative separatist organization founded during the Great 
Depression. At the turn of the 1940s, they orchestrated a rapprochement between Catholic 
militants in Mexico and French-Canadian nationalists with the creation of the Unión Cultural 
México-Canadá Francés. The organization’s Montreal chapter subsequently adopted a new name 
– Union culturelle des Latins d’Amérique (UCLA) – to reflect its broader mandate: that is, to (a) 
establish direct and ongoing contact with the people of Latin America and (b) to develop 
cultural, educational, social, and commercial relations with them. The UCLA’s focus was 
primarily on Spanish-speaking Latin America, but Brazil did feature on the radar of the O’Leary 
brothers. As Maurice Demers explains, they were pursuing transnational collaborations to 
advance a politico-cultural project rooted in identity politics. He writes: “By mobilizing latinité 




Canada at the crux of Canadian-Latin American diplomatic relations, thus improving the grim 
outlook for survival of its culture on this continent.”91 Although the organization was not yet a 
concern when Désy arrived in Brazil, it did garner attention, in both Montreal and Ottawa, while 
delineating emerging views about the place that French Canada could occupy in the Americas.        
  In some respects, Brazil was an ideal venue for the Québec-centred cultural outreach that 
the O’Leary brothers and – as we will see – Désy were envisioning. Since the heydays of the 
‘tropical belle époque,’ the country’s cultural and political elite had developed its anglophilia and 
francophilia at the expense of the Portuguese metropole. But it was France that made the most 
indelible mark on Rio de Janeiro, the capital city of the Old Republic and, since 1937, Vargas’s 
Estado Novo. Its central avenue evoked Paris with its architectural marvels, many of which 
(among others, the Teatro Municipal [Municipal Theatre] and the Museu Nacional de Belas 
Artes [National Museum of Fine Arts]) were inspired by French landmarks (the Opéra de Paris 
and the Musée du Louvre, respectively). “The Avenida, like the belle époque for which it stood, 
pulsed between … colonial realities and metropolitan dynamism, in a constant counterpoint,” 
writes Needle.92 “Civilization and Progress were generally rendered in French,” he adds.93 
Mônica Leite Lessa and Hugo Rogélio Suppo both demonstrate that the Quai d’Orsay, France’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, actively nurtured this francophilia by strengthening Brazilian-
French cultural relations through initiatives such as the 1922 foundation of the Institut franco-
brésilien de haute culture.94 Wealthy Brazilians learned French as a second language or attended 
classes in lycées. Many travelled to Paris to perfect their education or to find inspiration if they 
were artistically inclined. As a French-speaking Canadian envoy who had spent many years 
studying and working in France, Désy could expect to be well received in Brazil. He could 
perhaps even feel at home among Brazil’s francophile political and cultural elite.    
An Experiment in Musical Diplomacy 
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Désy’s arrival in Rio de Janeiro complicated the image of Canada put forward by McCrimmon. 
For one, he was a French-speaking Catholic. Secondly, he seemed more interested in developing 
intimate bilateral relations with Brazilians than in subsuming Canada’s autonomist moment into 
a Washington-dominated pan-Americanism. He tried to accomplish that by foregrounding 
French Canadians’ Latinity and sense of family. Whereas A Notícia had reduced the country to 
its Britishness, A Noite was quick to point out that Désy’s roots on the continent extended to the 
eighteenth century when his ancestors left France for the New World. The daily featured the 
minister on its cover with the headline: “He arrived speaking our language!”95 The A Noite 
journalist was manifestly impressed by Désy’s knowledge of Portuguese. The article highlighted 
the importance of Latinity in Canada – “forty percent, or approximately four million, but from 
the highest cultural and social circles” – while depicting Désy as a high-minded representative of 
French-Canadian society who juggled both family and diplomatic affairs with ability and 
genuine interest.96 The minister plenipotentiary spoke of his intentions to travel throughout 
Brazil to develop further his appreciation of the country’s rich and diverse landscape, its long 
history, and its cultural accomplishments. “I want to live the Brazilian way,” Désy said, as if the 
Canada-Brazil rapprochement he was tasked with promoting could be embodied.97 He insisted 
that it was about time that the two nations get to know each other better. Believing that 
intellectual curiosity could drive expertise, he immersed himself in Brazil’s cultural and social 
life while looking for opportunities to project an image of Canada that his Brazilian interlocutors 
could relate to and engage with.   
Désy embarked on his first musical nation branding campaign in 1943 when he invited 
Jean Dansereau to give a series of concerts in and around Rio de Janeiro. Born on the outskirts of 
Montreal in 1891, Hector changed his name to Jean at the turn of the 1920s, possibly to make 
himself more marketable in the United States or presumably in honour of Jean de Reszke, a 
Polish tenor with whom he worked as a répétiteur. Dansereau acquired a taste for music through 
his mother who was a cousin of Calixa Lavallée, the accomplished composer who had written 
the music to “O Canada,” a work which allegedly became – albeit unofficially – the country’s 
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national anthem with the visit of King George VI in 1939.98 He studied at McGill University’s 
Conservatory before being awarded the 1914 Prix d’Europe, a prestigious annual competition 
sponsored by the government of Québec and administered by the Académie de musique du 
Québec. In France, he studied with harmonist Charles-Marie Widor as well as pianists Isidore 
Philipp and Édouard Risler. He subsequently accompanied RCA recording artists in the United 
States (Mary Garden, among others), worked alongside Reske, and performed throughout Europe 
until his return to Canada in 1938. Dansereau soon found himself at home teaching at ESMO and 
then at the recently established Conservatoire de musique du Québec à Montréal (CMQM), 
institutions where Désy had personal connections.99       
Accompanying him was his wife, Muriel Tannehill, a native of New Jersey who was 
mistaken as Canadian-born in the Brazilian press.100 The confusion was understandable 
considering that she was married to Dansereau and that she had spent the greater part of her 
formative years training in France under the mentorship of Reske and Widor. She particularly 
liked singing works by French composers such as Maurice Ravel and Debussy, the latter being a 
favourite of her husband. Incidentally, the couple had a Debussy special planned for Ondas 
Musicais. Although the spotlight was on her husband, Tannehill’s presence in Brazil did not go 
unnoticed, partly because she had rubbed shoulders with acclaimed Brazilian soprano Balduína 
de Oliveira Sayão (aka Bidu Sayão) who also studied with Reske in the 1920s. More 
importantly, the image of an artistic couple made for great headlines in the effort to promote 
more intimate cultural relations between Brazilians and Canadians.   
In his capacity as minister plenipotentiary, Désy skillfully mobilized and consolidated his 
network of friends and contacts to reinvent himself as a cultural promoter – a status that helped 
him fulfill, both at home and abroad, his personal and professional ambitions. He had planned to 
get Dansereau and his wife to Brazil in the spring of 1943, but delays in the issuing of visas 
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resulted in the visit being postponed by a few months.101 This was all for the better, since the 
couple could then participate in Dominion Day celebrations scheduled to take place in Rio de 
Janeiro. With the approval of his pianist friend, Désy wore the hat of an impresario, coordinating 
with the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) and the Itamaraty to book concerts and 
arrange performances on Brazilian radio airwaves. He also reached out to the press whose 
support proved essential to the success of this first experiment in musical diplomacy. From early 
June to late August, Dansereau and his wife offered the gift of music to their Brazilian hosts, 
accompanying Désy on a round of social functions that put the artistic couple in contact with Rio 
de Janeiro’s political and cultural elite. Their multiple appearances on radio and in the press also 
made it possible for their music to reach into people’s homes, thanks to the assistance of the DIP.   
Conscious of the fact that Brazilians consumed their share of state propaganda every day, 
Désy softened his musical nation branding campaign by presenting the Dansereau couple 
primarily as his personal guests rather than as Canadian envoys. The approach was also 
consistent with his efforts to present himself as both personable and dependable. It nicely 
complemented his fatherly image, which is something Désy increasingly embraced after 
reuniting with his wife and children (figure 1.1). Drawing attention to his leadership qualities and 
caring abilities, he sought to accentuate paternal attributes that presumably qualified him for 
diplomatic work, especially since it involved managing cultural relations between two ‘sister 
nations.’ Désy’s masculine sense of self was a composite of his domestic and civic identities (as 
a devoted father and as a skilled diplomat), which proved easy to reconcile considering that he 
had free rein to experiment in Brazil, a country that must have felt like an oasis compared to war-
torn Europe.102 It was also informed by his membership in what can be described as an imagined 
transnational brotherhood of elite ‘white’ men – that is, descendants of settler colonists who saw 
themselves as champions of Western Christian civilization. On Dominion Day 1942, the daily 
Correio da Manhã published an interview with Désy. Pictured with his daughter, the Canadian 
diplomat spoke of family and of how much he felt at home in Brazil. He confided that he had 
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been seduced by the country’s rich history, folklore, literature, and music, which reminded him 
of Canada. The two nations were similar, Désy suggested, in that they were resilient and both 
carried forward into the ‘New World’ the core values of Western Europe: “Canada and Brazil are 
young countries whose unity is manifested through culture and patriotism.”103 He added: “We 
make common cause against everything that threatens our national and Christian heritage.”104 
The Brazil he described was one that corresponded with his self-image and with which he 
wished to engage. Hence his confidence that he could turn the “air de famille” he found in Rio de 
Janeiro into a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.105   
 
Figure 1.1. Jean Désy reunited with his family on the day they arrived in Rio de Janeiro 
(1941). Source: A Manha, Biblioteca Nacional. 
Désy knew just the right person to help with this. “Jean Dansereau is my compatriot and 
my friend,” he wrote in the program notes for the pianist’s first solo recital at the Teatro 
Municipal.106 The text established the terms with which to discuss the performance, but its 
reproduction in A Manhã, the following day, indicated that it also served to delimit the frame 
within which to think about Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations.107 Dansereau’s debut featured 
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a series of preludes by Debussy and Frédéric Chopin, pieces that formed part of a canonical 
repertoire shared by many of the nations that partook in musical pan-Americanism. But 
Dansereau was different by virtue of his French-Canadian roots and his Latinity, Désy suggested. 
He placed emphasis on his friend’s cultural background in the program notes, remarking that it 
made him a particularly effective translator of both ‘Old World’ and ‘New World’ sensibilities. 
Dansereau’s virtuosity was about technique as much as it was about emotional depth. His 
mastery of Debussy’s impressionist sonic palette was about capturing majestic landscapes with 
near-scientific precision whereas his heartfelt rendition of Chopin’s romantic preludes was a 
testament to his humanity. Désy’s insistence on this duality as well as his discussion of 
Dansereau’s background indicated that one needed to engage with not only the repertoire and 
delivery, but also the man, his worldview, and the values for which he stood. In some ways, 
Dansereau was Désy’s musical alter ego with both men personifying a distinctively unique 
Canada to which Brazil’s cultural and political elite were expected to relate.    
Promoters and critics took their cues from Désy in discussing Dansereau, “ambassador of 
Canada’s musical art” and “français de vieille souche.”108 In Brazil, the pianist performed works 
by Debussy and Chopin, but also Franz Liszt and Ludwig van Beethoven, among others. One 
writer described the concert he attended as a triumph. Dansereau was a musical genius with an 
ability to combine virtuosity with sensitivity, he wrote.109 Another was less categorical: the 
Canadian pianist possessed an impressive arsenal of musical skills to pull from, but that did not 
make him a virtuoso. Still, his performance was sufficiently enticing to merit long applauses.110 
Dansereau’s personalized touch either denatured the works he played or it augmented their 
resonance. The latter was generally truer according to a Fon Fon review, which noted how 
skillfully the Canadian pianist engaged with the great European masters without ever losing his 
personality.111 His soulfulness and ability to turn the concert stage into an intimate space were 
qualities that made him different. Alda Caminha, writing for Diario Carioca, expected nothing 
                                                          
108 “Ondas Musicais,” O Radical, June 1, 1943, 23, http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/830399/26184. In 
Portuguese: “… Embaixador do Arte Musical do Canadá.” Ariel, “Brasil-Canadá,” A Noite, July 7, 1943, 4, 
http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/348970_04/21504. 
109  “Jean Dansereau na Cultural Artística,” Gazeta de Noticias, June 16, 1943, 9, 
http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/103730_07/15411. 
110  “Jean Dansereau na Cultural Artística,” Dom Casmurro, June 26, 1943, 7, 
http://memoria.bn.br/DocReader/095605/2652. 




less after having read Désy’s program notes. She stressed Dansereau’s difference, particularly 
with respect to his musically inquisitive mind and enchanting personality, which demonstrated a 
rare predisposition for the polyphony of the world.112 Different indeed, concurred her colleague 
from Correio da Manhã.113 Echoing Désy, a reporter from that same paper marvelled at 
Dansereau’s ability to marry technique with emotion in a distinctively original style.114 The 
widely respected musicologist and critic Ayres de Andrade also fell under the charm of 
Dansereau although he thought that the French-Canadian pianist’s personality shone best through 
the works of the great French composer Debussy.115  
The emphasis on difference made it possible to think beyond the frame of musical pan-
Americanism even if Dansereau’s repertoire centred on canons. One critic, writing for Diário de 
Noticias, did describe the tour as a “good neighbour mission” serving continental ideals and 
values, but such a reading was the exception rather than the rule.116 When music’s potential to 
foster continental harmony was evoked, it was to better delineate the qualities that supposedly 
differentiated Canadians and Brazilians from the rest of the hemisphere. The image that emerged 
was that the two nations were bound to tradition yet progressively minded, industrious, non-
imperialistic, peace-driven, sincere in their dealing with the world, and – most of all – both 
freedom-loving and spiritually inclined. According to music critics, Dansereau’s goodwill 
cultural mission conveyed all these qualities. It rendered audible and corporeal the sororal ties 
that existed between the two “sister nations.”117 The trope of family spoke of closeness and 
intimacy, which the Dansereau couple both embodied and projected on stage, in the press, and 
during outings with Désy. Although Tannehill did not perform as often as her husband did, she 
helped set the musical mood for this cultural rapprochement, even if only by her presence. As an 
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artistic couple, they symbolized the interplay between tradition and modernity – between family 
and nation (figure 1.2).118   
 
Figure 1.2. Newspaper ad featuring Jean and Muriel Dansereau as an artistic couple in 
Brazil (1943). Source: O Radical, Biblioteca Nacional. 
These metaphors, although expressed in gendered terms, did not necessarily ‘effeminize’ 
Dansereau and his performance of nation. Like Désy, the multidimensionality of his masculine 
identity (as a husband and as an agile musician) tied in nicely with his newfound calling as 
impromptu ambassador. Although the figure of the sensitive pianist deviated somewhat from 
normative gender expressions, Dansereau conceptualized and embodied emotional experiences 
in ways that were coded male in 1940s Brazil.119 The press portrayed him as a grounded and 
sensible erudite performer whose skills commanded admiration and respect. Pictures showed him 
with an intent look, seated at a piano, with full mastery of the instrument. Dansereau played with 
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so much vigour that one of Chopin’s waltzes became something entirely different.120 His 
repertoire’s “manly lineage” lent credence to his stature as an authoritative performer.121 The 
French-Canadian pianist provided more evidence of the masculine overtones that permeated 
Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations when he listed the names of Brazilians artists with whom 
he associated the most as a Canadian: among others, Villa-Lobos, Mignone, José Siqueira, 
Radamés Gnattali, Arnaldo Estrella, and Magda Tagliaferro (all men except for the last). In Rio 
de Janeiro, he rubbed shoulders with many of these artists while making a name for himself in 
the city’s male-dominated cultural milieu. If there were any doubts about Dansereau’s manliness, 
the presence of his wife assuaged them. Together, they helped clarify the terms within which 
musical nation branding was to take place.  
Musical diplomacy thus offered multiple opportunities to fabricate – even amplify – 
fraternal feelings. In late 1942, Désy commissioned Claude Champagne to prepare a musical 
homage to Brazil. The Montreal-born composer acquiesced to the demand by writing “Quadrilha 
Brasileira,” a composition for piano based on an indigenous folk melody rooted in Marajó 
culture. Brazil’s response came shortly after with Mignone proposing his own musical homage: 
“Três Prelúdios (Sobre Temas Canadenses),” a short piano piece based on three French-
Canadian folksongs that featured female characters – “Marianne s’en va t’au moulin,” “Sainte 
Marguerite veillez ma petite,” and “À la Claire fontaine.”122 Dansereau’s presence in Brazil 
provided the opportunity to augment this musical exchange with a performative component. On 
July 1, 1943, Rádio Nacional celebrated Dominion Day with a special program featuring Estrella 
and Dansereau. The Brazilian pianist premiered Champagne’s “Quadrilha Brasileira” while 
Dansereau played Mignone’s “Três Prelúdios (Sobre Temas Canadenses).”123 Brazilians heard 
the performance live on radio at 5 p.m. while North American audiences listened to it via 
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shortwave transmission at 11 p.m.124 That evening, Dansereau entertained Rio de Janeiro’s 
political and cultural elite in the main hall of the Associação Brasileira de Impressa [Brazilian 
Press Association]. In addition to Mignone’s and Champagne’s works, he played two folk-
infused compositions by Canada’s Ernest MacMillan (“Les jeunes filles à marier”) and Achile 
Fortier (“Lève ton pied, bergère”). Tannehill then joined her husband and sang a few French-
Canadian folksongs to the great pleasure of the audience. As an extra friendly gesture, Dansereau 
dedicated his performance to Mignone and Villa-Lobos. 
Not only did this musical diplomacy elevate Désy’s status within Rio de Janeiro’s elite 
circles, it also changed the perception that Canada was defined, foremost, by its Britishness. In a 
piece published shortly after the Dansereau couple’s Dominion Day performance, a reporter 
from A Noite described a room filled with Canadian and Brazilians flags, symbols of harmony 
that spoke of the closeness between the two nations. Music, the piece concluded, provided a 
vivid experience of this growing bond of friendship: “It is now the hearts that intertwine in a 
common affection, a feeling made more refined and more harmonious through the art of Jean and 
Muriel Dansereau.”125 Canada, another journalist wrote, is a “romantic northern country, where 
spirit and ‘finesse’ miraculously fuse Latin grace with British solemnity, in the happiest and 
most perfect of alliances.”126 Through this musical nation branding, Désy and his friends 
demonstrated to Brazilians that Canada had, like Brazil, a culture of métissage, albeit one that 
centred on ‘whiteness.’ This particularity was, from the beginning, central to the making of a 
musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.   
As for Dansereau, it is unclear what he got out of this experience. He had moved back to 
Canada five years earlier after an absence of close to twenty years. Composer Wilfrid Pelletier, 
then artistic director of Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM), had greeted 
him at the station after having invited reporters to join him in celebrating the pianist’s return. 
None came. Pelletier felt “hurt” and made it his mission to prepare his friend’s success in the 
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province.127 A few weeks later, Dansereau performed Beethoven’s third piano concerto with the 
OCSM to great acclaim. By 1943, he was teaching at ESMO and CMQM (Pelletier was its first 
director with Champagne serving as assistant director). In addition to being an exotic destination, 
Brazil was most likely an opportunity for Dansereau to network with renowned composers such 
as Villa-Lobos and Mignone, enhancing his image as a great cosmopolitan artist, while 
familiarizing himself with his counterparts’ approach to musical nationalism and music 
education. One thing is certain: he embraced the mandate of cultural ambassador given to him by 
Désy. In an interview with Sheila Ivert, published in the magazine Carioca, Dansereau attributed 
to Brazilians the same qualities they had attributed to him. He complimented them for their 
generosity as well as for their distinctive personality and character. He may have stretched the 
truth when he claimed that Brazil’s culture was well-known and appreciated in Canada, but his 
intent was to remind Brazilians that, as a “creative civilization,” they shared with Canadians a 
need for “a continuously renewed spiritual source.”128 Music was the means through which they 
could bridge their shared past and their future. It was also the backdrop to conversations taking 
place within the Itamaraty about a possible cultural agreement between the two nations.        
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 
The fact that this first experiment in musical diplomacy went on, unperturbed by the urgencies of 
war, reveals the extent to which Brazil was far removed from the issues that preoccupied 
Canadians in 1943. The Vargas regime found a very eager interlocutor in Désy who brought to 
the DEA a particular understanding of how culture – French-Canadian culture, more specifically 
– could enhance Canada’s image overseas. A skilful actor in the influence game in Brazil, the 
Montreal-born diplomat availed himself of the opportunities presented to him despite his host 
country’s fascist inclinations. His astute interpretation of the Brazilian politico-cultural landscape 
and his opportunistic use of the dictatorship’s cultural infrastructure helped ensure that the 
Dansereau couple’s stay in Brazil would be productive. As an exercise in musical nation 
branding, the tour was about juxtaposing difference against the hegemonic sameness-embracing 
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of a Washington-driven musical pan-Americanism. It was about advancing an autonomous 
vision that placed French Canada centre stage while instrumentalizing Brazil’s difference to 
evoke the idea of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. Latinity and family 
served as apt tropes for this cultural rapprochement. The initiative, however, was never the 
DEA’s own. Instead it was heavily influenced and directed by individuals like Désy and the 
Dansereau couple who – with the encouragement of their foreign counterparts – juggled personal 





CHAPTER 2: A FAMILIAR FOLK 
 
The Alouette Quartet itself does not consist of actual folk singers. It is a group of trained singers 
of Montreal, organised over ten years ago by its present members. … Its approach is 
professional, which makes a difference.1 
– Marius Barbeau, 1942 
 
“En entrant dans la baie de Rio, ce qui frappe le plus, c’est cette imposante statue du Christ-
Rédempteur que l’on peut voir de toutes les parties de la ville, telle que les [M]ontréalais peuvent 
voir la croix sur le Mt-Royal,” explained Émile Lamarre to Montreal journalist Oscar Richer in 
December of 1945.2 The singer had just returned from a two-month tour of Brazil with his 
colleagues from Quatuor alouette: Jules Jacob, André Trottier, and Roger Filiatrault. They were 
not mere amateurs, as Marius Barbeau had pointed out after their performance at the 1942 
edition of the American National Folk Festival, which was held in Washington and New York 
that year.3 The four men were folklorists themselves and their project to give a “Fine 
Interpretation and Artistic Vulgarizing of French Canadian Folklore” was intertwined with their 
desire to use music as a means of articulating an antimodernist vision of the world.4 Filiatrault 
and Jean Désy were cousins, but that alone did not explain the group’s presence in Brazil in 
October and November of 1945. A regular fixture on radio airwaves, Quatuor alouette was 
wildly popular in Québec. Moreover, its members possessed experience as cultural ambassadors, 
having performed in France during the celebrations organized for the Fourth Centenary of 
Jacques Cartier’s first voyage to Canada (1934) as well as in the United States where they twice 
acted as official Québec delegates to the National Folk Festival (1942-43).5 Désy invited Quatuor 
alouette to Brazil to provide additional momentum to the cultural rapprochement spearheaded by 
Jean and Muriel Dansereau two years earlier. It was a departure from ‘serious music,’ but the 
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diplomat was optimistic that the group’s performances and repertoire would resonate with 
Brazilians.  
Much had happened between August 1943, when the Dansereau couple left Brazil, and 
October 1945, when Quatuor alouette disembarked in Rio de Janeiro. Désy had graduated from 
minister plenipotentiary to ambassador with the elevation of Canada’s legation to embassy status 
in 1944. The change had preceded the signing of a cultural agreement between the two countries 
by just a few months. At war since 1942, Brazil had been providing valuable assistance to the 
United States, mostly by helping beef up hemispheric defence and providing support in the 
Battle of the Atlantic. President Getúlio Vargas’s clearest commitment to an Allied victory came 
in July of 1944 with the deployment of a 25,000-strong Força Expedicionária Brasileira 
[Brazilian Expeditionary Force] to the Mediterranean war theatre. The mobilization was 
consistent with Brazilians’ desire to demarcate themselves within the hemisphere and to improve 
their standing on the international stage. The war experience bolstered nationalism, but it also 
brought into focus the evident contradiction of a dictatorship fighting undemocratic fascist 
regimes overseas.6 Vargas’s ongoing reluctance to commit to a return to democracy in Brazil 
fuelled a range of domestic discontents, from the spectre of a fifth-column communist subversion 
to the threat of a military coup. Despite these developments, Canadian policy makers in Ottawa 
paid little attention to Brazil, focused as they were on winning the war, managing bilateral 
relations with the United States, and dealing with a series of domestic problems – most notably 
French-English tensions over conscription, the fear of enemy aliens, and labour militancy. 
Désy’s musical nation branding effort thus continued its course unencumbered by the urgency of 
war.     
In Brazil, Quatuor alouette performed folksongs that spoke of nostalgia for an idyllic time, 
the sanctity of bonne entente and community, the picturesque and majestic Canadian landscape, 
and the importance of Christian values in changing times. Antimodernist undertones permeated 
these works and their rendition on stage and on radio airwaves. However, the tour provided 
Quatuor alouette with the opportunity to expand and attach new meanings to its repertoire. First, 
the four singers relied on a selection of French and French-Canadian songs, combined with an 
“Empire” potpourri (works originating from the British Isles), to depict Canadians’ national 
                                                          




identity as a composite of Latinity and Britishness. The group therefore engaged with the trope 
of métissage that was at the heart of Brasilidade. Filiatrault and his bandmates also emphasized 
their Catholic heritage, which in addition to Latinity, was something that French Canadians and 
Brazilians shared. The fact that Quatuor alouette arrived in Brazil at the same time as 
missionaries from the congregation Les Frères du Sacré Coeur was pure coincidence. But both 
parties were delighted by the serendipity of their encounter. It inspired the singers to lend their 
voices to the cause of their ordained brothers when performing for elite audiences in Rio de 
Janeiro, São Paulo, and the old imperial city of Petrópolis. They assumed that their publics – 
descendants of ‘white’ settlers themselves – would appreciate and recognize themselves in the 
music. Quatuor alouette’s contribution to Désy’s musical diplomacy thus helped further 
foreground ‘whiteness’ as the normative link between the two nations while placing French-
speaking, Catholic Québec at the centre of Canada’s image in Brazil. This chapter discusses the 
making of the 1944 cultural agreement and the broader politico-cultural context within which 
Désy designed this new musical diplomacy initiative. It then focuses on the discourses and 
practices of folklore studies pioneers, both Brazilians and Canadians, before zooming in on the 
logistics and deployment of – as well as reception to – Quatuor alouette’s tour.  
Making a Cultural Agreement 
Quatuor alouette’s tour occurred in the aftermath of two milestones in Canadian-Brazilian 
relations: Canada elevated its legation in Rio de Janeiro to embassy status and it entered, in May 
of 1944, into its first cultural agreement with another country. Neither were indications that the 
Department of External Affairs (DEA) wished to prioritize its bilateral relations with the South 
American giant. The first of these two developments was consistent with Canada’s ongoing 
efforts to assert its autonomy in international affairs by finding its place vis-à-vis both the United 
States and Great Britain (changes from legation to embassy occurred simultaneously across 
diplomatic missions). Canadians’ wartime contributions – from their skilful repurposing of the 
economy in support of the Allied cause to the hundreds of thousands of men and women who 
went overseas – made it difficult not to notice that Canada was making enormous sacrifices. The 
Second World War elevated the country’s reputation on the international stage, particularly 
within the Commonwealth where Canadians imagined themselves playing an inspirational role, 




nation, working through the challenges of closer relations with the United States as a means of 
developing a more stable autonomous footing outside of the British Empire. A signatory of the 
January 1, 1942, Declaration by United Nations, Canada pursued – somewhat timidly and 
haphazardly – its middle power aspirations with the help of British intermediaries at the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference where Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union met to 
discuss the creation of the United Nations.7 As Robert Bothwell explains: “Canadians believed 
that there was still a place in Anglo-Saxon geometry for their country, and they liked the British 
and Americans to understand that Canada was close to them politically, perhaps even that 
Canada was their best friend.”8 Minister of Trade and Commerce James MacKinnon and the 
DEA’s own Escott Reid championed this idea of Canada as a middle power, as a linchpin, even 
as a helpful fixer, when they argued in 1941 that it could play the roles of “interpreter and 
mediator between the United States and Latin America and between the United States and Great 
Britain in Latin America.”9 Notwithstanding these aspirations, Brazil, in itself, was of negligible 
importance to the DEA who remained focused on the war in Europe and on power dynamics 
within the North Atlantic Triangle.   
Likewise, the DEA agreed to go ahead with the 1944 cultural agreement due to factors that 
were, for the most part, external to Brazil. Not only did the department lack experience in the 
realm of cultural diplomacy, it was also unenthusiastic about the project, which Désy had 
unexpectedly brought to the fore as a near-fait accompli. It is not clear who initiated discussions 
regarding the establishment of closer bilateral cultural relations, but they most likely followed 
from Vargas’s suggestion, on his first meeting with Désy, that Canada and Brazil “do something 
new together.”10 On May 17, 1942, the Canadian diplomat and Temístocles da Graça Aranha, 
head of the Divisão de Cooperação Intelectual [Division of Intellectual Cooperation] (DCIn) in 
foreign affairs (aka the Itamaraty), met to brainstorm on the means of achieving a greater 
rapprochement between the two nations. From that point on, the two men discussed the issue 
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frequently while making plans for bringing Canadian art to Brazil.11 On December 9, they 
apparently agreed on a draft for a five-point agreement that covered a variety of topics: from 
promoting cultural manifestations to translating books and facilitating the exchange of students 
as well as professors.12 Considering Désy’s own experience as a travelling scholar and his 
experience with the DEA, it is surprising that he did not raise the issue of provincial jurisdiction 
over education with his interlocutor. Much of this was either wishful thinking or poor planning, 
both of which could be explained by the fact that Canada was a novice when it came to cultural 
diplomacy. It is more likely, however, that Désy acted intrepidly knowing very well that he 
would face resistance – or worse, indifference – in Ottawa.13 On December 17, he broached the 
topic with his superiors in a letter detailing what he and T. G. Aranha had been working on for 
several months. Désy’s closing statement read: “I need, of course, scarcely mention to you the 
importance for our purposes of establishing our cultural propaganda on a definite and official 
basis.”14 By presenting the agreement as a near-fait accompli, he was increasing his chances of 
having it be given the attention he thought it deserved. 
The DEA could not, however, be expected to move too promptly on the issue, especially since 
it could be misconstrued by the Americans as a form of British interference in Latin America. 
From Washington’s perspective, Canada had yet to demonstrate its autonomy in international 
affairs. This was the rationale for the State Department’s opposition to Canada attending the Pan-
American Union (PAU) meeting held in Rio de Janeiro earlier in 1942.15 On January 8, 1943, the 
DEA sent a teletype message to Lester B. Pearson, then Canadian minister in Washington, 
informing him of Désy’s letter and asking if the United States had concluded similar bilateral 
agreements with Latin American countries in the past.16 It seems likely that the strategy was to 
take the pulse of the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration on the issue without asking 
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directly whether or not it approved of Canada proceeding with the agreement. The response 
came a few days later – Washington had concluded no such agreements. Pearson added: “I 
understand they were afraid that if the agreements were not identical, it would immediately be a 
cause for complaint on the part of the Latin-American Republics themselves.”17 Norman A. 
Robertson, who succeeded O.D. Skelton as under-secretary of state for External Affairs in 1941, 
then wrote to Désy to tell him not to proceed. His explanation was hardly original; he simply 
appropriated the language used in Pearson’s message to describe the “general feeling” of the 
“Canadian authorities.”18 Désy refused to take no for an answer.19 The DEA contacted Pearson, 
once again, asking for additional information on American views regarding cultural diplomacy.20 
His response was a repeat of his previous message although he added that Charles A. Thompson, 
chief of the State Department’s Division of Cultural Relations, had informed him, “[o]ff the 
record,” that comprehensive agreements such as the one proposed by Brazil “seldom work” and 
that Canada “might think it expedient to resort to a practical arrangement” such as a less binding 
exchange of notes.21 If the DEA had stalled on the issue for fear of antagonizing its neighbour to 
the south, it finally had some sort of green light allowing it to proceed. 
Yet many within the DEA were hesitant to embark on a cultural diplomacy project such as 
this one. Robertson captured the mood of the group when he wrote that “some of us are still old 
fashioned enough to have reservations about the whole trend, and cannot work up very much 
enthusiasm for organized Canadian participation in it.”22 He added that provincial prerogatives in 
education and “lingering suspicion of state-aided support of ‘culture’” provided additional 
obstacles.23 On November 8, 1943, Désy finally had a chance to discuss the issue, face to face, 
with his colleagues during a short stint back in Ottawa. Robertson, Reid, Kenneth Rae, and 
Frederick H. Soward represented the DEA while John Grierson, Geoffrey C. Andrew, and Allan 
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Anderson spoke for the Wartime Information Board. A number of points were raised in 
opposition to the project: namely (1) the fear of setting a precedent in the Americas where none 
existed within the Commonwealth; (2) discomfort with the notion of exporting culture in a 
manner reminiscent of fascist propaganda; (3) concerns with the “danger of admitting 
undesirable propaganda into Canada virtually under government sponsorship”; (4) ambivalence 
vis-à-vis the “value of ‘exporting culture’”; and (5) apprehension at the thought of encroaching 
upon areas of provincial competence.24 The latter point might have sealed the fate of the 
agreement if the attendees had not realized that this was the one area where a precedent might be 
necessary. They remarked that “here there was the risk that if the federal government took no 
action the provinces might come to make cultural working arrangements abroad on the basis of 
their educational powers.”25 The need to protect Canada’s prerogatives in that area sufficed to 
rally everyone behind Désy’s proposed cultural agreement with Brazil. 
Things moved swiftly following that meeting. The Legal Division reworked Désy’s draft from 
a year earlier and submitted it to the DEA – and then to the Itamaraty – for approval. It now read: 
It is considered that, in the relations between the two countries, there should be a recognition of the 
desirability of promoting a greater mutual knowledge and wider comprehension of the respective 
peoples, their cultures, traditions, and institutions. 
In particular the Government welcomes efforts made: to encourage and facilitate the exchange of 
official, scientific and technical publications, reviews, newspaper articles, books, et cetera; and to 
encourage and facilitate the organization and presentation of artistic exhibitions, concerts, lectures, 
radio programs, films, and other activities and contacts. 
To this end the Government of Canada is resolved, within its constitutional powers, and by such 
means as are at its disposal, to encourage intellectual and cultural activities of reciprocal value in 
furthering the understanding of one country by the other.26 
The Exchange of Notes Between Canada and Brazil Constituting an Agreement for the 
Promotion of Cultural Relations Between the Two Countries was signed on May 24, 1944, at a 
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ceremony held in the Itamaraty. Interestingly, no one at the DEA seemed to have noticed that 
Brazilian authorities had opted for a much shorter name for the Portuguese-language version of 
the agreement: Acordo Cultural, a less obfuscating title that perhaps signalled Brazilians’ – or 
possibly Désy’s – intention to give the document more importance than the DEA intended.27                  
Projecting (French) Canadian Exceptionalism 
With the agreement signed, Désy wasted no time mobilizing his network in Brazil to keep the 
momentum going. He was especially committed to soliciting the help of non-state actors, many 
of whom were more than willing to indulge in the metaphors deployed to encourage a 
rapprochement between the two countries. The inauguration of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá 
[Brazil-Canada Institute] in Rio de Janeiro, on June 14, 1944, helped kick-start this new chapter 
in Canadian-Brazilian relations.28 Designed by Désy and his counterparts in the Itamaraty, the 
institute was meant to serve “as a clearing-house for all activities of a cultural nature which can 
be more easily directed by an organisation outside the Embassy.”29 Mindful that he should not 
overstretch himself, he reassured his less adventurous colleagues in Ottawa that the intention was 
to make the institute “a largely Brazilian affair.”30 Needless to say, they agreed on that point.31 
Raul Leitão, rector of Universidade do Brasil [University of Brazil] and founding president of 
the institute, celebrated the initiative for it proposed to transcend the physical distance that 
separated Brazilians from Canadians. In a speech delivered on inauguration day, Leitão evoked 
the trope of métissage to indicate that Brazilians were now seeing Canada as more than a British 
Dominion. He said: “Canadian history reveals the beneficent efforts of the coinciding influences 
of the energies and virtues of the aborigenes, Indians and Esquimoes, and of the Europeans, 
English and French, in the formation of the superior qualities of the Canadian people.”32 
Approaching Canada’s past through the same logic that informed the concept of Brasilidade 
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allowed Leitão to underscore the exceptionalism of the Canadian settler experience. However, in 
doing so he attributed to indigenous peoples a more important role than the one Désy had 
reserved for them in his own narratives. 
A former professor of history, the Canadian diplomat excelled at telling stories and 
weaving compelling narratives to engage audiences. The signing of the cultural agreement and 
the inauguration of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá were occasions for him to explain how the two 
nations shared a common past and destiny. Aside from their resource-rich and idyllic landscapes, 
Canada and Brazil were both penetrated by majestic rivers that carried the names of canonized 
Catholic figures: São Francisco and Saint Lawrence. Désy liked to populate his narratives with 
‘great men’ who embodied nationhood. Brazilian and Canadian men who, once juxtaposed, 
brought into focus a “communauté d’influences” as well as a “communauté d’habitudes et de 
pensées.”33 Men like bandeirante Pascoal Moreira Cabral and explorer Pierre Gaultier de 
Varennes, or Jesuit missionaries Antonio Vieira and Jean de Brébeuf, whose lives left a deep 
imprint on the economic and spiritual character of both Brazil and Canada. Désy continued:  
[Our two nations] have slowly discovered, cleared, and fashioned the land which our 
ancestors had chosen for us. We have humanised it in our image. We have peopled it with 
men, sacrifices, words, and thoughts. Our works have given it their impress. We can say ... 
that in the barbarous force of a new country an old root has found once more its adolescence.  
The first problem which we had to resolve was to endure physically. The second problem, no 
less important than the first, was to endure spiritually.34  
In his speeches, Désy marvelled at the exceptionalism of the two ‘white’ settler colonies, their 
warm and resilient community-oriented peoples, and the importance of culture in preserving “the 
essential features which differentiate us, while bringing us together.”35 Although most of his 
protagonists were French Canadians, Désy noted that industrious and enlightened English-
speaking Canadians played no small part in Canada’s development.36 The country’s so-called 
‘two founding races’ had learned to live harmoniously with each other in ways that set them 
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apart from less tolerant societies, he implicitly argued.37 The essentialized depiction of 
indigenous peoples as having little to no agency was not accidental: Désy had not reserved a role 
for them in his imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.  
The French-Canadian diplomat therefore championed a cultural understanding of 
métissage that foregrounded ‘whiteness.’ He also discussed the past in gendered terms that 
obfuscated the contributions of women and celebrated the enterprising spirit of the manful 
coureurs des bois and missionaries. Through these figures, he established a link between the past 
and the present, as others were doing in Québec, to demonstrate the central role that men played 
as nation builders. The Catholic priest and historian Lionel Groulx was among those who 
articulated the idea of ‘national manhood’ as a means of negotiating the tension between 
tradition and modernity. Jeffery Vacante explains: “This coupling of national and masculine 
identities released French Canadian men from the supposed effeminizing grip of modernity as 
well as from the confines of biological racial identity, and it permitted them to regain some of the 
power that they claimed they had lost over their fates by making male identity dependent upon 
their commitment to national identity.”38 Like Groulx, Désy placed the coureur des bois 
alongside the missionary in the “pantheon of heroes from New France.”39 He believed that 
French-Canadian men had played – and could continue to play – a crucial role as agents of 
cultural survival. Yet as a French-speaking, Catholic intellectual serving Canada in Brazil, his 
masculine and national identities were fluid, even situational, which is why he saw no 
contradiction in the fact that he was using nationalistic narratives from Québec to imagine a 
transnational community based on Canadians’ and Brazilians’ supposed shared culture of 
métissage.  
Latinity and Catholicism were the leitmotifs of Désy’s narratives. The Catholic Church in 
Brazil traced its origins to the sixteenth century when religious orders – among others, 
Franciscans, Dominicans, and Jesuits – entrenched themselves throughout the land, thereby 
assisting the colonial regime.40 Catholicism became the official religion of Brazil from the 
moment the country declared its independence in 1822 to the end of Dom Pedro II’s reign in 
                                                          
37 Ibid.  
38 Vacante, National Manhood and the Creation of Modern Quebec, 179. 
39 Ibid., 142. 




1889. The advent of the republic was marked by the separation of Church and State, but this did 
not prevent additional bishoprics from being established across the country. Vargas’s ascent to 
power signalled the beginning of a new era for the Catholic Church, which endorsed the 
president’s centralizing and corporatist approach to governance.41 During the Estado Novo, 
Church and State worked conjointly. “[T]hey became mutually-legitimating allies in the face of 
perceived ideological threats such as ‘anarchic liberalism’ and ‘atheistic communism,’” explains 
Marcelo Campos Hazan.42 He adds that this “reciprocal legitimation was played out musically” 
through liturgy, which acted as a “musical simulacrum of the authoritarian order,” and orpheonic 
singing, which “aimed at suppressing dissent, infusing obedience, and subordinating the urban 
masses to their political and musical leaders [i.e. Vargas and composer-educator Heitor Villa-
Lobos].”43 Désy was attuned to his hosts’ politico-cultural environment when he made the 
decision to recruit four singers for his new musical diplomacy initiative. Speaking on radio 
airwaves, while on vacation in Montreal during the summer of 1945, he explained: “Entre le 
Canada et le Brésil il y a une parenté d’esprit, de culture, de tradition, parenté qui se retrouve 
même dans le folk-lore et l’art religieux, parenté ancienne qui, malgré les apparences, s’affirme 
chaque jour dans les traits fondamentaux du caractère des deux peuples.”44 Quatuor alouette’s 
upcoming tour of Brazil would help give credence to this idea.45        
Searching for the Folk 
Désy’s reading of the Brazilian politico-cultural landscape and his familiarity with the state of 
knowledge regarding folklore studies in Canada informed his decision to invite Quatuor alouette 
to Brazil in 1945. Québec itself was the site where much of the fieldwork had taken place, which 
led some to argue that French Canadians embodied the essence of a folk society.46 A composite 
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term, folklore refers to a somewhat homogeneous social group (folk) and the totality of its 
cultural manifestations (lore), including the particular vision of the world that characterized it 
from one generation to another. A product of the investigative gaze, folklore is a “constructed 
term,” even an “essentialist abstraction,” that traced its origins to the Romantic period.47 
Philosopher and literary figure Johann Gottfried von Herder had placed the Folk at the heart of a 
nascent Germanic nationalism to counteract the disruptive effects of industrialization and 
cosmopolitan foreign influences in the eighteenth century. Herder’s championing of traditional 
local expressive cultures (from language to poetry and music) inspired others, such as German 
academics Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, to pursue his search for a fixed – thus stable and enduring 
– national essence. Ian McKay explains: 
As one of the great abstractions of Romanticism, “the Folk” came to be regarded as the 
epitome of simple truth, work, and virtue, the antithesis of all that was overcivilized, tired, 
conventional, and insincere. The Folk were closer to nature … and could respond more 
spontaneously to “natural music.” For romantic nationalists, the “Folk” were those whose 
very existence and culture testified to the possibility and necessity of the nation.48  
In posing the question of selfhood and nationhood versus ‘otherness’ – of ‘race’ and origins – 
folklorists such as Herder and the Grimm brothers searched for order and purpose in ways that 
betrayed their discomfort with the changing world around them.49          
A similar uneasiness inspired folklorists at the turn of the twentieth century. Responding to 
multifarious combinations of phenomena (from industrialization to urbanization, population 
migration, leftist agitation, changing sociocultural mores, and shifting power centres), they 
searched for an idyllic corporeal entity that could provide reassurance while serving as a model 
to cling to, perhaps even emulate, in the face of disquieting change. Francis James Child and 
John Lomax were folklore studies pioneers whose respective works on music contributed to the 
invention of the Folk as an agent with little to no agency (the former studied English and Scottish 
ballads whereas the latter focused on American folk music). In other words, the Folk was a 
repository and passive transmitter of expressive cultures, which folklorists could mine, 
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document, display, and comment on by drawing from anthropological and literary approaches. 
“There was … a complex and powerful Anglo-American folklore matrix, a common trans-
Atlantic entropic sensibility that structured assumptions and methods in the study of the Folk and 
their supposed lore,” argues McKay.50 Folklorists could be one or all of the following: 
academics, musical experts, cultural producers, or educators. In those capacities, they harnessed 
the potential of information technologies to record, preserve, frame, and disseminate their 
findings. Their project was as much about constructing a past that could offset the more 
disruptive aspects of modernization as it was about finding anchors for the nation and the social 
order within which they thrived as elite members of society. The turbulence of the First World 
War and the Great Depression made that project even more important, if not urgent.                
Folklore studies developed under a similar set of circumstances in Brazil with the 
difference that the country’s distinct demography and political evolution demanded a much 
broader interpretation of the Folk. From abolition up to and through the Estado Novo, Brazilians 
came to embrace the myth of the national family whose two pillars were the nation-state and 
cultural elites. The former was both the legitimate incarnation and the safe keeper of the myth 
whereas the latter defined its contours and gave it resonance.51 Corporatism and cultural 
populism provided the framework within which Brazilians imagined and experienced the 
national family. The search for the Folk coincided with the search for a national essence that 
could foster national unity and offset the destabilizing effects of the non-Portuguese immigration 
to Brazil, cultural imperialism, and industrialization on social order. Because it championed 
métissage rather than ‘whitening,’ Brasilidade demanded both a reengagement with indigenous 
folklore and the incorporation of Afro-Brazilian expressive cultures in the national imaginary. 
The country’s North and Northeast were coveted sites for fieldwork, because they were 
wellsprings of pre-Columbian and Afro-Brazilian cultures. They were also the sites of the first 
Portuguese settlements that followed Pedro Álvares Cabral’s landing in what is now Bahia. 
Hence the feeling of “saudade, or longing,” that accompanied evocations of the Northeast, a 
region that many considered “the cradle of Brazilian civilization.”52 
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A coorganizer of the 1922 Semana de Arte Moderna, Mario de Andrade helped articulate 
and popularize Brasilidade through his poetry, novels, and writings on music. His search for a 
national language and for national symbols placed him at the centre of folklore studies in Brazil. 
The São Paulo artist and intellectual initially refused to consider himself a folklorist: “I am 
certainly not a folklorist.”53 Yet he played a pivotal role in documenting – and theorizing about – 
expressive musical cultures from throughout Brazil. As founding director of São Paulo’s 
Departamento de Cultura [Department of Culture], he organized and sent a folklore research 
mission to the North and the Northeast in 1938. It returned with recordings of one thousand 
melodies, loads of musical instruments, close to eighteen thousand textual documents (from 
notebooks to notations and lyrics), cult objects, over one thousand photographs, and nineteen 
films.54 Andrade also founded the Discoteca Pública [Public Music Library], which eventually 
assured the cataloguing, preservation, display, and dissemination of the documents and items 
collected. As such, he actively sought out and mobilized source materials that he could then 
deploy as symbols to advance the national project. He thus participated in efforts to reimagine 
Brazil as an exceptional nation capable of “creating a cultural (if not a biologically) mestiço 
people.”55  
As for folklorists in Canada, they operated within the framework of the Anglo-American 
folklore matrix referred to above.56 Systematic fieldwork began in 1910 when anthropologist and 
linguist Edward Sapir became involved in the Geological Survey of Canada (GSC), which then 
included the Victoria Memorial Museum (later renamed National Museum of Canada). As the 
founding director of the Anthropological Division, he initiated a vast study of indigenous 
languages and expressive cultures, including music. Returning from Great Britain where he had 
studied on a Rhodes Scholarship, Marius Barbeau joined Sapir at the GSC in 1911 to conduct 
research in Québec and Ontario primarily. A chance encounter with Franz Uri Boas, the 
                                                          
53 Mario de Andrade, Música Doce Música (São Paulo: L.G. Miranda, 1934), 77. In Portuguese: “Não sou 
folclorista não.” 
54 Fernando Giobellina Brumana, “Mario de Andrade y la Missão de Pesquisas Folclóricas (1938): Une Etnografía 
que no Fue,” Revista de Indias LXVI, no. 237 (2006): 545-572. 
55 Davis, Avoiding the Dark, 61. 
56 McKay, The Quest of the Folk, 80. For more on North American cosmopolitan elites and their cultural works in 
Canada, see Jeffrey D. Brison, Rockefeller, Carnegie, & Canada: American Philanthropy and the Arts & Letters in 




renowned German-American anthropologist and one of Sapir’s former mentors, set him on the 
path of French-Canadian folklore. Loren Lerner explains: 
In the course of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Boas pioneered what he 
believed to be a science-based approach to anthropology. … This involved studying a unique 
culture in all its aspects, including art, languages, history, and religion. From his perspective, 
the French Canadians qualified as a culture and a history as a result of distinctive historical, 
social, and geographic conditions.57  
Boas thus encouraged Barbeau to set his gaze beyond the “native races.”58 If French 
Canadians were legitimate research objects, so were the Scots of Nova Scotia as folklorist 
William Roy MacKenzie might have argued. His work on British Isles ballads preserved in 
the province was in the Child tradition although he came on the scene a little too early to 
ride the “antimodernist wave” of the 1920s and 1930s.59 His successor, Helen Creighton, 
had better luck – and timing –  in constructing and popularizing an essentialist past for 
Nova Scotia.60 
Marius Barbeau set himself apart from his professional and semi-professional colleagues 
through his ability to combine research and knowledge mobilization in both French and English 
Canada. Born in 1883 in Sainte-Marie, Québec, he first studied law at Université Laval before 
transitioning to anthropology while in Great Britain. Following his meeting with Boas in 1913, 
he began fieldwork in Québec with the intent of better understanding how French-Canadian folk 
tales intersected with the expressive culture of the Wyandot people. Music, especially, captured 
his interest. His mother, an organist with the local parish, had taught him rudiments on the piano, 
which proved handy in preparing transcriptions, harmonizations, and arrangements for the 
folksongs he was recording. Johann-Baptist Beck, a philologist with an interest in troubadours, 
English composer Arthur Somervell, and Canadian-born composer Ernest MacMillan, among 
others, provided assistance with some of that work.61 Barbeau’s Folksongs of French Canada 
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(coauthored with Sapir in 1925) and subsequent publications established his expert status, which 
he built upon to reinvent himself as a cultural producer.62 At the turn of the 1920s, he started 
organizing and staging lecture recitals to popularize French-Canadian folklore and to educate 
audiences about the merits of a music that spoke, in the present, of terroir and an idyllic past. As 
John Haines explains, “les villages évoqués par Barbeau pour ses lecteurs citadins sont éloignés 
du Canada moderne et de ses grandes villes hétérogènes et modernisées.”63 He adds: “Il en va 
ainsi du chant du terroir: rustique, car lié à la terre dont il émane; joyeux, car non frustré par la 
corruption moderne; brillant et splendide, car préservé pendant des siècles à l’état brut.”64 
Whether it was the Veillées du bon vieux temps, held at Montreal’s Bibliothèque Saint-Sulpice in 
1919 and 1920, or the concerts presented under the auspices of the Canadian Pacific Railway 
(CPR) Festival, organized by publicity agent John Murray Gibbon between 1927 and 1931, 
Barbeau tirelessly conveyed his antimodernist and federalist vision to elite audiences throughout 
Canada.65   
Désy was among those who engaged with Barbeau’s work. In 1945, he published an article 
on Canadian folksongs in Brasil Musical, a prestigious publication destined for members of the 
country’s highest social and cultural circles. In it, he outlined the history of French-Canadian 
folklore, starting with songs imported from France in the seventeenth century to songs invented 
in the ‘New World’ by explorers, missionaries, and settlers. Borrowing from Barbeau, he 
proposed a taxonomy that accounted for variations in melody, wording, and pronunciation: 
lullabies, love songs, dialogues and vaudevilles, humorous songs, dance and work tunes, and 
religious hymns. Désy explained to Brazilian audiences that generations of French Canadians 
had preserved and nurtured the collective memory of folksongs that had long been lost in France. 
He stressed the nomadic character of these songs as if they had a life of their own; a life from 
which one could draw lessons about survival and endurance as well as the need for anchors in 
order to adapt and thrive. “No frontier prevented them from progressing for long; they knew how 
to change appearance and penetrate everywhere; how to modify their language, how to hide their 
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origin,” he wrote.66 Désy concluded by highlighting that Canada’s repertoire of folksongs 
included Irish, Scottish, and English materials. Its heterogeneity spoke of diversity, mutuality, 
and bonne entente, even métissage. It was, in other words, presumably analogous to Brazil’s own 
repertoire.  
By focusing on the cultural manifestations of settler colonists, Désy placed limits on what 
could be included in his musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. In the article, he 
made references to popular Brazilian songs such as “A Canoa Virou” and “Entrei na Roda,” 
which he described as being of Spanish-Italian and French origins. As for works originating from 
Africa, he briefly noted that their presence in Brazil could be explained by “the size of the black 
race established in this country.”67 It is revealing that Désy made references neither to Afro-
Canadians nor to the two countries’ role in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. By avoiding both 
topics, Désy could present Canada as having been forever ‘white’ and free of racism. 
Accordingly, he also made no mention of indigenous expressive cultures. The omission was 
consistent with the “discourse of disappearance” put forward by folklorists such as Barbeau.68 
Leslie Dawn explains that this “discursive framework … included the proposition that the 
diverse native populations in Canada formed a homogeneous group and a single race, that they 
had long been absent from the contemporary scene, and that they had left a vacant site to be 
filled by … artists who could produce the image of a nation based on their absence.”69 Whereas 
the birth of a Brazilian identity necessitated an engagement with indigenous cultures, the birth of 
a Canadian identity required relegating these same cultures to the distant – and dead – past in the 
1940s. The narrative that Désy deployed in Brasil Musical thus centred on the ‘exceptionalism’ 
of ‘white’ settler colonists – French and English – at the expense of other groups deemed to be 
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outside the nation. Published in the fall of 1945, the article served as a prelude to Quatuor 
alouette’s tour of Brazil. 
Singing in Unison with Quatuor alouette 
Founded in 1930 by Filiatrault and Trottier, Quatuor alouette permanently recruited Jacob and 
Lamarre the following year. Oscar O’Brien joined the four singers soon after to be their artistic 
director. The group traced its origins to the Veillées du bon vieux temps, which Barbeau had 
organized as part of his efforts to mobilize support for his study of French-Canadian folklore.70 
Filiatrault and his colleagues saw themselves as pursuing that project although there was also a 
personal – albeit indirect – connection to these events. In attendance was Charles Marchand, a 
baritone and folklorist, who felt inspired to form his own vocal ensemble in 1927. His 
Troubadours de Bytown quickly became a sensation as they associated themselves with 
Gibbon’s CPR Festival. In addition to performing, Marchand handled aspects of the events’ 
artistic direction. His sudden death on the eve of the 1930 edition created a significant void and 
led to the disbanding of the group he had founded. O’Brien, a long-time associate of Marchand, 
stepped in as artistic director for Gibbon. He then began looking for another group that could be 
the voice of French-Canadian folklore. Quatuor alouette’s professional approach and its mastery 
of the repertoire Barbeau had assembled in his numerous works impressed him.71 The group and 
O’Brien gave their first concert at Montreal’s Salle des artisans canadiens-français on May 29, 
1932, under the patronage of Gibbon and Lieutenant-Colonel Elzéar Hurtubise. Their success 
was not long coming. Within a few years, Quatuor alouette had become a regular fixture on radio 
airwaves while also performing throughout Canada as well as in Europe and in the United States.  
Born in 1892, Oscar O’Brien was an educator and a musician whose chosen instruments 
were the piano and the organ. He began collaborating with Marchand in 1915, accompanying 
him in his efforts to elevate folk singing to the status of a legitimate popular art form. From that 
point on, he harmonized and prepared arrangements for hundreds of songs in accordance with 
the vision that Barbeau put forward in his publications and on stage during the Veillées du bon 
vieux temps or in the context of similar events. On December 4, 1933, Quatuor alouette and 
                                                          






O’Brien organized a lecture recital for the École technique de Montréal’s faculty. He had three 
questions for the audience: Is folk music worthy of attention? Is it genuinely beautiful? Can it be 
the basis of our national music?72 He responded affirmatively to all three. After having detailed 
the work accomplished thus far by the likes of Barbeau, O’Brien stated unequivocally that folk 
music would not be studied, discussed, and performed so assiduously if it did not have intrinsic 
value. Its poetic and musical qualities, which folklorists had documented, lay in understated yet 
evocative imaging that only true art conveyed, he argued. Hence its popularity. It travelled 
through space and in time, from one generation to another, anchored in the terroir so that artists 
could harvest its fruits. According to O’Brien, folk singers and composers who let themselves be 
inspired by folk tunes made audible the essence of nation.73 His line of argument was evidently 
self-serving. There were also elements of self-fulfilling prophecy in his intellectual and artistic 
journey. Still, there is little doubt that he believed in the potency of music as a means of coping 
with the rapid pace of change during the interwar years.              
However, O’Brien did not lead Quatuor alouette in Brazil. In 1945, the group’s artistic 
director decided to embark on a new journey by entering the Benedictine Monastery of Saint-
Benoit-du-Lac. Roger Filiatrault thus found himself stepping into his departed colleague’s shoes 
while continuing as the group’s baritone. Born in Montreal in 1905, he first learned the piano and 
the violin before committing himself entirely to singing. In Brussels, he studied voice and choral 
conducting at the Royal Conservatory. One of his teachers, Désiré Defauw, would go on to direct 
the Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM) from 1941 to 1952. In Paris, 
Filiatrault studied the physiology of the voice. Back in Montreal, he founded Quatuor alouette 
and subsequently started teaching at École supérieure de musique d’Outremont (ESMO) as well 
as at Université de Montréal and at Université d’Ottawa. Like his three other colleagues in the 
group, he found his calling in the study, performance, and teaching of folk music. Their first 
decade and a half together reached its apex with a highly acclaimed recital at Montreal’s Plateau 
Hall, which was filled to capacity. Thinking back on the work accomplished since 1930, 
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Filiatrault noted proudly that the experience disproved the proverb, “No one is a prophet in his 
own country.”74 
Quatuor alouette’s overseas experience played an important part in its reception at home. 
In 1934, as already mentioned, the group had accompanied the official Canadian delegation to 
Paris for the Fourth Centenary of Jacques Cartier’s first voyage to Canada.75 The group had 
performed as a quartet most of the time although other singers (Gérard Gauthier, Paul Leduc, 
Antonio Dupras, Alexis Pepin, and Émile Boucher, who had been involved with the Troubadours 
de Bytown) had joined in on a few occasions. The highlight of that first trip to Europe had been 
the performance of “Panis Angelicus” at Notre-Dame de Paris and at Saint-Malo Cathedral 
where Cartier had received his blessings before departing for his voyage across the Atlantic.76 
Filiatrault and his associates returned to Europe in 1937 equipped with a better understanding of 
their status as cultural ambassadors. With the support of Québec’s Tourism Office and Provincial 
Secretary Joseph-Henri-Albiny Paquette, the group travelled to France and Belgium under the 
patronage of Philippe Roy, Canada’s minister plenipotentiary in France, who helped promote a 
picturesque and inviting image of both the province and the country.77 Filiatrault then wrote to 
Désy, his cousin, who was counselor at the Paris legation, to see if he could provide some 
assistance, which he did by reaching out to influential people he knew in the press and in 
broadcasting.78 The tour, which lasted from September 25 to November 20, included thirteen 
concerts, not counting those that the group gave at sea in the stunning Mayfair Lounge of the 
Empress of Britain. “[C]es jeunes gens ont fait en France une excellente propagande canadienne-
française,” stressed Désy in a letter addressed to Paquette.79 He was likely trying to help 
facilitate other such opportunities for his cousin’s increasingly popular and experienced vocal 
ensemble. 
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The four singers and their artistic director were skilful self-promoters who understood 
early on the career-building advantages of aligning their artistic démarche with the political and 
cultural trajectory of the French-Canadian nation. In a letter to renowned composer Wilfrid 
Pelletier, O’Brien explained that the group was pursuing “une œuvre nationale” and that their 
battle had two fronts: the first concerned the need to prevent amateurs from tarnishing the art of 
folk music while the second consisted of confronting the snobbery of those who failed to 
understand its importance as a form of national expression.80 “Je ne crois pas que nous ayions 
abaissé notre race,” he stated confidently.81 At the end of 1940, the group heard that Québec’s 
Tourism Office was considering hiring a group of amateur folk singers to promote the province 
south of the 49th parallel. O’Brien protested by reaching out to Hurtubise, a friend of Quatuor 
alouette since its beginnings, who had some influence within political circles.82 Hurtubise 
promptly obliged with a letter to newly elected Provincial Secretary Hector Perrier.83 The tactic 
worked. Perrier arranged for Quatuor alouette to receive funding for the 1942 ($600) and 1943 
($500) editions of the American National Folk Festival.84 The first of the two was held in 
Washington and New York while the second took place in Philadelphia and Chicago. As had 
been the case in Europe, the Canadian legation provided assistance on the ground.85 Eleanor 
Roosevelt, the First Lady, reportedly described the folk singers as “marvellous” after having seen 
them perform.86 Enthused, O’Brien hoped to see Canada, and thus Quatuor alouette, participate 
in more of these events. “[T]he fact of seeing all the people of the North hemisphere, from 
Alaska to Panama,” he wrote, “united in a spirit of good will, expressing themselves through the 
medium of their songs and dances, each in their own traditional way, this, I think, would be the 
greatest lesson of tolerance and understanding ever given to the whole world.”87 O’Brien no 
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doubt understood that these events would also be effective forums for national projection and 
national self-representation.   
The members of Quatuor alouette were convinced that their work was of great importance, 
particularly in the context of the Second World War. Being a cultural ambassador in these 
turbulent times also had its advantages as Filiatrault found out. In the summer of 1943, he 
received a notice that the Canadian army requested that he pass a series of medical examinations 
to determine whether he was fit for battle or not. Much to his dismay, he found himself face to 
face with the possibility of military service. Filiatrault immediately reached out to people of 
influence who could attest to his important role as a cultural ambassador. Among others, he 
sought an intervention from Pelletier, Édouard Montpetit (Désy’s former mentor and colleague at 
Université de Montréal), Sister Marie-Stéphane (director of ESMO and a relative of both Désy 
and Filiatrault), and Joseph Morin (director of Québec’s Service de ciné-photographie).88 “Sans 
aucune prétention, je m’estime plus utile à la nation en agissant comme professeur … et en 
faisant une saine propagande nationale au pays et à l’étranger, comme chanteur en interprétant 
nos chants du terroir dans les rangs du Quatuor alouette,” the singer wrote.89 It is true that in 
addition to the performances discussed earlier, Filiatrault and his colleagues had performed a 
propaganda role by appearing on wartime broadcasts, including Columbia Broadcasting 
System’s Millions for Defence.90 In New York, the group had also recorded material destined for 
the French resistance.91 On August 19, 1944, Filiatrault received the good news that his request 
to be exempted from military service had been approved.92 He was now free to pursue his role as 
a national and war propagandist.      
The four singers were therefore ideal candidates for the kind of musical diplomacy that 
Désy wished to deploy in Brazil. The initiative was entirely his in that the DEA and the 
Itamaraty appeared to have played only a minimal role in the organization of the tour. The same 
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was true for the provincial secretary despite the fact that the DEA enclosed the following note in 
Filiatrault’s passport: “The bearer … is proceeding to Brazil on an official cultural mission on 
behalf of the Government of the Province of Quebec, Canada.”93 Was that entry a gesture meant 
to acknowledge Perrier’s earlier efforts on behalf of Quatuor alouette or did someone – within 
the group or its entourage – request that there be some official recognition that the tour would 
speak foremost about French Canada? There is no evidence to support either hypothesis, except 
for a letter that Désy sent to Premier Maurice Duplessis at the end of the tour. In it, he provided a 
list of Quatuor alouette’s multiple engagements while praising the singers for their 
professionalism. It is revealing that Désy made no mention of their ambassadorial role – for 
either Québec or Canada – when highlighting the group’s “rayonnement” throughout Brazil.94 
He was evidently walking a fine line between promoting French-Canadian culture and projecting 
Canada. That said, the contract stipulated clearly that the agreement was between Désy and 
Quatuor alouette, the latter agreeing to travel – all expenses paid – to Brazil to give an 
unspecified number of performances for a minimum period of two months. The weekly fee was 
fixed at $600 with all living expenses covered by the ambassador. The contract also included a 
note to the effect that Désy would essentially act as an impresario, collecting payments and 
remitting to the group any amount collected in excess of the costs incurred by the embassy.95 In 
the end, Filiatrault and his associates received $970 in travel expenses and $6,000 for ten weeks 
of work, which suggests that no other party contributed financially to the tour and that Désy 
either broke even or lost some money with this experiment.96     
The terms of the contract were such that the Canadian ambassador had plenty of reasons to 
keep Quatuor alouette busy in Brazil. The four singers therefore had their work cut out for them. 
On September 4, they boarded a train from Montreal to New York where the steamship Jose 
Menendez awaited them. They arrived in Rio de Janeiro a month later, on Friday October 5, to 
the great pleasure of Désy who organized a reception for them. The group had its premiere at the 
Teatro Municipal the following Monday. It then travelled to Petrópolis, which was then a 
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summer retreat for the who’s who of Brazilian high society. It gave two concerts at the 
prestigious Palácio Quitandinha before returning to Rio de Janeiro for a two-week residence at 
Urca Casino. The tour also included a short stint in São Paulo for a recital at the city’s municipal 
theatre. Désy squeezed in additional performances here and there, including at the Igreja da 
Glória [Church of Glory], the Conservatório Brasileiro de Música [Brazilian Conservatory of 
Music], and the Ministério da Educação e Saúde (MES). If that was not enough, Quatuor alouette 
appeared more than a dozen times on radio thanks to the enthusiastic support of Rádio Tupi, 
Rádio Gazetta, and the hosts of Ondas Musicais, the musical program of Brazilian Traction, 
Light, and Power Company (aka The Light).97 
However, this busy itinerary was not just about balancing the budget. Désy wished to use 
Quatuor alouette to give shape and substance to the musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian 
community he had been envisioning. Since his arrival in 1941, he had been stressing similarities 
between the two nations; focusing on their so-called exceptionalism as former ‘white’ settler 
colonies, their resource-rich and picturesque landscapes, their shared spirit of community and 
family, their Latin and Catholic heritage, and – taking cues from Brazilian discourses on 
métissage – their exemplary commitment to ‘racial harmony.’ Désy instrumentalized Brazil’s 
and Canada’s differences to stress – paradoxically – their shared uniqueness vis-à-vis the rest of 
the hemisphere although he did so by underscoring ‘whiteness’ as the normative link between the 
two countries. As he had done with the Dansereau couple, Désy reverted to writing to make sure 
that people understood how to engage with Quatuor alouette’s onstage and radio performances. 
Hence, his article in Brasil Musical and the program notes that he prepared for the group’s Rio 
de Janeiro debut. The ambassador turned cultural promoter explained that the folk singers’ 
repertoire reflected Canada’s French heritage, but also the “precious contribution of Celtic 
lyricism and Anglo-Saxon joviality.”98 Their songs were “from a good race and a respectable 
genealogy.”99 In other words, Quatuor alouette’s repertoire was respectable because it was rooted 
in ‘white’ European cultures. The story it told was one that started with ‘white’ settlers. The 
history it celebrated was that of discovery, colonization, and Christianization. 
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Quatuor alouette had a vast repertoire of folksongs to work with – a collection that 
conveyed an antimodernist image of Québec with discernable federalist and religious undertones, 
but also an implicit celebration of settler colonialism. Most of the songs fell under the following 
categories: (1) old French songs; (2) French folksongs preserved in Canada; (3) folksongs 
originating from Canada; and (4) Irish, Scottish, and English folksongs preserved in Canada. The 
group complemented this repertoire with a selection of religious works, including “Panis 
Angelicus,” “Ave Maria,” and “Tantum Ergo.”100 Quatuor alouette performed “Panis Angelicus” 
on numerous occasions, most notably on its 1934 trip to France and during its fifteenth 
anniversary concert at Plateau Hall, but otherwise it reserved its religious songs for special 
occasions such as Christmas and Easter radio broadcasts.101 Also included in the repertoire was 
“Tenaouiche tenaga, ouichka,” a derogatory song that mocked indigenous languages and denoted 
a belief in settler exceptionalism. As for English-language songs, Filiatrault and his bandmates 
performed them infrequently. “Annie Laurie,” “Believe Me, if All Those Endearing Young 
Charms,” and “Drink to Me Only with Thine Eyes” were favourites of the group who inserted 
them in programs that featured an “Old Irish, Scots, and English Songs” subsection or an 
“Empire” potpourri.102 Otherwise, Quatuor alouette’s stage and radio performances in Québec, 
Canada, Europe, and the United States featured mostly French-language songs that belonged to 
the first three categories listed above. 
For its debut concert in Rio de Janeiro, Quatuor alouette put together a program that 
reflected the breadth and scope of its repertoire as described by Désy. The group performed its 
“Empire” potpourri and even sang “Vive la Brésilienne,” a playful rendition of the widely 
popular hymn “Vive la Canadienne.”103 Efforts to promote the group using the trope of 
métissage resulted in some unusual collages, such as ads that featured the singers wearing 
traditional French-Canadian attire, including the colourful ceintures fléchées, with illustrations of 
the Brazilian landscape juxtaposed with a drawing of the Canadian Rockies next to either pine 
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trees or a mounted police officer in the foreground (figure 2.1).104 Quatuor alouette, however, 
promptly gave precedence to their French-Canadian identity on stage and on the airwaves. 
Journalist Mary Newton remembered fondly one of the group’s performances at Urca Casino: 
Dressed in the heavy, colorful garb of the northwoodsman, they stood in front of a big mural 
of the Canadian countryside in this gay night club setting, and sang the beautiful, old songs 
of “New France.” 
Night after night the gay crowds applauded melodies of the Quebec lumber camps, of the 
country parishes, of family groups around their kitchen fireside and of school children 
playing in the convent yard.105 
Quatuor alouette’s performance of nation led the host of The Light’s Ondas Musicais to 
introduce the four singers as French Canadians rather than Canadians. However, someone edited 
the script to stress the fact that Filiatrault and his colleagues were, above all, cultural 
ambassadors for Canada. The host thus explained that their music was “l’expression de l’esprit 
d’une race” and that “les Canadiens français naissent naturellement chanteurs.”106 The group did 
perform its “Empire” potpourri, but it noted that the works that it comprised were not “à 
proprement parler du folklore.”107 Subsequent broadcasts on the airwaves of Rádio Gazetta and 
Rádio Tupi featured no English-language material.108 French was becoming the language of 
choice to “intensify the shared understanding and to further strengthen the relations that unite the 
peoples of Brazil and Canada.”109 The singers were manifestly on an official cultural mission for 
Québec even if the tour was taking place under the auspices of the Canadian embassy.   
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Figure 2.1. Ad for a performance by Quatuor alouette on the airwaves of Ondas Musicais 
(1945). Source: Diario de Noticias, Biblioteca Nacional. 
If Désy’s Dîner canadien was an attempt to rectify the situation, it failed. On November 12, 
the ambassador and his wife hosted an elaborate dinner in the main hall of the Associação 
Brasileira de Impressa; the same room where the Dansereau couple had performed on Dominion 
Day in 1943. More than two hundred guests accepted the invitation. They came from either the 
diplomatic corps or they belonged to Brazil’s highest political, economic, and cultural circles. 
Those present included the British ambassador, the American ambassador, France’s cultural 
attaché, Brazil’s minister of Foreign Affairs, and Rio de Janeiro’s mayor. The invitation they had 
received provided hints regarding what would be on the menu. The card’s design included a 
variety of illustrations that doubled as national symbols: a Canadian moose, a beaver, maple 




(figure 2.2).110 The extensive menu offered a taste of Québec with its apple juice, Gaspé salmon, 
pork stew and pie, leg of lamb, potatoes, brown beans with bacon, cheese, and maple ice cream. 
Seagram’s whiskey was, no doubt, the most Canadian of all the items and it too originated from 
Québec.111      
 
Figure 2.2. Marcel Roussin’s invitation card for Jean Désy’s Dîner canadien (1945). 
Source: Marcel Roussin Fonds, Centre de recherche en civilisation canadienne-française, 
Université d'Ottawa. 
Culture was front and centre throughout the entire evening. Quatuor alouette served as the 
artistic apéritif with its “chansons à boire,” “chansons à manger,” and “chansons à digérer.”112 
Rather than interrupting the dinner with a formal speech, Désy opted to print and distribute the 
text, which he titled “Discours qui ne sera pas prononcé par l’Ambassadeur du Canada.” In it, he 
explained that he thought often of his Brazilian friends while on vacation in Canada. It was 
impractical to invite them all north, so he decided to bring a little more of his country back to 
Brazil with him. With this Dîner canadien, he ventured into the unknown territory of culinary 
diplomacy, which he subsumed within the broader framework of cultural diplomacy when he 
explained: “Gastronomy is a civilized act. It is an art that has its traditions and its disciplines; it 
translates a refinement of the palate, at the same time that it represents the faculty of adaptation 
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to the geographical environment.”113 He added: “Good dishes and good wines are made for smart 
and educated stomachs.”114 Not forgetting that this initiative was meant to complement his 
musical nation branding (in addition to complimenting Brazilians in attendance), he concluded 
by noting that his “ancestors – who knew how to live, eat, and drink – would digest while 
singing.”115 Quatuor alouette was there to help with that part of the program.     
In trying to engage Brazil’s cultural elite and francophile bourgeoisie, this fanciful affair 
spoke more about the persistence of the French fact in North America than it did of Canada’s so-
called culture of métissage. French expatriate Jean-Gérard Fleury certainly thought so as he 
explained to the middlebrow readers of the Montreal-based La Revue Populaire. He was 
essentially corroborating La Presse which had described the event as a great success.116 
Conflating Québec with Canada, Fleury explained that Désy and his wife had shown their guests 
“combien ce dominion britannique est resté français dans ses goûts et sa pensée.”117 He noted 
that Brazilians welcomed this cultural rapprochement, because the war had cut off their ties to 
France: Québec culture – and Québec cheese – were valid substitutes, according to him. Fleury 
also reserved praises for Quatuor alouette’s performance. “Qu’importe si la France n’est pas 
maîtresse du nickel ou de l’uranium, des Montagnes Rocheuse; elle a bien mieux: la fidélité d’un 
peuple entier, dont la vie, les arts et la cuisine témoignent de la vitalité et de la grandeur éternelle 
de la mère-patrie,” he wrote.118 Canada – or perhaps more so Québec – was not a mere surrogate 
of the old imperial motherland. It was its extension, if not its new subimperial incarnation, into 
new territories. Perhaps inadvertently, Désy had emphasized Québec’s distinctiveness at the 
expense of the country of which he was the official representative in Brazil. It is revealing of the 
DEA’s laissez-faire approach (and lack of interest in cultural matters) that no one in Ottawa 
noticed that Quatuor alouette’s tour had taken a somewhat unexpected turn.  
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Catholicism also set French Canadians apart, which is a cultural trait that Quatuor alouette 
seemed more than willing to emphasize while in Brazil. Since its beginning in 1930, the group 
performed some of the religious songs that made up its repertoire on Christmas and Easter or on 
special occasions, such as on its fifteenth anniversary or during the celebrations for the Fourth 
Century of Jacques Cartier’s first voyage to Canada. What must have struck Désy is the 
frequency with which Filiatrault and his colleagues turned to religious material during the tour. 
“Le curé de notre village” continued to be a favourite, but other less popular works found 
themselves on set lists destined for Brazilian audiences more often than before. The group’s 
radio performances are a case in point. On October 9, it sang “Grâces soient rendues” followed 
by a series of works that told stories from the life of Jesus Christ and the Virgin Mary.119 Two 
weeks later, on October 23, Quatuor alouette opened with a triptych: “Notre Père,” “Panis 
Angelicus,” and “Sanctus et Benedictus.”120 These broadcasts followed the group’s October 14 
concert at Rio de Janeiro’s Igreja da Glória. Inaugurated in 1739, the church was a Brazilian 
landmark visited assiduously in the past by the imperial family, including Dom Pedro II who was 
baptized there. Hence its extended name: Imperial Igreja de Nossa Senhora da Glória do Outeiro. 
The program included the above three works augmented with “Hymne des Frères Moraves” and 
“D’où viens-tu bergère.”121 On October 30, the singers celebrated Christmas on the airwaves, 
two months early, with a selection that included “Le fils du roi de gloire” and “Allons bergers, 
partons tous.” They wished to tell Brazilians that they would remain close to them, in their heart 
and soul, on Christmas Day after having returned home.122  
It is likely that the new friends Quatuor alouette made en route to Brazil influenced the 
group’s musical choices. The four singers were not the only French Canadians aboard the 
steamship Jose Menendez. Missionaries from the congregation Les Frères du Sacré Coeur were 
also headed to Brazil to begin work in the small interior city of Campanha. The two parties 
bonded; the missionaries teaching Portuguese to the singers in exchange for informal classes on 
the physiology of the voice. Quatuor alouette also gave impromptu performances on the deck, 
especially on Sundays, to the great pleasure of their fellow travellers. Filiatrault was pleased with 
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the opportunity to sing “Panis Angelicus” in such a setting. “Quand il s’agit d’une bonne action 
le quatuor ne se fait jamais prier,” he noted humorously in his diary.123 On October 1, the singers 
offered a free recital, which featured three Brazilian songs they had learned on the sea: “Nesta 
rua,” “As bonecas,” and “O café.”124 They must have lacked confidence in Portuguese, because 
they only performed them infrequently in Brazil and they did so with mixed results.125    
Although the two parties went their separate ways upon arriving in Rio de Janeiro, the 
encounter left a deep imprint on Quatuor alouette. Les Frères du Sacré Coeur made sure to 
remind the singers that they formed part of the group’s audience in Brazil and in Canada. They 
attended its debut concert at the Teatro Municipal and listened with great interest to its radio 
performances. They sent letters of congratulations and invited Filiatrault, Lamarre, Trottier, and 
Jacob to the Sacré Coeur mission in the state of Minas Gerais.126 The four men could not make it 
to the interior, but they did visit other missionaries in São Paulo. Filiatrault maintained a 
correspondence with them and carried with him photos he took at the Dominican mission, one of 
which showed the group and three Fathers (Étienne-M. Laporte, Gustave-René Picher, and 
Marcel-Marie Desmarais) posing cheerfully in front of a lush palm tree.127 The missionaries were 
just starting to establish their presence in Brazil, but they were building on experience acquired 
elsewhere in Latin America and Asia. This experience gave them confidence in the possibility of 
extending Canadian goodwill through the people-to-people interactions that missionary work 
entailed.128 Informal ambassadors themselves, they conflated their religious and national 
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identities while encouraging the four singers to do the same. On the eve of Quatuor alouette’s 
departure for Brazil, Dom Raoul Hamel from the Benedictine Monastery of Saint-Benoit-du-Lac, 
the same community that O’Brien had joined, had sent an article to Le Devoir in which he 
addressed the group while praising it for its “œuvre nationale.”129 He wrote: “Ce n’est pas une 
unité matérielle que vous réalisez, une unité mécanique, inférieure, mais une unité vivante, 
rythmique, appuyée sur une interprétation spirituelle, objective, qui établit la différence d’après 
vos chansons et qu’éclairent une articulation très nette et une justesse rigoureuse.”130 It is this 
difference – and this spiritual calling – that animated the four singers in Brazil.     
Accordingly, Quatuor alouette augmented its set lists with songs that spoke of the 
‘civilizing mission’ of settler colonialism. “Danse indienne no. 1,” “Danse indienne no. 2,” and 
“Noël Huron.” The first two originated from Northern Ontario and reportedly illustrated the 
primitive sound of indigenous folklore. The third revealed indigenous music’s “melodic 
evolution under the influence of Canada’s missionaries.”131 The group sang them in that order – 
in other words, chronologically – to make the case that presumably dead indigenous expressive 
cultures could only subsist through sublimation. After all, Désy had told Brazilians that Quatuor 
alouette’s repertoire was a rare opportunity to hear Canada’s “first civilizing and civilized 
songs.”132 As for “Tenaouiche tenaga, ouichka,” the group chose not to perform it in Brazil 
despite the fact that it had sung it on numerous occasions prior to the tour: on stage in the United 
States during the National Folk Festival, at Montreal’s Plateau Hall, and on Canadian 
airwaves.133 Filiatrault and his colleagues perhaps felt that the song’s blatant racism would be 
difficult to reconcile with the discourses of métissage and ‘racial democracy’ that were being 
mobilized to musically imagine a Canadian-Brazilian community.  
Quatuor alouette’s final recital on Sunday, November 18, best exemplified the reach – and 
zones of exclusion – of its “œuvre nationale.”134 Held in São Paulo’s Teatro Municipal, the 
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concert featured only French-language material and it began with “La légende dorée,” a 
succession of short works evoking the life of Jesus Christ.135 A reporter from A Gazeta remarked 
that the singers had succeeded, through their heartfelt rendition of French-Canadian folklore, in 
engaging the Paulistas who responded with warm applause. “Il y a une communion instantanée 
qui montre clairement ce que pourrait être cet art collectif dont nous cherchons parfois la 
formule,” he explained.136 His review of the concert suggested that Filiatrault and his colleagues 
had finally succeeded in bringing to life a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. 
He continued:          
Dans la salle on ne voyait plus les spectateurs d’un côté et les artistes de l’autre, mais 
seulement une assemblée d’amis, cherchant de tout cœur à se plaire mutuellement. Il est rare 
qu’une telle unanimité soit atteinte, même dans les cercles les plus homogènes, comme dans 
les familles : mais le plus prodigieux dans ce pacte d’amitié si spontané fut l’enthousiasme 
avec lequel le public se joignit au quatuor pour chanter la chanson de l’Alouette – l’oiseau 
vivace et symbolique, image de la gaieté et de la bravoure, de la confiance impérissable dans 
la vie et en Dieu.137 
The sonorous community thus imagined was one that was united in faith. If it differed from that 
initially imagined by Désy, it is because of the agency he afforded to his cultural ambassadors 
and the confidence he placed in music’s potential as a forum of encounter.    
The above report from A Gazeta demonstrates that the local press responded favourably to 
this latest musical diplomacy initiative. Reporters did so by using, once again, the tropes of 
family and friendship.138 At the same time, they underscored difference and championed singing 
– like Vargas and Villa-Lobos were doing – as a means of imagining the nation and giving it 
both purpose and direction. The spontaneity and raw authenticity of Quatuor alouette’s music 
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sparked interest, because it was soulful and conveyed the “pulse of the collectivity.”139 If art was 
“the revelation of the moral and material greatness of peoples,” one could legitimately argue that 
there is no “other manifestation more expressive than the human voice to evoke and exalt the 
riches of the earth and the virtues of the peoples themselves.”140 Reporters praised Quatuor 
alouette for its professionalism and its unwavering performance of nation.141 As for Québec’s 
French-language newspapers, they showed continuous interest in the tour, especially when self-
congratulatory reports from Brazil started trickling in. La Presse congratulated the four singers 
for having so brilliantly fulfilled their mandate as “ambassadeurs du folklore Canadien” while Le 
Devoir noted approvingly that Quatuor alouette is “un organisme lyrique qui fait honneur à notre 
race.”142 Not surprisingly, Canada’s English-language newspapers took little to no interest in the 
tour.143 In hindsight, one could argue that the Montreal Star demonstrated surprising 
clairvoyance when it referred – perhaps inadvertently – to the four singers as “missionaries” 
instead of ambassadors on the eve of their voyage to Brazil.144 
Impromptu ambassadors or missionaries, Filiatrault and his bandmates embodied Catholic 
French Canada in ways that evoked the ‘great men’ that populated Désy’s narratives. However, 
the success of this enterprise was not guaranteed since singing had become increasingly marked 
as feminine in the first half of the twentieth century. Although widely accepted as a masculine 
activity in the past, singing was now suspect due to the growing popularity of crooners in the 
1920s and 1930s. Their fragile, emotionally charged voices, which required amplification, 
contrasted with the masculine vocal performances of the past. “To the primarily male 
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representatives of both highbrow and lowbrow culture …, crooners’ high voices, their 
privileging of emotional vulnerability, and their association with female audiences devalued 
them artistically and suggested a lack of manliness,” writes Allison McCracken.145 The four 
performers’ reliance on an earlier style of singing ensured that there was no ambiguity regarding 
their manful effort – the more so because it restrained emotions through an intellectual 
engagement with folk music’s historical origins and contemporary manifestations.146 The 
group’s approach was also easily reconcilable with the regimented singing culture that Villa-
Lobos championed during Vargas’s Estado Novo. As musical diplomacy pioneers, the singers 
acted as de facto musical emissaries for national manhood in that they sought to position 
themselves as inspirational figures (like the coureurs des bois and Catholic missionaries) for 
their nation’s ‘heroic’ struggle for cultural survival.                         
  □□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 
There was, of course, a prescriptive dimension to Quatuor alouette’ performance in Brazil; at 
least in the group’s promotion of an antimodernist vision of the world and its championing of 
Western Christian values. Yet the four singers appeared more intent on approaching the South 
American giant as a stage upon which to perform their own identity politics than in engaging 
dialogue with their Brazilian counterparts. In fact, they remained uncritical of the Estado Novo’s 
fascist leanings – possibly because of how familiar the country seemed to them when looked at 
through the gendered tropes of family, Latinity, and Catholicism. Examining the group’s records 
of its stay in Brazil, you would not know that the country was going through dramatic changes in 
the fall of 1945. On October 29, the military forced Vargas to resign and placed José Linhares, 
president of the Supremo Tribunal Federal [Supreme Federal Court], at the helm of the country. 
Brazilians had grown impatient with the dictator’s promises of a return to democracy, so the new 
president was tasked with organizing proper elections before the end of the year. None of the 
events preceding or following the coup d’état interfered with Quatuor alouette’s national 
performance, which centred on Catholic French Canada above anything else.  
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In Brazil, the four singers looked for a validating reflection of themselves and their 
struggle for cultural survival. Lamarre had, after all, compared the Cristo Redentor statue 
perched atop Corcovado mountain to the Mount Royal cross. Back in Montreal, Filiatrault told 
La Presse’s Roger Champoux:           
Le Brésil est le creuset de trois cultures : si la formation intellectuelle européenne est battue 
en brèche dans la jeune classe bourgeoise par les captivantes formules américaines, il reste 
néanmoins que l’esprit nationaliste portugais tient victorieusement le coup dans les couches 
supérieures où la langue française est amie de la portugaise et ne souffre pas l’intrusion des 
idiomes anglo-saxons.  
Le Portugais cultivé a peut-être oublié la mère patrie mais il ne cesse de puiser aux sources 
vives de la culture latine dont le centre sera toujours Paris. Cependant, le Brésilien est un 
nationaliste autocrate. Le Brésil d’abord et avant tout. Les formes de la beauté qu’il découvre 
ailleurs, il se refuse à les imiter, satisfait de les interpréter selon une conception 
spécifiquement brésilienne.147 
As an exercise in musical diplomacy, Quatuor alouette’s tour was undoubtedly one-sided, 
oriented as it was towards national projection and national self-representation. As an exercise in 
musical nation branding, it showed how vulnerable Canada’s image was in the hands of non-
state actors with a mission of their own.        
                                                          




CHAPTER 3: THE ART OF COUNTERPOINT 
 
I do think your Department [of External Affairs] ought to be kept reminded of the absolute 
necessity for doing something reasonably adequate to promote better international relations 
through music.1 
– Ernest MacMillan, 1946 
 
 
Ernest MacMillan was a towering figure of Canada’s musical life when he departed for Brazil in 
the summer of 1946. At the helm of the Toronto Symphony Orchestra (TSO) since 1931, he was 
knighted by King George V for his service to music, some of which involved transcribing 
material for Marius Barbeau and preparing arrangements for John Murray Gibbon’s Canadian 
Pacific Railway (CPR) Festival. A conductor and composer of ‘serious music,’ MacMillan was 
also well versed in folk music. He was undoubtedly flattered when Jean Désy invited him to Rio 
de Janeiro for a series of concerts with the Orquestra Sinfônica Brasileira (OSB). He embraced 
the status of cultural ambassador offered to him with the hope that the dissemination of Canada’s 
music overseas would create additional work and funding opportunities for artists at home. The 
Toronto-based composer had just helped establish the Canadian Music Council whose mandate 
was to organize and promote a national musical culture.2 He certainly did not hesitate to remind 
the Department of External Affairs (DEA) that it could do more in that area. In any case, 
whatever high hopes he had for Brazil, the reality on the ground kept them in check. “Rio is the 
most beautiful city I have ever seen,” but it is also “the most exasperating,” he wrote in his 
diary.3 He added more tellingly: “Désy and [Chargé d’affaires Benjamin] Rogers came to 
represent in my mind the only solid ground in a country of quicksands.”4 Repetitive 
administrative, scheduling, and rehearsal problems with the OSB were at the root of some of his 
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frustrations although city life in the tropics also brought its share of discomfort and 
unpredictability. 
The six weeks that MacMillan spent in Brazil might have been even more challenging had 
Claude Champagne not joined him on this goodwill tour. The Getúlio Vargas era had just ended 
with a fragile return to democracy under the presidency of former Minister of War Eurico Gaspar 
Dutra. Concerns over leftist agitation were growing even though the Cold War had not yet 
become front-page news in Brazil.5 Désy kept his superiors in the DEA sporadically informed 
about political developments. One such instance concerned the appointment of Soviet 
ambassador Jacob Suritz. Désy explained that his communist counterpart’s role was to “convince 
the Brazilians of the imperialistic aims of Anglo-Saxon capital with regard to Brazil.”6 Yet he 
saw no signs of an emerging cultural Cold War in 1940s Rio de Janeiro. In fact, he pursued his 
musical nation branding efforts as if little had changed in Brazil. The DEA neither interfered nor 
requested that Désy explain his cultural campaigns, which indicated that there was little appetite 
in Ottawa for his intelligence gathering and his unorthodox approach to diplomacy. Canadian-
Brazilian cultural relations thus evolved as if detached from the larger geopolitical context of the 
immediate postwar years. Désy and his new impromptu ambassadors, MacMillan and 
Champagne, preoccupied themselves primarily with projecting an image of Canada that 
validated their self-perception and accommodated their professional ambitions. The two 
composers were to participate in the making of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian 
community by sharing a multiday program that would feature each other’s compositions and 
present a sophisticated image of a bicultural Canada.       
  A thorough examination of MacMillan and Champagne’s national performance in Brazil 
reveals how fragile the metaphors deployed to imagine a Canadian-Brazilian community through 
music were. In Rio de Janeiro, the two men sought experiences that could enhance Canada’s 
prestige abroad while confirming their status as cosmopolitan artists. They accomplished this, in 
part, by mingling in the city’s male-dominated elite ‘high’ art milieu. As representatives of 
Canada’s ‘two founding races,’ they embodied Britishness and Latinity through the seemingly 
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apolitical language of folk-infused ‘serious music.’ Their parallel efforts in Brazil aligned with 
the trope of métissage, but it did so – once again – through the prism of ‘whiteness.’ Their 
encounter with ‘others,’ musical or otherwise, shaped their self-image as ‘white’ male composers 
in ways that influenced their perception of distance between Canadians and Brazilians. The 
South American giant appeared increasingly foreign, even inchoate, when looked at from a 
northern gaze. In the eyes of MacMillan and Champagne, Brazil was indeed a distant stage upon 
which Canadian aspirations could be played out. Oscillating between nationalism and 
universalism, between difference and sameness, they demonstrated ambivalence vis-à-vis 
Brazilians whom they considered inferior, as did some of their compatriots. Further undermining 
the project of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community was the fact that the tour also 
put onto display Canada’s ‘two solitudes’ despite attempts to depict the country’s national 
culture as a form of métissage. In Brazil, the two impromptu ambassadors followed 
complementary yet separate paths rather than collaborating on a multiday program as originally 
intended. This chapter begins with a discussion of the Instituto Brasil-Canadá to depict the 
broader context within which the tour took place. It then juxtaposes the national musical cultures 
of the two countries before examining the highs and lows of the Champagne-MacMillan 
excursion to Rio de Janeiro.           
The Instituto Brasil-Canadá and the Northern Gaze  
Although the signing of the 1944 cultural agreement and the subsequent opening of the Instituto 
Brasil-Canadá failed to propel the DEA into action, it did bring into focus the impact that 
individuals on the ground could have on shaping the country’s image overseas, particularly in the 
context where Canadians had yet to agree on what to project and how. Malcolm MacDonald, 
high commissioner to Canada, shared with others in the British Foreign Office the belief that 
Canadians had yet to find a unified voice with which to assert themselves on the international 
stage.7 Charles E. Shuckburgh, in a memorandum prepared for London, further explained that 
Canada’s inability to articulate and perform its self-designated status as a “catalyst-nation” 
revealed “the characteristic uncertainty of the country’s position” as both an American nation 
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and a member of the Commonwealth.8 According to him, it also revealed deep schisms within 
Canadian society among continentalists, imperialists, and autonomists. As for French Canadians, 
he refused to believe that they had the vision and cultural infrastructure to act upon their so-
called “racial affinity” with Latin Americans.9 “They have failed, partly though their own 
narrowness of outlook and partly by deliberate localism, to create in Quebec or Montreal centres 
of attraction for modern French thought and culture on this continent,” Shuckburgh wrote in a 
contemptuous tone.10 Still, he noted that Désy may eventually succeed in projecting an engaging 
image of Canada in Brazil and that he “may well play a part in making … ‘Latin affinity’ … 
something more of a reality than it has hitherto been.”11 Canada’s ambassador to Brazil seemed 
intent on proving him right on that point while countering the view that the country’s elusive 
international identity was a function of its Dominion status and its vacillating posture vis-à-vis 
the United States. 
The Intituto Brasil-Canadá was one of the venues used by Canadians to display their 
intellectual and cultural proficiency. With branches in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, it served as 
a forum of encounter for mostly francophile elite men from Brazil’s highest intellectual and 
economic circles. Designed by Désy and his Brazilian counterparts in foreign affairs (the 
Itamaraty), the institute was to operate independently with little to no government involvement, 
but the reality was otherwise. The Canadian ambassador held the title of honorary president, 
which was an acknowledgment of his role in founding and providing momentum to the 
organization. Building from a narrow network of personal and professional contacts, Désy 
engaged an ever-growing range of protagonists by putting them in relation with each other 
through occasional cultural initiatives. Invariably, these began with the Canadian diplomat doing 
some heavy lifting and fundraising himself as when he handpicked paintings to bring back to Rio 
de Janeiro for a planned exhibition or when he convinced influential friends in Brazil, including 
representatives at Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light) and the Royal 
Bank of Canada, to provide financial support to the Instituto Brasil-Canadá. He himself added 
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$15,000 to the organization’s coffers – money he raised “from private firms and individuals” 
while he was undergoing medical treatment in Canada in the fall of 1943.12 The pattern that 
emerged through his dealings with the institute was one of directed improvisation and it allowed 
eager individuals, such as political scientist Marcel Roussin and painter Jacques de Tonnancour, 
to navigate around bureaucracies to pursue their professional ambitions beyond Canada’s borders 
in a context that initially appeared – as it did for Quatuor alouette– familiar to them.      
As the institute’s first scholarship recipient, Roussin astutely seized the moment by using 
Canada’s cultural rapprochement with Brazil as a stepping stone for his career.13 Born in 1918, 
he earned a Bachelor of Arts from Séminaire de Joliette before relocating to Montreal where he 
spent two years studying international law. He then undertook graduate studies in political 
science at Université d’Ottawa. He completed his master’s degree in 1941 and successfully 
defended his doctoral dissertation four years later. Roussin learned Spanish and Portuguese to 
establish his reputation as a Latin Americanist. He published numerous articles, including in 
L’Action Catholique, Les Carnets victoriens, L’Étoile du Nord, and Le Jour, which featured his 
multipart series on Latin America. A sessional lecturer at Université d’Ottawa, he represented 
the institution at the National Federation of Catholic Universities, a position that entailed 
coordinating “la propagande de Pax Romana” towards the Southern Hemisphere.14 Starting in 
1943, the young scholar began advocating for the creation of a Comité Canada-Brésil to promote 
closer economic and cultural relations between the two countries. The commonality of feelings, 
identities, and desires that he claimed existed between the two nations rested on Brazilians’ 
adherence to Western Christian values and their knowledge of the French language, which 
allowed them to go “n’importe où au monde où il y a des gens civilisés.”15 Yet Brazil also was 
on the periphery of the world as Roussin knew it. It was therefore both familiar and exotic to 
him. He already had his eyes set on a research trip to Rio de Janeiro so this public support for 
closer Canadian-Brazilian relations gave him both visibility and credibility. Caio de Mello 
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Franco, Brazilian minister in Ottawa, took note of Roussin’s “sympathetic disposition” towards 
Brazil and the “disinterested nature” of his intentions.16 The young scholar was undoubtedly 
earnest, but to describe him as disinterested is to miss the fact his publication record served to 
establish his expert status as an observer from the North.     
Roussin’s ethnocentric gaze helped validate his belief that Canadians were politically, 
economically, and culturally more advanced that Brazilians. The power-asymmetry implicit in 
this North-South binary resulted in the young scholar prioritizing performance and projection 
over engagement. It led him to seek the familiar in Brazil while adopting an essentializing 
outlook to deal with difference. As the recipient of a scholarship from the Instituto Brasil-
Canadá, he intended to spend a full year overseas, but he shortened his stay to six months, 
apparently for health reasons.17 In Rio de Janeiro at the same time as Quatuor alouette, he 
enjoyed the sense of family that he felt around his compatriots. The reports he sent back to La 
Presse applauded the group for being eminent dignitaries for the Canadian nation. He reserved 
similar praises for the French-Canadian Dominican Fathers he met in Brazil. In both instances, 
Roussin’s observations centred on the question of national self-representation.18 His one-way 
approach to Canadian-Brazilian relations on this trip resulted from the ambivalence he felt vis-à-
vis his hosts. His depiction of Rio de Janeiro betrayed his contempt for Brazilians who, because 
of their place on the periphery of the industrialized North, were destined to fail in their efforts at 
emulation.19 Roussin weighed his words carefully in public forums, but his private notes reveal 
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the extent to which his scalding gaze informed his perception of urban life in Brazil. The 
following excerpt from his “Impressions et dépressions” is a case in point: 
A la messe, on chante n’importe quoi. Ce matin, 29 juillet 1945, à l’église N.S. de 
Copacabana, un baryton a chanté un Ave Maria sur l’air de la Berceuse de Jocelyn, et un 
ténor a chanté la deuxième partie du Sanctus … en omettant la première, et le tout finit sur 
un air de valse. Sans oublier un petit nègre, qui se croit obligé de danser pieds nus dans la 
grande allée, en allant d’avant en arrière, au milieu des fidèles. Le Créateur doit avoir des 
regrets des fois.20 
In this entry and many others dealing with topics ranging from tramways to fashion and domestic 
life, Roussin mocked Brazilians for failing to reproduce adequately the values and habits of 
Western Christian civilization, as he understood them. He described Brazilian life as 
disorganized and rudimentary as well as deficient on questions of morality and religion. Going 
from attraction to repulsion, Roussin’s ambivalence towards his hosts reflected his perception of 
Brazil as a distant stage where – through encounters with an ‘other’ – he could perform, and thus 
validate and propagate, a boastful self-image centred on ‘white’ normativity. 
Roussin was not alone in travelling south to define himself in relation to a Brazilian 
‘other.’ Montreal-born painter Jacques de Tonnancour had tried unsuccessfully in the past to 
secure government funding to study overseas so he was ecstatic when he learned that the 
Brazilian government, following Désy’s recommendation, was inviting him as a guest of the 
Instituto Brasil-Canadá.21 Tonnancour was twenty years old when he enrolled at École des 
beaux-arts de Montréal. An admirer of Paul-Émile Borduas, Pablo Picasso, Goodridge Roberts, 
and the Group of Seven, he dropped out after just a few years in reaction to the conservative and 
regionalist mindset of his teachers. He then rented a studio, befriended established painters such 
as Alfred Pellan, published short pieces in various art publications, and held his first solo show at 
Montreal’s Dominion Gallery in 1943. But he found it difficult to make a name for himself in 
Québec. “Chez soi nul est prophète,” he confided to a journalist once in Brazil.22  
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Désy had set the stage for Tonnancour by displaying Canadian art in Brazil as early as 
1942. With the help of Harry Orr McCurry, director of the National Gallery of Canada (NGC), 
he had arranged to have a bundle of ten paintings shipped to him to decorate the walls of the 
legation and of his residence in Rio de Janeiro. Surrounded by the works of painters Clarence A. 
Gagnon, Walter J. Phillips, and David B. Milne, Désy was able to show his “Brazilians friends” 
that Canada could produce “something more than wheat, salmon, and apples.”23 Pellan was one 
of his favourites, which is why he commissioned him to create two large panels for the waiting 
room of the legation.24 The murals depicted Eastern and Western Canada in vivid colours that 
evoked the depth and breadth of the country’s diversity as well as the interplay between tradition 
and modernity. Always resourceful, Désy got the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC) to 
cover the $1,560 bill.25 He also arranged to place two articles about Pellan’s work in Brazilian 
publications. Robert Ford’s piece appeared in Sombra while Maurice Gagnon published his in A 
Vida.26 The language they used to describe the paintings was consistent with that used by Désy 
to promote Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations: “In authentic tones, the profound honesty of 
our race, its generous hospitality with which it serenely welcomes the friend who falls under the 
charm of our landscape.”27 News of this initiative did not take long to reach the NGC. “You are 
setting a very important precedent which I hope will be widely followed,” wrote an evidently 
enthused McCurry.28         
The ambassador carried on with an exhibition of Canadian paintings and handicrafts whose 
stars turned out to be Pellan and Tonnancour. Held first in Rio de Janeiro and then São Paulo at 
the turn of 1945, the Pintura Canadense Contemporânea show brought together close to two 
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hundred works by seventy-four artists from across Canada.29 Désy had begun collecting 
paintings on his own, but he reached out to McCurry once he realized that his connections did 
not stretch far enough beyond Montreal and Quebec City.30 The exhibition thus turned out to be 
a collaborative affair that involved the NGC, the DEA, the DTC, galleries in Montreal and 
Toronto, the Québec government, the Instituto Brasil-Canadá, the Itamaraty, and Brazil’s 
Ministério da Educação e Saúde (MES).31 “It was the common work of us all in furthering in 
Brazil the propaganda of Canada at a time when it is extremely important, commercially, as well 
as politically, to keep Canada on the map in this country,” explained Désy to James Angus 
MacKinnon from the DTC. The embassy estimated that total attendance for the two events was 
close to fifty thousand. Even Vargas made an appearance to the great pleasure of Désy.32 The 
press wrote enthusiastically about Pintura Canadense Contemporânea although the opposite 
would have been surprising considering that the exhibition was organized under the official seal 
of the then still-in-office dictatorship.  
The NGC undeniably deserved much of the credit for this success. It already had 
considerable experience with developing art exhibitions abroad, which included dictating the 
stories conveyed through the works put on display. In this instance, McCurry commended Désy 
for taking the initiative, particularly since it provided an opportunity to nudge the DEA into 
doing more to assist the NGC in its operations.33 Even though the exhibition was not being 
managed by his institution, McCurry did not spare any effort in helping make Pintura 
Canadense Contemporânea a truly pan-Canadian exhibition. In the end, the “école de Montréal” 
stole the show despite the attempt to feature artists from all provinces.34 McCurry might have 
encouraged such a dénouement by highlighting in the catalogue that the meeting of Anglo-Saxon 
and Latin cultural forces in Montreal “will undoubtedly produce a Canadian school of painters of 
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unusual power and interest.”35 The enthusiastic reception accorded to Pellan and Tonnancour 
suggested that Montreal-based, French-Canadian painters were best equipped to visually 
translate for Brazilians the idea of ‘Canadianness’ as a form of métissage. Tonnancour, who had 
yet to receive the good news that he would be travelling to Brazil, sold three of the six paintings 
he had loaned for the exhibition.36  
Like Roussin, Tonnancour adopted a northern gaze that allowed him to situate himself vis-
à-vis both his hosts and his compatriots in Brazil. During his twelve-month stay, he befriended 
members of Quatuor alouette and lent a helping hand to Désy by designing programs for the 
singers’ debut concert and the embassy’s Dîner canadien. He first shared a studio with exiled 
Polish painter Count August Zamoyski before moving his tools into Désy’s garage, which was 
located atop Santa Teresa Hill. Towards the end of his stay, in August of 1946, he showed his 
work during a well-attended solo exhibition – about ten paintings and twenty drawings. Critics 
responded favourably to his interpretation of the Brazilian landscape, noting that Tonnancour 
had captured the essential qualities of the city’s tropicality. The painter indicated that he had no 
choice but to adopt a tourist gaze to shut out the buzzing city life and take in the immensity of 
the hills, bays, and ocean that surrounded him: “Peintre, je dus, par la force des choses, me faire 
touriste, c’est à dire consommateurs.”37 Tonnancour was very much conscious of both his 
personhood and his nationhood, as well as the importance of the ‘other’ in defining the ‘self’ 
prior to leaving for Brazil. In an interview with Le Canada’s Eloi de Grandmont, he explained: 
“[J]e pourrai mieux situer le peuple canadien par rapport à d’autres et mieux situer mon plan à 
moi … je pourrai mieux me situer sur mon propre plan.”38 He added: “Vous devinez à quoi je 
veux en venir: aux qualités les plus authentiquement miennes (et canadiennes donc) exprimées 
dans la forme la plus universelle que je puisse inventer.”39 Ultimately, he hoped that the intensity 
of life in Brazil, once tamed and juxtaposed against its surrounding landscape, would help him 
cast a different gaze on the world, including his own. Tonnancour did not leave much behind in 
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terms of his impressions of Brazil, but he did complain to a friend that the trip cost him 
opportunities in France while providing little in terms of creative enrichment: “c’est de 
l’immédiat, or très limité.”40 Brazil, it seemed, was of little use in and of itself, aside from its 
function as a stage for self-representation and national projection. 
Brazil’s Image Problem and Music  
In the eyes of Tonnancour, Roussin, and many other Canadians, Brazil could not escape its 
‘peripheral’ status despite the efforts of its political and cultural elite. Vargas’s fatherly image as 
the “great protector of the poor” may have helped sustain the Estado Novo, the reality was that 
an enormous socioeconomic gulf separated the haves and the have-nots in both urban and rural 
areas.41 It also did not matter that Brazilians had fought alongside the Allies in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean war theatres; the country continued to be ruled by a dictatorship, which made its 
alignment with the West suspect. Désy’s musically imagined community did little to change 
perceptions in Canada, especially considering the tremendous sacrifices Canadians were making 
in the fight against totalitarian regimes in Europe. The Montreal Gazette, for example, did not 
hesitate to attach the label “FASCIST” – in bold capital letters – to Vargas in 1940.42 Photo-
Journal did the same in the midst of Brazil’s war efforts, noting that resistance was growing 
within the country against Vargas’s fascist government.43 In both instances, Brazilian authorities 
voiced their opposition to this unfavourable coverage: first in a letter to under-secretary of state 
for External Affairs O.D. Skelton and then through a letter to Photo-Journal in which consular 
officials decried the misrepresentation of Vargas.44  
These interventions and the president’s faltering commitment to hold elections after the 
war did not help assuage suspicions. Désy’s reports were more frequent throughout 1944, which 
in Brazil was a transitional period characterized by civil unrest, continuous political intrigues, 
heightened fears of a coup, and desperate political maneuvering by the Vargas regime. “The 
situation is very speculative and I do not believe the atmosphere has been more tense since I 
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came to Brazil,” he wrote on July 4.45 Things quieted down shortly after, at least from the 
embassy’s perspective with Désy busying himself again with cultural matters. Brazilians did 
return to democracy in December of 1945. It was a timid transition in that the country elected 
Dutra who had been minister of war during the Estado Novo. Brazil also managed to elevate its 
status on the international stage during the closing months of the war, most notably as a founding 
member of the United Nations. These developments motivated Quatuor alouette’s Roger 
Filiatrault to manifest some optimism regarding the future of the South American giant: “Le 
Brésil, terre d’avenir,” he told La Presse’s Roger Champoux in the days that followed the 
group’s return to Canada and Dutra’s ascent to power.46    
Notwithstanding the prejudices of some of his compatriots, Filiatrault felt especially 
inspired by the ease with which Brazilians negotiated the tension between nationalism and 
universalism. In musical terms: their ability to participate in the concert of nations without 
having their individual parts overpowered by that of the larger ensemble. The metaphor is an apt 
one since music was central to Brazilians’ efforts to define, consolidate, and project their 
national and international identity. In other words, it was a core component of the strategies 
deployed to remedy the country’s image problem. From Antônio Carlos Gomes’s Luso-Brazilian 
operatic imaginaries to Heitor Villa-Lobos’s hybrid patriotic works, Brazil’s musical life no 
longer drifted between the ‘here’ and ‘there’ under Vargas. State support for the arts facilitated 
the proliferation of a national musical culture that centred on the idea of Brasilidade. It helped 
establish the reputation of Brazilian composers – and by association Brazil – as worthy 
interlocutors on the international stage.  
Efforts were internal at first. Through his regime’s multiple radio stations, Vargas created a 
nationwide outlet and receptive audience for domestic works. The daily radio show of the 
Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP), A Hora do Brasil, also rehabilitated Gomes by 
making “Il Guarany” compulsory listening and de facto substitute to Brazil’s national anthem.47 
State and municipal governments did their part. São Paulo’s Discoteca Publica is a case in point. 
Created in 1935 by Mario de Andrade, then director of the city’s Departamento de Cultura, this 
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sound library was conceived with the idea of democratizing access to culture while 
demonstrating the socializing power of music through educational projects. The importance 
accorded to ‘serious music’ – foreign and domestic works – reflected the belief that it was the 
perfect medium for forming the cultural elites whose task it would be to provide depth and 
resonance to Brasilidade. The institution’s director, Oneyda Alvarenga, also oversaw the 
production of records for libraries, radio stations, and embassies both within and beyond Brazil’s 
borders.48 These initiatives prepared the terrain for the reception, production, and dissemination 
of musical works that the Vargas regime could recuperate for its nation building and nation 
branding projects.  
The Brazilian government was not alone in trying to tackle the country’s image problem 
while creating opportunities to both unify the country and foster dialogue with foreign 
interlocutors. Initiatives also came from practitioners who understood how a more engaging 
image could benefit their career. Founded in 1940 by a “group of Brazilian idealists,” the OSB 
saw itself as the vehicle through which Brazilians could demonstrate their cultural sophistication 
and savoir-faire.49 Conceived as a great patriotic endeavour, it sought to educate the masses and 
promote national pride and unity through its performance of works by Brazilian composers and 
its rendition of the canon of Western music. It also aimed to energize musical life in Brazil by 
providing a forum for interaction with visiting composers. Supported by Vargas, the OSB’s 
mandate rested on the twin pillars of cultural democracy and musical nationalism; hence the 
orchestra’s efforts to connect with broader publics through religious and youth concerts, radio 
broadcasts, and cross-country tours.50 Launched in 1944, the magazine Brasil Musical served 
similar purposes by featuring Brazilian artists and opening its pages to foreign composers and 
writers. Published exclusively in Portuguese, the overseas reach of this expansively produced 
magazine was somewhat limited although it did position Brazil’s national musical culture 
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favourably for the world to see by placing Brazilian artists alongside some of the great names in 
the world of ‘serious music.’ Brasil Musical, like the OSB, was conceived partly as a vehicle for 
the projection of an appealing and engaging image of Brazil – an image destined to cosmopolitan 
artists and intellectuals most likely to influence perceptions of the South American giant in their 
own country.51   
The Itamaraty’s interest in these matters became more pronounced in 1946 with the 
realization that domestic cultural policies and musical diplomacy were intricately connected. 
Throughout much of the Estado Novo, initiatives lay in the hands of the MES, the DIP, and the 
Divisão de cooperação Intelectual (DCIt) whose task was to do the work of the Itamaraty with 
regards to “cultural relations with other countries, the diffusion of Brazilian culture, and the 
publicizing of useful knowledge … in the principal foreign centers.”52 However, inadequate 
budgets and a lack of coordination between government bodies impeded early efforts, which 
ranged from supporting touring musicians, inviting foreign artists, financing cultural events, 
sponsoring private organizations, and sending both records and musical scores to embassies and 
consular offices overseas.53 Domestically, the Vargas regime used ‘serious music’ and musicais 
populares [popular music] such as samba to rally the population around the ideal of Brasilidade, 
but only the former appealed to the agencies who shared the responsibility for devising Brazil’s 
musical diplomacy in the 1940s.54 Juliette Dumont and Anaïs Fléchet contend that there was a 
clear “disassociation between what was valorized in the internal spheres and what was shown 
about Brazilian culture in the international scenario.”55 It is not that ‘serious music’ served no 
purpose domestically – it did as indicated above, but unlike popular music it served the added 
purpose of enhancing Brazil’s prestige overseas while increasing confidence in the country’s 
ability to join the concert of nations as an adept and mature player. The end of the Vargas era and 
the subsequent dismantling of the DIP brought about dynamic changes on that front. In 1946, the 
Dutra government centralized and further institutionalized its cultural diplomacy through a new 
agency: the Divisão Cultural do Itamaraty [Cultural Division of the Itamaraty] (DCIt). The 
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defence of Brazil’s international identity – that is, the measures taken to address the country’s 
image problem – was a priority for the DCIt who began to more actively seek out the support of 
composers and cultural producers.56        
It is revealing of the defective state of the Estado Novo’s cultural diplomacy that its first 
musical ambassador to Canada travelled with the support of an American-based organization: 
Columbia Concerts.57 Born in Rio de Janeiro in 1908, Arnaldo Estrella mastered the art of the 
piano at the Escola Nacional de Música where he familiarized himself with the works of Villa-
Lobos. The two became close friends – so much so that the pianist became one of the key 
interpreters of the composer’s works. A connoisseur when it came to Frédéric Chopin and 
Johannes Brahms, Estrella was foremost a champion of Brazilian music. He found himself 
travelling north in the winter of 1943 after having won a Columbia Concerts competition held to 
promote better cultural relations between the United States and Brazil. By that time, discussions 
between Désy and Temístocles da Graça Aranha regarding a possible Canada-Brazil cultural 
agreement were well under way. The Dansereau couple’s tour of Brazil was also in the works. It 
is not clear who proposed to bring Estrella to Canada, but plans were in place a full month prior 
to the pianist’s New York debut on February 7.58 Burdened with a busy schedule, Estrella 
managed to cross into Canada on March 30 for a one-off performance of Brazilian works on the 
airwaves of Radio-Canada: Villa-Lobos, Brasílio Itiberê da Cunha, and Camargo Guarnieri.59 
Brazilian diplomats in Montreal reported enthusiastically that their compatriot had demonstrated 
“superior technique and Brazilian sensibility” at the piano.60 Yet the press failed to take note of 
the event since it was poorly promoted. Still, Estrella managed to meet with Champagne who 
had just finished his “Quadrilha Brasileira” at the request of Désy. On vacation in Montreal at 
the time, the Canadian diplomat organized a reception for the Brazilian pianist.61 It is likely that 
it is on that occasion that the idea of having Estrella premiere Champagne’s composition on 
                                                          
56 Ibid., 10. 
57 “Le pianiste Estrella à Radio-Canada, le 30,” L’Avenir du Nord, March 26, 1943, 4. 
58 T. Graça Aranha to Caio de Mello Franco, January 7, 1943, 37/02/13, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras – 
Ottawa (Despachos), Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, AHI.       
59 “Le pianiste Estrella à Radio-Canada, le 30,” 4. 
60 Letter to Oswaldo Aranha, April 3, 1943, 48-931, DCI, Ministério das Relações Exteriores Fonds, Arquivo 





Dominion Day in Brazil was born. A musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community was 
decidedly in the making.    
José Siqueira followed a similar route to Canada with no more luck than Estrella. Born in 
1907 in the small town of Conceição, in the northern part of the country, he acquired his musical 
education in the army and then at Rio de Janeiro’s Instituto Nacional de Música. He started 
making a name for himself as a composer and conductor in the 1930s, but his career really took 
off with the OSB of which he was the director and a founding member. He had travelled to the 
United States at the invitation of Nelson Rockefeller in 1943. He was again northbound in 
December of 1945 to meet with composers Leopold Stokowsky and Karl Krueger. Siqueira had 
reached out to the DCIn for assistance in October although it was not until Désy got involved 
weeks later that the idea of performing in Canada was raised.62 On December 6, the Canadian 
ambassador contacted MacMillan to see if he could arrange for the Brazilian composer to direct 
the TSO in January of 1946.63 He had also written to Champagne to inquire about the possibility 
of organizing something in Montreal. Whereas Champagne managed to secure a Radio-Canada 
performance for Siqueira, MacMillan failed to generate opportunities for his Brazilian 
counterpart with such short notice. The situation caused him much anxiety since Désy had just 
shared the news that plans were being made to bring him and Champagne to Brazil. Siqueira 
appeared somewhat annoyed in his correspondence – at least in the eyes of MacMillan who felt 
that his reputation and that of the TSO were being damaged unnecessarily. Seemingly indulging 
in self-importance, MacMillan voiced his frustration to the DEA in a letter which evoked the 
likelihood of a diplomatic incident. He was certainly exaggerating although such language 
allowed him to make the point that more could be done to facilitate cultural exchanges and that 
better planning would be consistent with Canada’s efforts to project a positive image overseas.64 
Yet there were domestic power dynamics at work as well in this episode: “Montreal will get the 
credit and Toronto the blame,” MacMillan complained to the DEA.65 In the end, Siqueira’s radio 
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performance, on January 30, went largely unnoticed although it probably earned Champagne 
additional goodwill with elite Brazilian francophiles.66  
A Canadian Musical Mosaic? 
Canada’s musical life still bore the indelible mark of its British and French origins in 1946. As 
Paul Helmer explains, it “was bifurcated in a manner that reflected its history: there was an 
anglophone community oriented towards London and Edinburgh, and a francophone community 
oriented towards Paris, with Montreal serving as the geographical synapse of the two.”67 
Whether it emanated from Toronto or Montreal, Canada’s ‘serious music’ continued to be 
inspired by both British and French traditions dating back to the turn of the twentieth century. 
The two cities had their own music schools, music faculties, and orchestras with which to assert 
their identity, if not dominance, on the national stage. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC) often served as a conduit for these efforts although it was itself a potential competitor 
since it also employed artists and had its own orchestra. In this contest, Toronto and Montreal 
counted on the patronage of wealthy families eager to help Canadian talent graduate from 
musical salons to concert stages: the Massey family who funded Toronto’s Massey Hall and the 
Athanase family who helped found the Orchestre des concerts symphoniques de Montréal 
(OCSM). Composers and musicians who travelled to Great Britain and France to perfect their 
training could then return to dynamic music scenes although they still faced financial precarity in 
the 1930s and 1940s. Many went back to Europe or travelled to the United States for further 
training or work opportunities. This was true for both Toronto and Montreal, but also other 
cultural centres with blossoming music scenes: among others, Quebec City, Halifax, and 
Vancouver.       
Those trips to Europe and the United States reveal the importance of international 
connections in the development of an elitist, cosmopolitan culture in Canada. The permeability 
of the border was of significance during the interwar years, because it permitted the circulation 
of people (touring orchestras), sounds (radio broadcasts), and funds (philanthropic endeavours); 
all of which encouraged the professionalization, institutionalization, and modernization of 
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musical life in urban cultural centres. Philanthropic organizations such as the Carnegie 
Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation played an especially important role by providing the 
means and the skills necessary to advance from a private approach to cultural patronage to one 
increasingly dependent on corporate and state structures.68 Such transnational exchanges brought 
into focus a commonality of values among those who defined themselves as members of a 
cosmopolitan elite – most of them “white, financially comfortable, middle-aged males,” 
according to Jeffrey D. Brison.69 He adds: “In short, a basic community of interest, shaped by 
social class, education, and gender, more often than not obscured national interests, loyalties, and 
differences.”70 However, by the 1940s, Canada’s cosmopolitan elite increasingly turned to 
governments to maintain its cultural hegemony and to shield itself from the so-called lowbrow 
culture that was emanating from the United States  – a process that led to calls for greater public 
support for the arts and active efforts to develop a national culture.71 Writing about English 
Canadians, Maria Tippett argues that this “gave them a distinctly heightened sense of their 
importance, for they now saw themselves more clearly than ever before, not simply as nation-
builders or educators but as the custodians of the values their civilization was struggling to 
preserve.”72 French Canadians were not passive spectators in all of this, Paul Litt reminds us.73 
Indeed, MacMillan and Champagne were both participants in – and products of – these 
developments. 
Canada’s evolving soundscape provided an engaging environment for European musicians 
fleeing both persecution by totalitarian regimes and war. Their presence in cities like Toronto 
and Montreal provided additional stimulus to the development of a cosmopolitan culture rooted 
in Canadians’ experience with modernity. Between 1933 and 1942, thirty-eight of them arrived 
in Canada – a small number that does not quite capture the breadth of the contributions these 
artists made to their host country’s musical life.74 Born in Vienna, pianist and harpsichordist 
Greta Kraus fled the Nazis in 1938. She relocated to Toronto where she established her 
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reputation as a stellar performer and a dedicated educator. Mannheim-born cellist Lotte Brott 
also arrived in Canada in 1938, performing with the McGill String Quartet and the OCSM 
throughout the 1940s. Born in Berlin, pianist Helmut Blume escaped to England in 1939 where 
he was interned and then transferred to Canada. Released in 1942, he participated in wartime 
propaganda broadcasts and made his mark as an instructor and administrator at McGill 
University’s Faculty of Music. These individuals, and many others like them, injected new life 
into Canada’s compositional and educational culture. Their experience, Helmer argues, is 
“essentially a story of liberation.”75 According to him, it is also a story of decolonization in that 
they encouraged Canadians to think beyond French-English binaries. He writes: “Émigré 
musicians helped us to move beyond a colonial mentality by opening our musical consciousness 
and giving us a new appreciation of the rich tapestry that constitutes the Canadian mosaic.”76 
“Their efforts brought about a Canadianization of our musical life,” he adds.77 Yet to describe 
Canada’s wartime and postwar musical life as a mosaic would be to look at the past through the 
prism of the ideology of multiculturalism, which had yet to move individuals such as Désy, 
MacMillan, and Champagne in 1946.   
At the turn of the 1940s, Canada’s cultural elite continued to seek inspiration in the works 
of folklorists who prioritized source material that spoke of the country’s cultural survival and 
‘white’ settler origins. George A. Proctor refers to the interwar decades as a period of “early 
nationalism” in Canadian music.78 During this period, composers experimented with melodic or 
thematic elements that they could quote or incorporate into their works to evoke Canadian life 
and spaces. Theirs was not a systematic or concerted effort. “In many European countries 
nationalism was crystallized through the works of a major composer …, but in Canada no single 
significant composer had emerged; indeed musicians were generally not cognizant of music 
produced elsewhere throughout the country,” explains Elaine Keillor.79 Hence, the crucial role 
that Barbeau played in the development of folk-infused art music in Canada. His efforts and 
those of Gibbon provided incentives for composers to begin transcribing folksongs to create 
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vocal and instrumental arrangements. Their 1927 and 1928 editions of the Quebec City CPR 
festival saw MacMillan and Champagne contributing “Two Sketches for String Quartet” and 
“Suite Canadienne,” respectively. MacMillan went on to focus increasingly on English-Canadian 
and Irish folksongs with the encouragement of Barbeau while Champagne continued his 
exploration of French-Canadian folklore through works such as “Danse villageoise” and “La 
Laurentienne.”80 The international connections and émigré contributions discussed above 
injected dynamism and direction in the country’s musical life without necessarily rendering 
obsolete the interest in folk material, especially in Québec where the practice of engaging with 
stories of origins remained strong.81    
French-English binaries thus continued to matter and affect dynamics within – and 
between – cultural centres such as Toronto and Montreal. Not surprisingly, they informed many 
of the works of non-fiction and fiction published at the time. Gibbon’s The Canadian Mosaic 
discussed the immigrant experience of ‘racial groups’ from Europe and their acculturation into 
Canadian society, but it did so in ways that celebrated Britishness and English-Canadian cultural 
hegemony.82 French Canadians were marginal characters in the cityscapes that Gibbon depicted 
in 1938. Set in Montreal and its surrounding region, Hugh MacLennan’s Two Solitudes provided 
a more accurate description of French-English and Catholic-Protestant relations in Canada. 
Published in 1945, the novel revolves around a wealthy, Catholic, French-Canadian family torn 
by incongruous forces – tradition and modernity, family and individualism, religion and 
secularism, country and city – and the need to navigate around sociocultural mores that 
encouraged allegiance to one’s ‘race’ and nation while nurturing suspicion of ‘others’ in the 
struggle for cultural survival and progress. In his work, MacLennan encapsulated many of the 
tensions that troubled Canadian society in the years leading up to the Second World War – 
tensions that also shaped the country’s international image.83 By engaging with the trope of 
métissage, the joint MacMillan-Champagne tour of Brazil was both a challenge to the idea of 
‘two solitudes’ and an effort to offer a more modern and rounded image of Canada than that 
proposed by Quatuor alouette the previous year.              
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Musical Envoys from Canada’s ‘Two Solitudes’ 
Sir Ernest MacMillan, as many people called him, was one the central forces behind the 
emergence of a distinctively Canadian ‘high’ art musical culture in the 1940s. Born in 1893 in 
Mimico, Ontario, he grew up in a Presbyterian family. A minister and hymnist, his father 
encouraged him to play the organ at Church. In 1905, MacMillan accompanied his family to 
Scotland where he perfected his musical education. Back in Canada in 1908, he was once again 
eastbound; although this time he was headed to Paris to study the piano. He was in Germany for 
a music festival when the First World War broke out. Interned at Ruhleben as an enemy alien for 
the duration of the conflict, MacMillan used that time to refine and develop his organizational, 
compositional, and conducting skills with musicians that he assembled into impromptu 
orchestras. After the armistice, he was released from the detention camp and returned to Canada 
where he began a prolific teaching and administrative career while also taking up the position of 
conductor at the TSO. He subsequently collaborated with Barbeau and Gibbon in their efforts to 
find a place for folk materials within Canada’s emerging national musical culture. MacMillan 
accepted the Knighthood awarded to him in 1935 not because he was an imperialist, but because 
the title was an “acknowledgment of the growing importance of music in public life.”84 
Throughout the 1930s, he tirelessly called attention to the need for more funding, better 
coordination, and greater promotion of the strategies deployed to train musicians, disseminate 
their works, and educate publics about the value of ‘serious music.’85 Resolvedly, he put his 
career at the service of the nation, although the Canada that he embraced was one that was 
characterized – above all – by its Britishness.86 According to Helmer: “A super musician and a 
consummate gentleman, MacMillan was a prime example of the British domination of the 
musical scene in Toronto and to some extent across Canada.”87  
Wilfrid Pelletier was in many ways “MacMillan’s francophone counterpart.”88 Born in 
Montreal in 1896, he played percussion with local bands in his youth before learning rudiments 
on the piano. With the help of a private instructor, he rose through the ranks of the city’s small 
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music community to secure a position with the National Theatre’s orchestra. In 1915, he won the 
Prix d’Europe although he had to wait until the following autumn to cross the Atlantic due to the 
war raging overseas. In 1917, he made his way to New York where he found work as a répétiteur 
for the singers of the Metropolitan Opera’s French repertoire. Within just a few years, he was 
conducting orchestras himself and giving performances throughout the United States. He was 
one of the Metropolitan Opera’s regular conductors when news reached him that he was needed 
back in Canada. Montreal philanthropists wanted him to serve as artistic director for a new 
orchestra that would have as part of its mandate to feature Québec-born and Québec-trained 
soloists and composers, particularly Prix d’Europe recipients. Pelletier participated in the 
creation of the OCSM in 1934 out of national pride and to repay his debt to the burgeoning 
cultural elite that had made it possible for him to travel overseas almost two decades earlier. Like 
MacMillan, he became a champion of ‘serious music’ by appealing to broader audiences through 
youth concerts and by working towards better training opportunities for French-speaking 
musicians. The opening of the Conservatoire de musique du Québec à Montréal (CMQM) in 
1943 was the culmination of these efforts.89  
Although MacMillan shared with Pelletier certain preoccupations regarding the teaching 
and dissemination of ‘serious music,’ his true counterpart in Québec was arguably Claude 
Champagne.90 Born in 1891, the Montreal-born composer-educator adopted the violin as his 
instrument of predilection. Educated at the Dominion College of Music and the Conservatoire 
national de musique, he first made a name for himself as a teacher and performer. Champagne 
completed his first composition in 1914, but it is his “Hercule et Omphale,” a 1918 symphonic 
poem, that caught the attention of Montreal’s cultural elite. Between 1921 and 1928, he studied 
in Europe – first in Belgium and then in Paris – where he premiered “Hercule et Omphale” to 
great acclaim. From there, he composed “Suite canadienne,” which won one of the prizes 
awarded during the May 1928 edition of the Quebec City CPR festival for works inspired by 
French-Canadian folk melodies. Incidentally, MacMillan also secured a prize with his “Six 
bergerettes du Bas Canada” that year. Back in Montreal in 1929, Champagne concentrated most 
of his energies on administrative and teaching duties while helping reform music education in 
Québec. He was instrumental in preparing the terrain for the provincial law to which the CMQM 
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owed its existence. In his capacity as assistant director of the new institution, he strove to elevate 
musical life in Montreal and prepare future generations for successful careers within the province 
and beyond.91 Champagne travelled in the same social and cultural circles as Désy, which is how 
he found himself tasked with writing “Quadrilha Brasileira” and helping arrange opportunities 
for Siqueira. He was therefore better positioned than Pelletier to accompany MacMillan to Brazil 
in 1946, especially considering his previous accomplishments as a composer of folk-infused 
works.92 
The initial plan for the joint MacMillan-Champagne tour revealed that Désy’s musical 
nation branding efforts were designed with both domestic and foreign audiences in mind. It also 
indicated unambiguously that the trope of métissage would, once again, serve to promote a 
musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community that centred on ‘whiteness.’ The ambassador 
invited MacMillan and Champagne to Brazil for two concerts that would launch the OSB’s 1946 
musical season in Rio de Janeiro. They were expected to share a two-part program whereby 
MacMillan would direct works by French-Canadian composers while Champagne would handle 
the English-Canadian repertoire. The former would begin the first concert and end the program 
on the second night. Désy insisted that this musical scheme would provide a great example of 
bonne entente and intercultural exchange “for both compatriots and foreigners.”93 A rebuttal, in 
some ways, of the ‘two solitude’ thesis. Hence the suggestion that the concerts be broadcast on 
Brazilian airwaves and then relayed to the CBC. Désy was inviting Champagne and MacMillan 
as his official guests “with the assistance of his friends in Brazil.”94 The DEA did not seem too 
keen on contributing to the scheme although it was willing to offer logistical support. Québec, on 
the other hand, offered $4,000 to cover some of the costs for one of the concerts. As for Ontario, 
it declined to help fund the project – possibly because the predominantly English-speaking 
province could not see how a tour framed as a “Cultural Propaganda Movement” with “no 
commercial character whatsoever” could benefit Ontarians with marginal ties to Brazil and 
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whose cultural standing in Canada seemed secure.95 The discrepancy between each province’s 
response to the project was another indication that the idea of a musically imagined Canadian-
Brazilian community resonated more with French Canadians than with English Canadians.  
The difficulties encountered by MacMillan and Champagne during the planning stages of 
the tour demonstrated the extent to which Désy’s musical diplomacy was improvised. The two 
composers first heard about the project in the summer of 1945. Details were blurry; there were 
talks of a shared program to be performed with the OSB on two consecutive nights, but also 
mentions of potential concerts in various venues throughout Rio de Janeiro, performances on the 
airwaves, and lectures at the Escola Nacional de Música. The concerts were to take place in May 
although they were later postponed to June, then July, and finally August. Whereas Champagne 
was happy to keep his schedule open until full details were available, MacMillan was becoming 
increasingly impatient with the fact that Désy could confirm neither the dates nor the financial 
terms. He had also asked the ambassador if he could arrange for him to conduct more concerts 
since he thought it was “absurd” to travel all the way to Brazil only to perform a shared program 
twice.96 It did not help that the DEA was not more informed than him regarding this new 
experiment in musical diplomacy. MacMillan had “not yet given up hope” although he was 
clearly exasperated by the slow pace at which things were moving.97 As for Champagne, he was 
“rather surprised, and worried” by the fact that his Ontarian counterpart seemed to have second 
thoughts regarding the tour.98 His personal relationship with Désy gave him confidence that 
everything would work out in the end. On April 10, 1946, he wrote to MacMillan to remind him 
of how important the tour was for “boosting Canadian music abroad.”99 He added: “Of course, 
with you, being a professional conductor, the case may be a little different, but I feel sure if you 
will visualize the ‘overall’ good it will do Canada, you will think it a very worthy gesture.”100 
Champagne appeared to doubt MacMillan’s willingness to put his career at the full service of the 
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nation. In the end, Canada seemed barely more capable than Brazil to organize such a tour on its 
own since MacMillan only agreed to go after Columbia Concerts got involved and negotiated 
terms for him.        
The DEA, more so than Désy, was to blame for the haphazard way in which the tour was 
organized. At least, this is what MacMillan believed. He did not need Champagne to lecture him 
on cultural diplomacy. “He is preaching to the converted,” he thought.101 MacMillan had resisted 
the temptation to walk away from the project to avoid embarrassing “our Ambassador in his 
genuine efforts to promote international good will.”102 The DEA had told Désy and MacMillan 
that Ottawa did not have the resources to support such initiatives in the immediate aftermath of 
the war.103 Its resources were presumably stretched so thin that it could only make partial 
photostats of the scores needed in Brazil. MacMillan, who had been actively campaigning for 
public support for the arts, was disappointed that Ottawa could not do more to support its artists 
by ensuring the best of conditions when performing abroad. More importantly, he felt that the 
DEA was failing Canadians by not keeping up with less developed nations that had already 
equipped themselves with a cultural diplomacy apparatus. “I am not wishing to plague you 
personally but I do think your Department ought to be kept reminded of the absolute necessity 
for doing something reasonably adequate to promote better international relations through 
music,” he told Information Division Director Terence W. L. MacDermot.104  
Although MacMillan made frequent references to music’s ability to foster international 
cooperation, his lobbying efforts were aimed primarily at creating opportunities for artists like 
himself and those he was working with as a conductor and an educator. The insistence with 
which he brought these matters to the DEA was less about creating a musically imagined 
Canadian-Brazilian community than about creating the conditions for the projection of an 
appealing image of Canada that corresponded to the high-ranking place he thought the country 
occupied in the concert of nations. In that sense, he was not much different than Siqueira who 
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also championed musical nation branding to consolidate his career and elevate his country’s 
status on the international stage. 
In this context, MacMillan and Champagne embodied the domestic power dynamics 
between Montreal and Toronto referred to above. The two composers appeared to collaborate 
somewhat reluctantly throughout the year that it took to conclude the details of the tour. 
MacMillan politely expressed his reservations regarding the original two-part program by 
indicating that having conductors share a stage was destabilizing for both the orchestra and the 
audience.105 He also mentioned that it would be more appropriate for him to headline the first 
concert, which suggests that his indisposition had to do with practicality as much as status.106 He 
shared some of his concerns in private correspondence with Désy who kept Champagne in the 
loop. The ambassador and the French-Canadian composer were on a first name basis and spent 
time together in Montreal during the summer of 1945. Proximity and familiarity informed 
Champagne’s response to Désy’s proposal. The opposite was true for MacMillan. Latent tensions 
between the two composers, especially in light of MacMillan’s reluctance to commit to the 
project until April 1946, resulted in the abandonment of the initial plan. Evoking health reasons, 
Champagne told his diplomat friend that he preferred to focus on teaching while in Brazil and 
that it would be best to let MacMillan handle the concerts with the OSB.107 Final details for the 
tour were finally agreed on just weeks prior to departure: MacMillan would conduct eight 
concerts while Champagne would give eight lectures at the Escola Nacional de Música in 
addition to conducting two concerts (at Cine-Rex and in the auditorium of the MES). This new 
experiment in musical national branding would be about the ‘two solitudes,’ after all. 
The trope of métissage was a doubtful metaphor for the tour as evidenced by the works 
performed by the two composers in Brazil. Siqueira had confused Champagne and MacMillan by 
telling them that he was looking forward to their shared program of “Canadian and British 
music.”108 More than a semantic mistake, the use of these adjectives suggested that he associated 
Canadian culture primarily with French Canada. Correspondingly, the culture of English-
speaking Canadians appeared to him as more colonial in its adherence to Britishness. Thinking 
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that Siqueira actually meant works by British composers, Champagne told MacMillan that works 
by French composers would then have to be incorporated to properly balance the shared 
program.109 That was before the initial musical scheme fell apart. Désy ultimately agreed to let 
the two composers conduct their own affairs although he encouraged them to include Canadian 
works in their respective programs. For his Rio de Janeiro debut, Champagne performed his 
“Berceuse” alongside Czech (Bedřich Smetana), Russian (Nikolai Rimsky-Korsakov), and 
French (Arthur Honegger and Henri Rabaud) works. He dedicated his second concert entirely to 
Canadian composers, all of them from Québec. Aside from his own “Two Sketches for String 
Quartet” and a one-off performance of Champagne’s “Danse canadienne,” MacMillan performed 
mostly compositions associated with the canons of ‘serious music’ (from Ludwig van Beethoven 
to Franz Schubert and Gustav Theodore Holst, among others). Whereas Champagne focused on 
Québec’s cultural output and its connections to both France and the musical nationalisms of 
Smetana and Rimsky-Korsakov, MacMillan situated his practice within the cosmopolitan 
universalism of Western ‘high’ culture – ‘two solitudes,’ indeed.110         
Coverage of the tour inevitably reflected this polarization. The Brazilian press welcomed 
MacMillan and Champagne as “guests of maestro Siqueira” and “messengers from Canada,” but 
it also emphasized their difference from one another by noting that they embodied distinct 
musical manifestations – rather than variations – of Canada’s musical culture.111 Reporters often 
found themselves discussing the two composers simultaneously since they were in Brazil at the 
same time to foster cordial relations between Canadians and Brazilians.112 Yet this made it easier 
to consistently juxtapose MacMillan’s connections to the English-speaking world against 
Champagne’s connections to the French-speaking world. Toronto and Montreal appeared as 
worlds apart in the Brazilian press, especially with MacMillan and Champagne following their 
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own itineraries in Rio de Janeiro. The fact that Ontario newspapers took an interest in the tour 
did not mean that Désy was more successful in his efforts to have an image of national unity 
reflected towards Canada. English-language newspapers had for the most part shown no interest 
in Désy’s earlier cultural diplomacy initiatives, but MacMillan’s successes with the OSB were 
cause for celebration for reporters. Most of them, however, failed to take note of Champagne’s 
presence in Brazil.113 French-language newspapers did not do better in that they focused on their 
Montreal-born musical envoy and his ambassador friend rather than engaging with the image of 
bonne entente and the trope of métissage that initially informed this latest musical nation 
branding experiment.     
What did all this mean for Désy’s musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community? As 
was the case with other aspects of the tour, the way in which the two composers engaged with 
their hosts’ culture differed. MacMillan thought it appropriate to ask Désy and Siqueira, shortly 
before the trip, whether he should include a Brazilian composition in one of his concerts. He was 
therefore shocked to learn that Brazil’s government had passed a law requiring all conductors to 
feature at least one Brazilian work in their programs.114 Coming as it did at the last minute, this 
new restriction became an additional source of annoyance. Not everyone in Brazil endorsed the 
law since it generally meant that visiting conductors usually picked compositions that were easy 
to play and could be learned quickly. The result was that audiences were often confronted with 
lesser quality works that did not quite reflect the richness of their country’s musical culture.115 
Still, the law forced foreign artists to familiarize themselves with the Brazilian repertoire, which 
meant that some of them became informal ambassadors for Brazil when returning home. In Rio 
de Janeiro, MacMillan performed Siqueira’s “Crepúsculo” and “Dança Brasileira” as well as 
Villa-Lobos’s “Caixinha de Boas.”116 Champagne, on the other hand, was above the law. Neither 
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of his two concerts included Brazilian works although he did share the stage with Siqueira who 
opened the Cine-Rex program with works by Carl Maria von Weber and Wolfgang Amadeus 
Mozart. It is possible that Champagne was exempted from the law’s requirement because of the 
close friendship he seemed to be developing with Siqueira. His reputation was also in good 
standing since he was already known for “Quadrilha Brasileira,” an original composition based 
on an indigenous folk melody from northern Brazil. Aside from this 1942 composition and 
unlike their Brazilian colleagues, neither Champagne nor MacMillan were inclined to seek 
inspiration in indigenous musical cultures that were “alien to the white race.”117 If a musically 
imagined Canadian-Brazilian community was to emerge from their efforts, it would have to 
foreground ‘whiteness.’ 
It would also have to be androcentric as Brasil Musical indicated shortly before MacMillan 
and Champagne arrived in Rio de Janeiro. Seeking to set the stage for the tour, Désy arranged for 
the publication to feature the young French-Canadian pianist André Mathieu in its pages (figure 
3.1). Born in 1929 in a prolific musical family, Mathieu wrote his first piece for piano at the age 
of four. By 1936, he had performed his own works in front of bedazzled publics and had settled 
in Paris, thanks to the support of the Québec government. Acclaimed as a genius in Europe, he 
then conquered audiences in New York before returning to Montreal where he composed what 
would soon become his defining work: “Concerto #3.” Mathieu was close to the peak of his 
career when he appeared on the cover of the ninth issue of Brasil Musical. He was depicted 
reading the first issue of the magazine, which featured Villa-Lobos on the cover. This play of 
opposition served to underline the exceptional character of the child prodigy in his passage to 
adulthood. Wearing a suit and tie, Mathieu fixed his intent gaze on the publication in ways that 
masked the fact that he could not read Portuguese. He projected a confident curiosity, 
composure, and intellect. Combined with the idea of creative genius, these attributes ensured that 
Mathieu’s performance in front of the camera would be coded male. The ability to communicate 
authentic experiences through the language of ‘serious music’ was understood as a form of 
mastery, even authority, over otherwise feminine emotions, which is why the “creative genius 
could only ever be a man” in the popular imagination.118 However, Mathieu – the ‘Canadian 
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Mozart,’ was not yet a full-grown man, which explains why additional elements were mobilized 
to substantiate his performance of masculinity. The interview that accompanied this mise en 
scène brought into focus the young pianist’s big and strong hands, his calm and mature 
demeanour, his interest in competitive sports, and his recent adoption of smoking habits. By his 
own admission, Mathieu avoided unflattering photo angles that trapped him in the image of the 
“child prodigy.”119 The young artist was not scheduled to perform in Brazil, but his presence in 
the pages of Brasil Musical revealed the gendering process at work in Canada’s musical nation 
branding on the eve of the Champagne-MacMillan tour.  
 
Figure 3.1. André Mathieu pictured reading about Heitor Villa-Lobos on the cover of Brasil 
Musical (1946). Source: Brasil Musical, Biblioteca Alberto Nepomuceno. 
The two impromptu ambassadors gravitated in and around predominantly male political 
and cultural circles in Rio de Janeiro. They befriended and developed collegial relationships with 
                                                          





the likes of Villa-Lobos, Francisco Mignone, and Oscar Lorenzo Fernández; towering male 
figures that the two composers needed to measure to. MacMillan’s on-stage performances 
provided evidence that he was up to the task, according to Brazilian music critics. They placed 
him in the same category as Mathieu, by noting that his musical genius shone through his 
playing at a very early age.120 Not only had he grown into an accomplished and widely respected 
composer-educator, he had also survived German internment camps during the First World War 
and had been awarded Knighthood.121 His “vigorous artistic attitude,” objective outlook, and 
even temperament allowed him to rest control and guide the OSB to “one of the biggest musical 
triumphs” ever experienced in Rio de Janeiro.122 These journalistic hyperboles were thought to 
capture the full measure of the man. In a parallel way, he and Champagne were pictured smoking 
with radiant – almost victorious – smiles in the Canadian press.123 A similar photo of Champagne 
with Villa-Lobos served to further convey the normative framework within which the Canadian-
Brazilian cultural rapprochement was to take place.124 Pipe and cigar smoking were practices that 
reinforced one’s sense of masculine and bourgeois identity. It was also a marker of sociability as 
the Champagne and Villa-Lobos picture seemed to suggest (figure 3.2).125 This representation 
helped depict the French-Canadian composer as being on par with his Brazilian counterpart 
whom the press described as the “arbiter” and “absolute ruler of things musical in his 
country.”126 A photo, rather than words that evoked patriarchal power, sufficed to argue that the 
two men were in the same league.      
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Figure 3.2. Claude Champagne and Heitor Villa-Lobos discussing cigars at a social event 
(1946). Source: Ernest MacMillan Fonds, Library and Archives Canada. 
One thing is certain; the OSB put MacMillan’s manful authority to the test. Although he 
successfully surmounted obstacles with vigour and valour during live concerts (from 
inexperienced musicians struggling through hard passages to horns playing out of tune), he found 
himself discouraged and enervated, even powerless, during rehearsals.127 The problems he faced 
ranged from a missing key to open the piano to the double booking of rehearsal halls, delayed 
payments of conductor fees, missing and incomplete scores, as well as rehearsal and concert 
calendars that kept changing. Most tiring were the musicians themselves. MacMillan 
sympathized somewhat with them in that he recognized that they were underpaid and 
overworked, but he still reprimanded them for their indiscipline, lack of focus, and frequent 
absences. “Musicians are a bit like children anywhere, but here perhaps more than elsewhere,” 
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he wrote in his diary.128 Being old did not shield them from criticism: “The oldest player must 
have been 75 and seemed very short-sighted; he was certainly abysmally stupid.”129 Echoing 
Roussin’s disparaging remarks, he described the OSB as a subpar orchestra based in a city whose 
musical standards did not compare with those of true metropolises.130     
MacMillan’s ambivalence vis-à-vis Brazilians was not just about their heedlessness and 
their unresponsiveness to his patriarchal power. They were a disconcerting ‘other’ in a 
disorienting city. Rio de Janeiro had, at first, seemed familiar with its layout, cafés, and 
buildings, which reminded MacMillan of Paris: its Avenida Presidente Vargas was a little bit like 
the Avenue des Champs-Élysées and the Teatro Municipal was a “miniature of the Paris 
Opera.”131 Spending most of his time in elite ‘white’ circles, he found the city not as ethnically 
diverse as he expected.132 Yet Rio de Janeiro had none of the comforts that Toronto offered. 
MacMillan’s first room did not have a bath. The room he moved into after had plumbing issues, 
which forced him – on one occasion and to his great chagrin – to conduct a concert unbathed. 
“Even toilets call for patience,” he noted with exasperation in his diary.133 Brazilians mishandled 
his laundry and his mail when they did not overcharge for cabs and stamps. He complained of 
their  attitude, their unreliability, and their inability to hold promises.134 “How so apparently 
lacka daisical a race managed to build Rio I don’t know,” he wrote.135 Growing increasingly 
disenchanted with his hosts, MacMillan feared being contaminated by what he considered to be 
their flawed character. He conceded that this “sweeping generalization” applied primarily to 
Brazilians although “visitors and foreigners of brief residence” were susceptible “to be infected 
by the Brazilian attitude.”136 His compatriots were also at risk since this improvidence “was 
beginning even to creep into the Canadian embassy.”137 Fortunately, he could turn to Désy and 
Rogers who provided unceasing support and made him feel at home. Like Roussin, he sought 
comfort in the familiar and held Brazilians accountable for not living up to the standards he set 
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for them through his northern gaze. Reflecting on his experience in Brazil, he penned the 
following words in his diary: “Never in my life have I wished more ardently to get away from a 
place – unless perhaps Ruhleben.”138 In his eyes, Rio de Janeiro was barely more bearable than a 
detention camp in wartime Germany.   
Champagne did not leave behind a tour diary detailing his impressions of Brazil, but it is 
fair to assume that his experience of Rio de Janeiro was more enjoyable than that of MacMillan’s 
since he concentrated his activities on lecturing, which put him into contact with fellow 
composers and educators, many of whom were francophiles. Unlike MacMillan, he felt “very 
much at home” in the city because of its “European atmosphere,” its “cosmopolitan spirit,” and 
the supposed absence of “race discrimination.”139 Champagne’s positive depiction of Rio de 
Janeiro reflected, of course, the fact that he spent most of his time in elitist circles and had few 
contacts with musicians who often came from the popular classes. Yet it was also consistent with 
his support of Désy’s cultural initiatives in that he was not going to disparage a people with 
whom Canadians were expected to engage. It would also have been ungrateful considering the 
high esteem in which Brazilians held him because of his closeness to Désy and the assistance he 
provided to Siqueira during his trip to Canada earlier that year. In attendance during one of 
MacMillan’s concerts, Champagne was honoured with a long ovation by the “habitués” of the 
Teatro Municipal.140 By using a French term to describe the concert hall’s audience, Jornal do 
Brasil’s Francisco Cavalcanti underlined the continued importance of Latinity and France-
derived ‘high’ culture in Canadian-Brazilian relations. In fact, Désy and his many impromptu 
ambassadors had been so successful at dislocating Britishness from the centre of Canada’s 
international image that Brazil’s elite now assumed that all Canadians spoke both French and 
English fluently.141               
If there is one thing that MacMillan and Champagne agreed on, it was that Brazilians were 
an exemplary nation in terms of their engagement with culture and their support for the arts. The 
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two composers returned inspired – but also somewhat embarrassed, even angry – that Brazil, a 
country on the periphery of the world as they knew it, had progressed more than Canada on the 
question of government support for the arts.142 This realization certainly destabilized their self-
image as dignified cultural representatives of a great modern nation from the North. The 
interviews they gave to the press upon returning to Canada revealed the urgency with which they 
sought to tackle that issue. Champagne romanticized what he witnessed in Brazil when he stated 
that “la musique y prime tout,” but the point that he was trying to make was that governments 
(federal and/or provincial) had a responsibility to subsidize artists if they wished to create an 
authentic national culture and see Canadians take their rightful place in the concert of nations.143 
“Brazil is far ahead of Canada so far as creative musical activity is concerned,” he told Thomas 
Archer as if to create a shock response in The Montreal Gazette’s readership.144 MacMillan, who 
should not have been forthcoming in talking about Brazil, qualified his compatriot’s statement in 
an interview with The Globe and Mail: “They are far ahead of us as far as opera and the ballet 
are concerned, but I think their symphonic tradition has perhaps lagged behind ours.”145 That 
said, he concurred with Champagne with regards to government support, productivity, and 
audience receptivity to ‘serious music.’ MacMillan had, of course, reserved some of his 
criticisms for the “unimaginative people” at the DEA who were failing to understand “the place 
that cultural propaganda can and should take in foreign (or for that matter, any) relations.”146 The 
Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka the Massey 
Commission) would allow him to articulate and disseminate some of his ideas regarding these 
matters.147   
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 
Since the opening of the legation in 1941, Désy and his associates – state and non-state actors 
from both Brazil and Canada – championed cultural intercourse to put forward the idea of a 
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musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. However, the circulation of peoples, ideas, 
and cultural works was for the most part unidirectional, which was consistent with the emphasis 
placed on musical nation branding. Projection, rather than reciprocal engagement, defined 
Canada’s musical diplomacy in the early years of the two countries’ cultural rapprochement. The 
Globe and Mail, in the aftermath of the Champagne and MacMillan tour, wrote that Brazilians 
were now more “inclined to think of Canada as a nation of artists, poets and musicians, rather 
than to harbour the more frequent foreign notion that Canada is a glacial land inhabited by 
trappers, Eskimos and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.”148 Désy deserved much credit for 
this state of affairs. Mayfair’s George Austen attributed his success to two things: “[A] real 
interest in Canadian painters and musicians, and a combination of showmanship and hard work 
that would get him a hearing as a press agent, let alone as the ambassador of a friendly 
power.”149 However, Désy did not have full control of his musical nation branding campaigns 
since the non-state actors that he mobilized had plenty of opportunities to enact agency, which is 
why Canada’s international identity was a contested matter. Between métissage and ‘two 
solitudes,’ the latter predominated in 1946. And while Champagne and MacMillan took part in 
the acts of national projection and national self-representation, ‘othering’ Brazilians in the 
process, they also served as conduits through which Brazil’s own cultural ambassadors 
propagated their ideas and works. Having failed to help Siqueira in the winter of 1946, 
MacMillan had indicated that he would do his best to reciprocate upon returning home. In March 
of 1947, he wrote to his Brazilian counterpart to let him know that he had just introduced 
Torontonians to his “Danças Brasileiras [1 and 5].”150 Boldly and with the satisfaction of having 
accomplished one of his goals, Siqueira replied: “I hope you will go on playing Brazilian 
composers since the public seemed to like it.”151 Brazilians were evidently not passive actors in 
this story as the following chapter indicates.     
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CHAPTER 4: CIRCULAR (RE)TRANSMISSIONS 
 
Exchanges with other nations in the fields of the arts and letters will help us to make our 
reasonable contribution to civilized life, and since these exchanges move in both directions, we 
ourselves will benefit by what we receive.1 
– Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences, 1951 
 
On March 12, 1953, Jean Désy found himself in the unenviable position of having to testify in 
front of the House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs (HCSCEA) to discuss 
the recent activities of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 
(CBC-IS). He was there in his capacity as director general of the organization, a title he held 
since January 1952. He had left Brazil in 1947 to continue his diplomatic career in Italy; that is, 
until he was recalled to help reorganize the CBC-IS so that its policies better aligned with those 
of the Department of External Affairs (DEA). He might as well have kept his ambassador and 
impromptu impresario titles since the HCSCEA had convened him in part to explain why he had 
spent close to $25,000 on the production of a concert and a recording by Heitor Villa-Lobos at 
Montreal’s Plateau Hall. Held on December 17, 1952, the event, which was broadcast live to 
South America, was the culmination of a decade-long history of cultural relations between 
Canada and Brazil, but not everyone agreed that this was a sound investment of taxpayer money. 
The Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka 
the Massey Commission) had published its report less than two years earlier and Désy had found 
in it plenty of arguments to support his most recent musical diplomacy initiative. Quoting from 
the document, the ambassador turned administrator evoked the need to reciprocate to continue 
accumulating international goodwill and enriching Canada’s cultural life.2 After all, the report 
did stress that the “promotion of a knowledge of Canada abroad is not a luxury but an 
obligation” and that Canadians had neglected their “distant neighbours, taking little and giving 
less.”3 Not only that, the commissioners had argued that the use of culture in international 
relations was an effective means of countering “false propaganda” by hostile regimes.4 It should 
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not have come as a surprise that Désy saw in the report a vindication of his earlier efforts and an 
opportunity to provide impetus to Canada’s Cold War cultural diplomacy.   
The turn of the 1950s was a time of both hopefulness and insecurity in Canada. Established 
on April 8, 1949, the Massey Commission had as its mandate to report on the significance and 
state of culture from coast to coast while making recommendations on how best to promote and 
sustain “the national tradition of the future.”5 Through its proceedings, it gave voice to – and 
served as a forum of encounter for – artists, administrators, producers, and patrons who were 
investing much hope in the project of a state-supported national culture. The prosperity and 
growing sense of national identity that followed the Second World War fuelled their optimism. 
At the same time, this bustling activity masked growing concerns regarding continental 
economic integration and American cultural penetration in the form of low art forms, both of 
which threatened the hegemony of the country’s cultural elite. With the Cold War in full swing, 
Canadians found themselves seeking consensus on their national and international identities to 
fend off perceived ‘red threats’ while avoiding complete subservience to the United States and its 
anti-communist agenda. Launched in 1942, the CBC-IS served to channel and give direction to 
these ambitions. Under-Secretary of State Dana Wilgress told the HCSCEA that the organization 
was entering its third phase after just ten years of existence: (1) from sending messages of 
support to Canadian forces in war-torn Europe to (2) promoting postwar “peaceful international 
collaboration” and (3) engaging in the “war of ideas” against communism.6 The Massey 
Commission had emphasized phase two of the CBC-IS in its report although it also couched its 
discussion of the broadcaster in Cold War language when it underlined that “information and 
cultural matters are now becoming more and more an essential part of foreign policy.”7 The 
Louis St-Laurent government put Désy at the helm of the CBC-IS to solidify the broadcaster’s 
mandate as an instrument of psychological warfare aimed at Europe, but the former ambassador 
believed – as did the commissioners – that shortwave radio was, first and foremost, a powerful 
nation branding tool; particularly vis-à-vis Brazil, the only country with which Canada had a 
cultural agreement at the turn of the 1950s. 
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The Villa-Lobos concert, coming as it did during the Cold War and at the end of the CBC-
IS’s first decade of shortwave transmissions, exposed the limits of the metaphors and 
technologies deployed to project Canada abroad. While commentators sought to distinguish 
between psychological warfare (the dissemination of information for propaganda purposes) and 
broadcasting (the dissemination of ostensibly apolitical, objective information), the international 
service performed a less apparent, but equally important third and crucial role, namely that of an 
instrument for national projection and national self-representation.8 In the same way that pan-
Canadian broadcasts helped listeners imagine themselves being part of a nation from the 1920s 
onward, the CBC-IS used shortwave transmissions to tell stories, often through music, about 
Canadians and the place they occupied – or thought they ought to occupy – in the world.9 Its 
mastery of radio technology and enterprising use of transcription records, combined with the 
staging of sophisticated mediated events such as the Villa-Lobos concert, also put Canadian 
savoir-faire and economic power on display while facilitating the transnational circulation of 
sounds and musicians, all of which were meant to shape perceptions of the country at home and 
abroad.  
In this context, the elaborate 1952 broadcast concert was supposed to be about the 
projection of Canadian identity more than Brazilian music. Above all, the event was about 
embodying a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community that – it was hoped – 
corresponded with Canadians’ self-image and sense of place in the world. Villa-Lobos’s 
‘difference,’ however, proved too destabilizing to the Plateau Hall audience who failed to 
recognize themselves in the image reflected back at them. Negative reviews of the concert and 
the controversy over costs that surrounded it revealed that Canadians had yet to reach consensus 
on what to project (and how) to secure their place in the concert of nations. This chapter begins 
with a brief history of shortwave technology, looking at the emergence of radio diplomacy in the 
United States, Great Britain, and Brazil to contextualize the nation branding imperatives that 
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motivated Canada’s late arrival on the international broadcasting stage. It then examines the 
CBC-IS’s southbound transmissions, which echoed the cultural diplomacy championed by Désy, 
who was still in Brazil when broadcasts began in 1945. The chapter then situates the Villa-Lobos 
concert, including the criticisms and commentaries that accompanied it, along a continuum of 
earlier musical nation branding efforts in order to shed light on the tensions inherent to the 
process of projecting Canada abroad.   
Radio Diplomacy 
Canada was a novice player when it entered the international broadcasting arena in 1945. The 
first breakthroughs in shortwave transmissions had occurred more than two decades earlier when 
radio amateurs in the United States and Great Britain established transatlantic communication 
with each other. From the First World War onward, radio technology developed at a rapid pace 
with commercial broadcasters competing for limited space on the airwaves, which they also 
shared with military organizations. Believing that high powered, low frequency longwave 
transmissions held greater potential, regulators forced amateurs into the upper portion of the 
radio spectrum to prevent them from creating interference in military and commercial 
communication.10 However, radio amateurs successfully experimented across long distances 
using high frequencies to the great surprise of observers who had yet to fully understand the 
physics of radio communication in the early 1920s. Fred Fejes explains: 
Shortwave transmission depends on skywaves, or those radio waves which do not follow the 
surface of the earth, but are directed upward. The groundwave of a shortwave signal travels 
only a very small distance, … a phenomenon that led early engineers to dismiss the long 
distance capability of shortwaves. The skywave of the shortwave signal, however, is 
transmitted upward, bounces off the ionosphere, travels back to earth, bounces back towards 
the ionosphere again and finally returns to earth. This type of skywave propagation pattern 
allows shortwave signals of very low power to travel immense distances and to be received 
thousands of miles away while receivers within 10 miles of the transmitter may not pick up 
anything at all.11   
                                                          
10 Fred Fejes, Imperialism, Media, and the Good Neighbor: New Deal Foreign Policy and United States 





Despite these developments, the commercial potential of shortwave radio was not yet apparent, 
although imperial governments were quick to note that long-distance communication could serve 
to link together their colonial holdings. At the turn of the 1930s, the British, the French, the 
Belgians, and the Dutch began experimenting with shortwave broadcasts, which they aimed at 
‘white’ settlers in their colonies.12 The Soviet Union, on the other hand, turned to transnational 
broadcasting to convey the meaning and promises of the Communist Revolution to the world. 
Established in 1929, its Radio Moscow pioneered the use of airwaves for propaganda purposes. 
Other nations, most notably Germany and Italy, followed suit with greater vigour and 
belligerence as war clouds rolled over Europe in the late 1930s.13 Canadians had much catching 
up to do and time was short.          
Although Great Britain may have been ahead of the curve, it was still a reluctant 
participant in the propaganda contest that was unfolding on the airwaves. The first official 
British foray into the world of shortwave communication occurred in 1926 when the Marconi 
Company, in conjunction with the British Post Office, established an imperial radio network that 
linked Canada with its mother country. The following year, the network expanded to include 
Australia, South Africa, and India. Great Britain’s experience with shortwave communication 
was limited mostly to imperial broadcasts by the aptly named British Broadcasting Corporation 
Empire Service. Launched in 1932, the organization adopted a new name in the closing year of 
the decade: the British Broadcasting Corporation Overseas Service (BBC-OS). The change 
reflected the fact that the British could no longer confine their long-distance communication to 
the Commonwealth if they wanted to maintain their hegemony throughout the world. The 
Germans and Italians had been actively disseminating anti-British propaganda using 
transnational broadcasts in multiple languages. English strategists understood that radio 
diplomacy held potential for projecting an honest and engaging image, maintaining alliance 
relationships, refuting Axis propaganda by disseminating ostensibly impartial news, and shaping 
public opinion in other countries. By 1945, the BBC-OS transmitted content in forty-five 
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languages.14 A form of public diplomacy, international broadcasting quickly became a central 
component of the modern state’s foreign affairs apparatus from the late 1930s onward.15 The 
appeal of radio was that it also offered opportunities to activate, even amplify, other public 
diplomacy practices such as disseminating advocacy, transmitting culture, or contextualizing 
international exchanges.16  
State and non-state actors in the United States demonstrated flexibility in exploiting the 
potential of international broadcasting. American radio amateurs had played a key role in 
demonstrating the ability of shortwaves to travel across borders over long distances. Following 
those experiments, commercial broadcasters began competing for influence in the upper portion 
of the radio spectrum to secure control over larger portions of their country’s communications 
market. The companies that dominated the domestic soundscape during the Great Depression – 
Westinghouse Radio Stations, Radio Corporation of America, General Electric, and American 
Telephone and Telegraph Company – were doubtful about the economic potential of shortwave 
radio, but they acquired experimental licences nonetheless to explore opportunities in Latin 
America. The Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, on the other hand, saw international 
broadcasting as a potentially effective public relations tool for its Good Neighbor policy. 
Commercial broadcasters were hesitant at first to make room for the State Department since they 
feared that such a precedent would lead to government intervention in domestic markets. 
Executives soon realized, however, that Good Neighborism’s emphasis on trade promotion and 
cultural penetration was consistent with their self-interests, particularly as a means of countering 
propaganda by regimes that undermined liberal developmentalism.17 Joint private and public 
approaches to economic and cultural expansion in Latin America thus served to establish 
American “hegemony in hemispheric communications.”18 By 1941, Nelson Rockefeller’s Office 
of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) had joined the fold with its radio division 
whose tasks were to amplify transmissions throughout Latin America, analyze Axis propaganda, 
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and create Good Neighbor content for audiences south of the Rio Grande.19 The entry of the 
United States into the war saw the State Department venture further into the realm of 
international broadcasting with the launch, in February of 1942, of a station that would soon 
become known as the Voice of America.20                   
Brazil was one of the main targets of these efforts, because of its economic and strategic 
importance for hemispheric stability and defence from the 1930s through the 1950s. American 
national interests were conveyed in great part through the medium of radio, a process facilitated 
by the fact that the Getúlio Vargas regime welcomed cooperation in the field of communications 
as part of its bargaining strategies with major Western powers. For example, its Departamento de 
Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) demonstrated pragmatism when it opted to discuss broadcasting 
opportunities with Columbia Broadcasting System executives.21 By allowing commercial 
broadcasters to maintain and further develop relations with affiliate stations in Brazil, Vargas 
permitted an influx of expertise and equipment that greatly enhanced the Estado Novo’s own 
broadcasting capabilities. The trend continued through the Eurico Gaspar Dutra presidency and 
Vargas’s final term in office (he returned to power in 1951). From Roosevelt’s ‘Good 
Neighborism’ to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s ‘Campaign of Truth,’ broadcast strategists strove to 
spread the ‘American dream’ to advance the United States’ economic and political interests in 
South America while countering the view that North Americans were a racist and imperialist-
minded people. They did so by disseminating content from shortwave stations in the United 
States and by either sending scripts to affiliates in Brazil or getting involved in local productions. 
Assessing the effectiveness of such strategies was made difficult by the fact that Brazilians 
clearly expressed their preference for their own music and for BBC-OS content.22 What could not 
be denied, however, was the impact that these strategies had on the modernization, consolidation, 
and expansion of the South American giant’s broadcasting infrastructure.23 
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When it came to radio, Brazilians were engaged, pragmatic, and purposeful. In 1922, they 
celebrated a century of independence with a world expo that attracted participants from fourteen 
countries: among others, Belgium, France, England, Portugal, and the United States. The 
festivities began with a special broadcast – a national first – from atop Corcovado Mountain. The 
event was a perfect display of prowess, which reinforced the image of economic, political, and 
cultural progress that the Brazilian government wished to foreground during its Independence 
Centenary International Exposition. Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company – with 
some assistance from Canada’s Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka the Light) – 
had helped the country enter the age of radio in a spectacular way.24 With Vargas’s rise to power 
in 1930, broadcasting in Brazil went through a rapid phase of expansion carefully scripted 
through regulatory mechanisms, state censorship, and adroit negotiations with North American 
organizations. Radio helped unite a dispersed population, a large portion of which was illiterate, 
around the regime’s nation building project. The DIP and the Ministério da Educação e Saúde 
(MES) participated actively in these efforts, which ranged from the deployment of education 
programming to the dissemination of musical works that propagated the idea of Brasilidade. 
Starting in 1940, the DIP dedicated much of its attention to nation branding. The Vargas regime 
had just acquired the popular Rádio Nacional and it wished to direct some it its activities to 
international broadcasting with the hope of seducing foreign audiences with a positive image of 
Brazil.25 Launched on December 31, 1942, Rádio Nacional’s shortwave transmissions to the 
world represented a “victorious initiative” for the Estado Novo.26 Its inaugural broadcasts 
revealed Brazilians’ confidence in their national musical culture. They also provided an 
indication of what Brazil’s priorities were in terms of interlocutors. The four-part, trilingual 
program was aimed to (1) Latin America, (2) Portugal, (3) England, and (4) the United States. 
Scheduled from 11 p.m. to midnight, the North American transmission focused exclusively on 
music except for a brief introduction by American Ambassador Jefferson Caffery.27 It is likely 
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that the signal travelled north of the 49th parallel although few people would have been listening 
at that time of the day in this early phase of Canada’s rapprochement with Brazil.     
The CBC-IS 
It took another two years for the CBC-IS to launch Voice of Canada and join the international 
broadcasters club. Established in 1936 through an Act of Parliament, the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (CBC) concerned itself exclusively with the domestic stage in the years leading up 
to the Second World War. The projection of Canada abroad was not in the plans of the crown 
corporation even though Canadians had been allocated shortwave frequencies at the 1932 
International Telecommunications Conference.28 Yet voices within the CBC and the DEA 
expressed interest in broadening the institution’s mandate as early as 1937. “While politicians 
viewed an international broadcasting service as an instrument for war-induced counter-
propaganda, the CBC personnel referred to the proposed station as an instrument for delineating 
the Canadian identity,” explains Hall.29 One of the key arguments made was that the Canadian 
government had to “occupy” the frequencies assigned to it by the international community to 
prevent other nations from taking them over.30 Failure to do so would result in Canadians being 
“shut out of the field.”31 Leonard W. Brockington, chairman of the board of governors of the 
CBC, remarked that Canada’s national prestige was at stake since the country was lagging 
behind others in the competition taking place on radio airwaves.32 Proponents of shortwave 
broadcasting insisted that an international service would help Canada “take her rightful place 
among the nations of the world,” which was imperative to ensure continuous economic growth.33 
Canadians needed to be heard and noticed if they wanted to enhance and develop trade relations. 
Projecting an appealing and esteemed image would help them accumulate goodwill and position 
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their country favourably in anticipation of a new postwar world order. These arguments revealed 
Canadians’ concerns with self-image, but also their search for an international identity that could 
foster national unity. The debates surrounding international broadcasting foregrounded internal 
benefits, which ranged from partaking in program exchanges to extending the reach of French-
language broadcasts to “contribute to a better understanding between the two mother races in 
Canada.”34   
Wartime exigencies and Canadians’ middle power aspirations also factored into the 
debates. Some commentators argued that international broadcasting could help Canada keep its 
soldiers and allies informed about its national war efforts. It could also complement the 
broadcasts deployed by the United States and Great Britain to discredit Axis propaganda. 
Canada’s presence on the airwaves was needed to ensure ongoing transmissions in the event that 
the BBC-OS stations were damaged. This would permit the relaying of critical information to 
combatants at the front and the resistance in occupied territories.35 Canadians of European 
origins would have a role to play in inviting their former compatriots to embrace “peace and 
understanding” over war.36 Canadians were well equipped to disseminate such messages argued 
CBC Assistant Manager Augustin Frigon:    
There is a legitimate and dignified place which Canada can occupy in international 
broadcasting. The experience of our country in reconciling differences of race and religion 
and our unique background of a joint cultural heritage constitute a message which can 
unobtrusively and profitably be made available in the world’s present troubled state and in 
the period of reconstruction, when peace has been restored.37 
The above arguments suggest that psychological warfare on the airwaves was about defeating 
belligerent foes and defending liberal democracy as much as it was about branding Canada and 
accumulating goodwill to help the country find its place in the concert of nations alongside the 
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United States and Great Britain. Champions of international broadcasting hoped that the CBC-IS 
would serve Canadians well as a wartime and peacetime instrument of public diplomacy. 
The William Lyon Mackenzie King government finally opted to move ahead with the 
project after having carefully considered the briefs presented to the House of Commons Standing 
Committees on Radio Broadcasting in 1938, 1939, and 1942. On September 18, 1942, the Privy 
Council recommended that immediate actions be taken to establish “two 50 kW short wave 
transmitters, three directional antennas and associated apparatus” in Sackville, New Brunswick.38 
Already occupied by a CBC-owned radio station, the site was ideal because it was at a safe 
distance from the disruptive electromagnetic field generated by the magnetic pole and it offered 
“high ground conductivity for the antenna arrays,” which needed to reach Europe, Africa, and 
South America.39 As per the directives outlined in Order-in-Council 8168, the CBC was put in 
charge of the international service with operational funds coming from direct parliamentary 
grants and the DEA acting as a consultant on programming content. In December 1942, CBC-IS 
and DEA representatives began discussions about which regions to prioritize and whether 
wartime needs should take precedence over postwar needs. Unable to predict how much longer 
Canada would be at war, they decided to plan for both, prioritizing the United Kingdom and 
Commonwealth first, followed in order by Latin America, France, China and the Far East, and 
Russia and Central Europe.40 Delays with network construction, and the growing realization that 
the war could last several more years, provided a new context that squarely prioritized wartime 
over postwar imperatives. On March 8, 1944, then Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Norman A. Robertson sent Frigon a revised priority list with the United Kingdom at the top 
followed by the whole of Europe. In this new hierarchy, Latin America slipped to sixth place.41 
Finally, on February 25, 1945, Prime Minister King officially inaugurated the CBC-IS when he 
announced on air: “Tonight … Canada enters the world radio arena.”42 
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The advent of the Cold War resulted in wartime priorities being extended beyond 1945. 
The CBC-IS initially beamed its broadcasts in French, English, and German although Dutch, 
Slovak, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Spanish, Portuguese, and Italian programming were soon 
added to the list. By 1952, tensions between the Eastern Bloc and the Western Bloc had reached 
such proportions that the CBC-IS launched Russian and Ukrainian programs.43 In this context, 
the term ‘psychological warfare’ was often used synonymously with ‘political warfare’ and 
referred to the dissemination of content to shape – to one’s advantage – public opinions and 
attitudes in other countries. As Andrew Burtch notes, it included “not only offensive propaganda 
but ostensibly impartial news services and state-produced ‘publicity,’” both of which aimed to 
lend legitimacy to the Voice of Canada.44 Unlike propaganda, the term found greater acceptance 
in official discourses since it was more easily disassociated from the communication strategies 
deployed by totalitarian regimes. Yet psychological warfare was propaganda nonetheless since it 
aimed to “influence attitudes of large numbers of people on controversial issues of relevance to a 
group.”45 Whereas “black propaganda” tended to promote insurgency through the somewhat 
covert dissemination of subversive material, “white propaganda” employed so-called 
“dispassionate and honest news service that would discredit enemy suppression and distortion of 
the facts without specifically addressing (and thereby lending credibility to) enemy propaganda,” 
explains Burtch.46 Canadians favoured the latter, particularly since it reinforced their self-image 
as a friendly, impartial, and exemplary people.47 In the end, the distinction between 
psychological warfare and national projection through shortwave radio was not a clear cut one. 
The Massey Commission paid attention to these developments, because it recognized the 
CBC-IS as the “most important agency engaged in the task of promoting a knowledge of Canada 
abroad.”48 The commissioners and lobby groups whose influence is most apparent in the report 
championed cultural nationalism and national unity as a means of giving purpose and direction to 
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Canada. Paul Litt explains that members of the country’s cultural elite adopted a liberal humanist 
approach to justify government participation in the media landscape and government support for 
the arts; both of which would serve as a defence against the tyranny of totalitarian ideologies and 
the “illiberal menace of mass culture” poring over the border from the United States.49 In their 
eyes, “Canada alone represented the last best hope for liberal democratic values in an uncertain 
world,” writes Litt.50 The cultural nationalism of the Massey Commission lent itself easily to 
nation branding, which in turn helped legitimize the idea of Canada as an independent-minded 
middle power and trustworthy voice in international affairs. The commissioners thus 
recommended:  
a. That the International Service of the C.B.C. be continued and expanded with a view to 
increasing the knowledge and understanding of Canada abroad. 
b. That every effort be made to use for this purpose as often as possible the service of 
Canadians eminent in various fields.51 
If, as Zoë Druick argues, the Massey Commission sought to establish the cultural foundation for 
Canadian membership in an international community such as the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), it is fair to assume that it also perceived the 
CBC-IS to be one of its key instruments.52   
Canada’s entry into the world radio arena came with its share of complications, which the 
Cold War exacerbated. Firstly, the expansion of services – from the lengthening of the broadcast 
schedule to the creation of programs in an increasing number of languages – created budget 
headaches in the immediate postwar years since the funds set aside for peacetime transmissions 
were insufficient. The situation led CBC-IS representatives to seek more funds by highlighting 
the “comparative cheapness and effectiveness of radio as a potent weapon in the arsenal of 
defence.”53 In other words, shortwave radio was an economical way to fight the Cold War 
against the Eastern Bloc. Another source of concern was the lack of effective coordination 
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between the CBC-IS and the DEA. This raised other questions as Hall points out: “Which agency 
was responsible for International Service actions? Was it the CBC or External Affairs? Or 
both?”54 These were important questions that sought to shed light on the policy aspects of 
international broadcasting and the effectiveness of the service in accomplishing its stated goals. 
Between 1942 and 1951, liaison between the CBC-IS and the DEA was imperfect with the two 
experimenting with different approaches, all of which “met with varying degrees of success.”55 
This situation exposed the CBC-IS to various attacks, the most serious being that it had been 
infiltrated by Communists whose “pinkish influence” tainted Canada’s image overseas.56 In 
January and October of 1951, The Ensign’s Robert Keyserlingk published two pieces claiming 
that the CBC-IS’s neutral tone could mislead Iron Curtain countries into thinking that Canada 
was sympathetic to their cause. The organization, he claimed, was guilty of adopting an “anti-
anti-communist slant.”57 However unfounded or sordid the accusation, it caused considerably 
anxiety within the CBC-IS in the aftermath of the red scare that had plagued the National Film 
Board of Canada (NFB) earlier in 1948.58  
Established through an Act of Parliament in 1939, the NFB pursued the mandate of 
interpreting “Canada to Canadians and to other nations.”59 From its inception, it served both 
nation building and nation branding purposes using the medium of cinema, most notably 
animation films and the documentary genre, two cinematic languages with which Canadian 
artists excelled. Rather than impeding the growth of the NFB, the war generated opportunities for 
the organization, which busied itself with “progressive film propaganda of education, inspiration, 
and promise of a better tomorrow.”60 Its impressive wartime and postwar output elevated the 
status of Canadian filmmakers – and Canada – on the international stage.61 NFB productions did 
find their way to Brazil in the 1940s, specifically in the context of a photograph exhibition on life 
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in Canada and for a screening on organ production organized during the Ernest MacMillan and 
Claude Champagne tour. Désy, however, felt that it was futile to rely on films to compete against 
initiatives such as those of the OCIAA.62 That said, the NFB, which employed its share of left-
leaning and broad-minded artists, faced much bigger problems than American competitors in the 
immediate postwar years. In 1945, Igor Gouzenko, a cipher clerk at the Soviet embassy in 
Ottawa, defected with documents that revealed the existence of spy rings involving members of 
the Canadian civil service. The resulting climate of national insecurity placed the NFB inside the 
bullseye of the Kellock-Taschereau Commission and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, which 
spearheaded a communist witch-hunt that lead to substantial purges on the basis of ideology 
despite little to no evidence of subversion within the organization.63 In this context, the DEA 
could not afford to dismiss The Ensign’s accusations without first doing some house cleaning 
within the CBC-IS.              
The appointment of Désy to the newly created position of director general constituted an 
effort to deal with the crisis in direction, authority, and trust in the organization.64 The former 
ambassador had some relevant experience in the broadcasting policy field. In 1927, he had joined 
his colleagues in the DEA and the Department of Marine and Fisheries at a meeting held in the 
United States to discuss the allocation of wavelengths in North America.65 He had also helped 
extend the reach of CBC-IS broadcasts to Brazil when they began in 1945. Told that he would 
maintain his rank and status while “on loan” to the CBC-IS, Désy served for eighteen months 
from January 1, 1952, to July 15 of the following year.66 During this period, he undertook a 
major overhaul of the organization by bringing previously relatively autonomous language 
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sections under the control of an expansive administrative structure. He also recruited Yvon 
Beaulne, a foreign service officer with whom he served in Italy, to handle the circulation of 
classified materials back and forth between Ottawa and CBC-IS offices in Montreal. He further 
improved liaison with the DEA through the creation of a Political Coordination Unit that had “as 
its primary responsibility the provision of policy guidance.”67 These changes allowed him to 
correct the CBC-IS’s ‘red-tainted’ image without having to fire or demote anyone.68 
But while bringing administrative order to the international service, Désy was also 
emboldened by the Massey Commission report and seized the opportunity to advance his own 
dearest passions by ensuring that more attention was lavished on music and Latin America. 
However, the heavy hand with which Désy approached his job combined with the DEA’s 
intrusiveness into the everyday operations of the CBC-IS alienated many people. According to 
the institutional biographers of the CBC-IS, the director general’s ostentatious, tactless, and 
condescending managerial style demoralized employees.69 Similarly, they claimed that his elitist 
posture translated into grandiloquent self-serving undertakings that were difficult to reconcile 
with the foreign policy goals of both the DEA and the CBC-IS. Accused of being a “big spender” 
who “never lost sight of his own personal interests,” Désy was especially tarnished by the 1952 
Villa-Lobos concert, which his critics dismissed as a“pet project” emblematic of his wasteful 
“flair for the extravagant.”70 While an easy target, the focus on Désy’s personality does not 
explain fully the increasingly ambitious nature of Canada’s emerging radio diplomacy.  
Southbound Transmissions 
The cultural Cold War unfolding on the airwaves in Europe and the need to defend the 
organization against accusations that it was soft on communism mobilized much of the CBC-IS’s 
resources at the turn of the 1950s. That said, Latin America continued to be an area of concern 
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even if most eyes and ears were directed at Iron Curtain countries in the aftermath of the 1948 
Czechoslovak coup d’état. In fact, the Caribbean and the South American continent were on the 
agenda of the CBC-IS’s masterminds from the very beginning. The Order-in-Council to which 
the broadcaster owed its existence stipulated that southbound transmissions would help promote 
internationalism while projecting an engaging image of Canada to complement diplomatic 
relations in countries such as Brazil, Chile, and Argentina.71 Parliamentary debates echoed those 
views since Axis propaganda threatened to undermine Canadians’ emerging economic ties to the 
region.72 The DEA and the CBC-IS remained committed to begin beaming towards South 
America before the end of the war even if the continent slipped down the list of priorities in the 
months leading to the construction of the Sackville transmitters. On April 26, 1944, Assistant 
Under-Secretary of State Hugh L. Keenleyside informed Canada’s ambassadors in Rio de 
Janeiro, Santiago, and Buenos Aires that all services would be in operation by January 1 of the 
next year.73 Further delays resulted in the Latin American service being inaugurated a couple of 
years later although experimental broadcasts did begin in 1945. Internal correspondence from 
1951 stressed that shortwave transmissions to the Southern Hemisphere were to remain a 
pressing matter: “While the Latin America area cannot be considered to have the same primary 
political importance as Europe, it has its own urgency which cannot be ignored without risk.”74 It 
is true that total weekly broadcast hours to Europe (59 hrs: 50 mins.) were more than those 
allocated to Latin America (29 hrs: 10 mins.) in 1952, but this was also the result of needing to 
reach a more diverse population using a greater number of languages; 11 for Europe and 4 for 
Central and South America (figure 4.1). A case in point: weekly hours of Portuguese-language 
programming totalled 8 hrs: 10 mins., which surpassed any other language service aimed at 
Europe except for French (8 hrs: 10 mins.), English (8 hrs: 45 mins.), and Czech (9 hrs: 45 
mins.).75 
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Figure 4.1. The reach of the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation at the end of the 1950s. Source: Department of External Affairs Fonds, Library 
and Archives Canada.   
In his capacity as ambassador of Canada in Brazil, Désy immediately understood that 
shortwave transmissions would make a wonderful addition to his cultural diplomacy arsenal. He 
was therefore disappointed to learn in 1945 that the CBC-IS had not yet made definite plans for 
the inauguration of its service to Latin America.76 His eagerness to support Canada’s foray into 
the realm of international broadcasting led Director Peter Aylen and his colleagues to act to “live 
up” to the promise made to Canadian diplomats in South America. They therefore set aside funds 
for experimental broadcasts, which began on August 12, 1945.77 “After only one week of 
broadcasting, word has been received that the new short-wave programs beamed to Latin 
America ... come in loud and clear,” announced the CBC-IS shortly after.78 Benjamin Rogers, 
chargé d’affaires at the Rio de Janeiro embassy, agreed although he also volunteered constructive 
criticism with regards to the language proficiency of the announcer. More importantly, he wrote:  
I think particular attention should be paid to the musical tastes of Brazilians and Latin 
Americans in general. The consensus … seems to be that the music played on the test 
broadcast is not very good. The competition with American, British, French, Spanish, 
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Argentine and other short wave broadcasts is going to be intense and unless the C.B.C. 
programmes are as good or better, the great expense in building this station will be lost. 
People are only going to listen to the best.79 
An ally of Désy since the opening of the legation in 1941, Rogers was an active participant in the 
musical nation branding of his country in Brazil. Having taken advantage of Brazil’s radio 
infrastructure in the past, he and the ambassador immediately arranged for domestic broadcasters 
to record and replay CBC-IS programs to reach larger sections of the population.80 By doing so, 
they were able to further disseminate the Voice of Canada, which Brazilians could normally hear 
for thirty minutes every Sunday evening at 9 p.m.81    
The CBC-IS arrived in Brazil at a pivotal moment in the country’s history. Brazilians’ 
return to democracy launched the Second Republic (1946-64) – a period characterized by 
growing instability, factionalism, and economic hardship. The end of the dictatorship meant, 
among other things, a return of the Partido Comunista do Brasil [Communist Party of Brazil], 
which collected ten percent of the popular vote in the election that brought Dutra to power. 
Brazil had enriched itself somewhat during the Second World War, but its fortunes decreased 
significantly in the immediate postwar years. The South American giant was, “in the parlance of 
the day, still a ‘backward’ country,” notes Thomas E. Skidmore.82 By 1947, its foreign reserves 
were depleted so the government resorted to promoting staple exports at the expense of the 
continued industrialization and modernization of the economy. Faced with stagnating – even 
decreasing – standards of living, workers turned an increasingly sympathetic ear to left-leaning 
organizations until Dutra, with the encouragement of the United States, moved to crack down on 
Communists and terminate diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. As Robert M. Levine 
explains, the former general’s “somber presidential style subdued the heated political atmosphere 
that had been generated at the end of Vargas’s tenure.”83 At the same time, it extended “the 
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shadow of the Estado Nôvo … over a newly democratic Brazil.”84 Vargas’s populist rhetoric and 
his skilful manipulation of the recently founded Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro [Brazilian Labour 
Party] allowed him to defeat a divided opposition during the election of 1950. He returned to 
power with a nationalist and interventionist platform that alerted both champions of liberal 
internationalism and hardened anti-communist nationalists. Unable to revert to presidential 
decrees as he had done in the past, Vargas struggled to overcome congressional opposition to 
unite the country and reverse its economic decline. Désy thus found himself looking at a Brazil 
that was both strangely familiar and confoundingly different when he arrived at the CBC-IS in 
1952.   
The man who succeeded Désy in Brazil, James Scott MacDonald, did not deviate much 
from the course set since 1941. Rogers, who remained in Rio de Janeiro, provided continuity. 
The DEA initially struggled “to find a suitably qualified person … who would be willing or able 
to accept the appointment at short notice.”85 The post had been vacant for several months and 
time was of the essence since the Governor General of Canada, Harold R.L.G. Alexander, 1st 
Earl Alexander of Tunis, was due to visit Brazil in June of 1948. With the DEA since 1927, 
MacDonald served as high commissioner in Newfoundland before joining Rogers in South 
America. Possibly taking cues from his chargé d’affaires, the new ambassador seemed inclined 
in Brazil to look for similarities that could inform and validate Canada’s autonomist impulse. 
MacDonald was particularly interested in the Divisão Cultural do Itamaraty (DCIt), because it 
had been created to tackle problems that Brazilians and Canadians shared:  
Both of us fall in the group of countries which have neither a colourful, ancient civilization 
… nor yet a modern culture like that of the United Kingdom, the United States or France 
whose literature, press, radio, films, etc., are distributed on such an extensive scale by 
ordinary commercial agencies that they practically monopolize interest and rule out effective 
competition from official cultural agencies operating with meagre funds.86 
In Brazil for only two years, MacDonald did not show much initiative with regards to cultural 
relations aside from helping coordinate Canadian participation in both the newly established 
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Bienal Internacional de Arte (São Paulo) and the first Exposição Indigena Interamericana (Rio de 
Janeiro).87 The embassy’s priority was to emphasize Canadian autonomy in international affairs, 
which the Governor General’s visit threatened to undermine. Alexander had been invited by 
Brazilian authorities in part because the Força Expedicionária Brasileira had been under his 
command during the Second World War. The British embassy in Rio de Janeiro was keen to 
capitalize on the visit so Rogers and MacDonald had to carefully script the entire trip so that it 
was branded primarily as a Canadian-Brazilian affair.88  
MacDonald hosted another important visitor during his short tenure: Hugh W. Morrison, 
supervisor of the CBC-IS’s Latin American Section. Born in 1908 in Vegreville, Alberta, 
Morrison began his career in journalism prior to acting as director of Talks and Public Affairs at 
the CBC in the early years of the Second World War. He then relocated to New York where he 
served as assistant to the president of the pan-American airline company Transportes Aereos del 
Continente Americano until 1947. Homesick and seeking to refocus his career, he initiated a 
correspondence – followed by “exploratory” meetings – with Lester B. Pearson who had just 
accepted the position of secretary of state for External Affairs.89 Morrison was wondering, 
among other things, whether he “would fit into External Affairs” considering his familiarity with 
Latin America and his experience in communications and wartime transportation. His pitch 
included a short biography, which revealed the extent to which his conception of the Canadian 
identity was rooted in Britishness and geography:   
I think I know my native land pretty well – well enough to have pride in calling myself a 
Canadian. My father was from the Maritimes and my mother is from New England. I was 
born and raised on the Prairies with occasional spells on the Pacific Coast. After returning 
from Oxford and a few months on Fleet Street I went through the mill of the Toronto “Star” 
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… and then … with CBC. Thus having experienced a pretty good cross-section of Canada, I 
am constantly finding myself prodded by two things here: the fundamental misconceptions 
about Canada … and the recurring remark that Canada exports its brains.90 
Pearson did not hire Morrison, but he encouraged him to resume his career in broadcasting and 
disseminate his vision of Canada by arranging for his appointment to the post of supervisor of 
the Latin American Section.91 Morrison’s career path suggests that the line separating policy 
makers at the DEA and information specialists at the CBC-IS was not as clear cut as depicted in 
institutional biographies.     
Morrison began his new job on April 1, 1948, with the mandate to examine and possibly 
expand services to Latin America. Regarding Brazil, the CBC-IS had begun beaming weekly 
thirty-minute experimental broadcasts using two frequencies in August of 1945.92 Shortly after 
taking office, Morrison authorized daily transmissions to Brazil to better account for the 
country’s importance in terms of both geography and population. Seeking to understand the radio 
landscape in the Southern Hemisphere, he visited nine countries and thirteen cities in November 
and December of 1950. His itinerary included a short stop in São Paulo (December 5-10) and a 
one-week stay in Rio de Janeiro (December 10-17). The CBC-IS’s expanded programming 
schedule, which included a range of content (general continuity, news bulletin, commentaries 
and news talks, expository talks, music, audience mail answers, and feature programs), paid off 
with the Brazilian press welcoming Morrison as a champion of Canadian-Brazilian cultural 
relations.93 Such an enthusiastic response was expected considering that audience mail received 
from Latin America had tripled between 1948 and 1950: from 1,842 to 5,472, with forty percent 
of the letters coming from Brazil.94 Most of these were favourable with praises highlighting the 
clarity of the transmissions, the quality of the content, or the positive image of Canada that the 
CBC-IS was helping disseminate. An enthusiastic listener confided: “Two languages, but one 
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heart – that is the Canadian people! The way you attract your listeners with your programs is 
winning more and more new friends and admirers for Canada.”95 The broadcaster badly needed 
positive reports like these to deal with the crisis in which it was embroiled at the turn of the 
1950s.   
As noted above, the CBC-IS faced accusations that it was soft on communism at the turn of 
the 1950s. Budget concerns and liaison challenges with the DEA did not help matters, especially 
for the Latin American Section, which had been singled out in one of the pieces published in The 
Ensign. Both CBC-IS Director Ira Dilworth and Morrison dismissed the attacks as unfounded 
and politically motivated.96 Still, public criticisms put the international service in a position 
where it constantly needed to justify its usefulness whether as a trade facilitator or as a tool of 
psychological warfare. The latter proved more expedient in the context of the cultural Cold War. 
On February 8, 1951, representatives from the DEA, the CBC-IS, the Department of Finance, 
and the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC) met to discuss these matters. All were 
unsure about the political, economic, and cultural value of the southbound broadcasts since there 
was insufficient evidence to assess their true impact on populations.97 In a report submitted the 
following day, Dilworth retorted that Latin America was “a fertile ground for communist 
penetration” and “an exposed flank in the Western Hemisphere.”98 The Voice of Canada, he 
argued, had a role to play in championing Western liberalism alongside the United States and 
Great Britain in the hemisphere.99 In his post-tour report, Morrison used the same alarmist tone 
by describing Latin America as a “politically combustible area” that could very well “become 
another Far East” since “communism and its agents” were everywhere, “lying in wait.”100 
Broadcasting time in Spanish and in Portuguese should be maintained, even increased, he 
argued. Morrison was overstating his case, at least with regards to Brazil where anti-communism 
had become de facto state policy. As a matter of fact, reports coming out of Rio de Janeiro by 
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MacDonald and Ephraim Herbert Coleman, Canada’s new ambassador to Brazil in 1951, suggest 
that ultra-nationalism and authoritarianism threatened democracy there more than 
communism.101    
Morrison might have lacked a proper understanding of the politico-cultural landscape in 
Brazil, but he nonetheless collected ample evidence to demonstrate that Brazilian shortwave 
listeners welcomed the CBC-IS and that Canada had a role to play on the airwaves, even if only 
as a junior partner in the war of ideas. His discussion of the BBC-OS and Voice of America 
broadcasts reflected his faith in Canada’s middle power capabilities, which he sought to validate 
through a comparative analysis of shortwave transmissions aimed at Brazil. CBC-IS broadcasts 
could be heard daily for thirty minutes on two frequencies. Voice of America transmissions 
followed a similar schedule using four frequencies. As for the BBC-OS, it disseminated its 
hours-long programs using three frequencies. Morrison noted that the CBC-IS’s counterparts 
thus had a greater presence on the airwaves, which explained why they were “easier” to find 
although the discrepancy in programming times and frequencies did not mean that their 
transmissions were “better.”102 Indeed, his report stressed the quality of Voice of Canada signals 
and the enthusiastic reports of listeners. Morrison proudly noted that Canada received more 
letters from Brazil than the United States did: “Remembering that we are heavily outnumbered in 
frequencies this is no small achievement.”103 That said, he nurtured no illusions that Canadians 
could compete with their American neighbour. Yet, he insisted that the CBC-IS occupied an 
important space and that its role was likely to grow, especially since the BBC-OS and the Voice 
of America were likely to increasingly focus their attention towards Cold War Europe.104 
Keeping in mind the need for ammunition to deal with the crisis plaguing the CBC-IS, Morrison 
emphasized that trade and “considerations of human brotherhood” are but two reasons why 
broadcasts should be maintained at their current level. A more important incentive, he explained 
at a luncheon of the Canadian Inter-American Association, was “to preserve our inherited system 
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of government by consent of the governed, by showing our friendly neighbors that we are 
reasonably happy and healthy under such a system and that we have no aggressive designs upon 
their territory or fanatical plan to convert them to our individual national way, willy-nilly.”105 
Canadians had accumulated plenty of goodwill to undertake that mission, he explained 
unequivocally. 
Music was a key component of the CBC-IS’s strategies since it was an ostensibly apolitical 
– and thus inconspicuous – means of projecting both Canadians’ adherence to normative 
Western values and their difference vis-à-vis Americans. At the turn of the 1950s, it represented 
approximately thirty-eight percent of the content beamed towards Brazil compared to thirty-one 
percent for the rest of Latin America. What most differentiated the broadcasts in Portuguese 
from those in Spanish is the exclusive focus on ‘serious music’ and folk music. Jazz and other 
popular shows were notably absent from the schedule prepared for Brazilian audiences.106 
Morrison’s musical choices were consistent with those championed by Désy in his efforts to 
musically imagine a Canadian-Brazilian community. He observed that there was “more than a 
surfeit of popular music on local Latin American stations” and that he could well “imagine that 
shortwave listeners would seek relief.”107 He thus argued for “continuance of serious and folk 
music,” which could be further disseminated through transcription records; that is sound discs 
prepared specifically for distribution to overseas broadcasters. These albums made it possible for 
Canadian music to reach broader audiences while providing a solution to fidelity issues which 
often emerged when transmitting recordings over long distances using shortwave bands. They 
were also economical since they could be reproduced and used repeatedly unlike live 
performances. The CBC-IS thus fulfilled an important need when it launched its first series of 
transcription records in 1949. By December 1952, the Transcription Service had produced more 
than 80 albums featuring works by a variety of Canadian artists: among others, composers Ernest 
MacMillan and Claude Champagne, folk singers Alan Mills and Quatuor alouette, jazz pianist 
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Oscar Peterson, as well as pop singers Gisele and Alys Robi.108 There was, however, no place for 
jazz and other popular sounds in the projection of Canada in Brazil as evidenced by Désy’s early 
initiatives and Morrison’s recommendations. MacDonald concurred with them. Désy, however, 
believed that more could be done to better align CBC-IS and DEA objectives using music when 
he reinvented himself as an international broadcaster in 1952. 
Villa-Lobos’s Difference 
The CBC-IS participated actively in the musical nation branding efforts deployed in Brazil. Its 
programming put forward the idea that Brazilians’ musical tastes were as sophisticated and 
informed as those of Canadians, particularly regarding popular sounds coming through Voice of 
America. If not, they could be shaped to be so. The broadcaster’s musical choices reflected the 
Canadian cultural elite’s expectation that its South American counterparts share its liberal 
humanist and highbrow nationalist ideals. In the context of the Cold War and Brazil’s faltering 
return to democracy, such programming concealed normative undertones. More revealingly, it 
betrayed Canadians’ desires to validate their self-image as model international citizens and 
stalwarts of democracy worth emulating. On the one hand, this approach called for more 
exchanges with prominent individuals with whom Canada’s cultural elite could identify. On the 
other hand, it required ‘othering’ Brazilians who were at the receiving end of southbound 
transmissions. Villa-Lobos was a first-rate interlocutor due to his extensive experience as a 
cultural ambassador as well as his fearsome reputation on the world stage – notably in France 
and in the United States – where he confidently proclaimed his difference.109 More significantly, 
he had taken a keen interest in Désy’s early musical diplomacy initiatives, whether it was to 
provide a venue for Quatuor alouette at the MES or helping Champagne network with Brazilian 
colleagues. The ambassador had made sure to thank him personally before leaving his post for 
Italy.110 He also intended to reciprocate at the first opportunity.     
Reciprocating was easier said than done. Part of the problem, some had argued 
sardonically, was that Brazilians were lacking in effectiveness and efficiency. What was more 
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difficult to recognize was that Canada was never a priority for Brazilian artists who saw the 
United States as a more promising stage for career building. For many of them, travelling north 
of the 49th parallel was either an afterthought or an opportunity to explore, but only once firmer 
plans had been established south of the border. This was the case with Arnaldo Estrella, in 1943, 
and José Siqueira, a few years later, both of whom travelled to Canada following invitations to 
perform in the United States. As ambassador, Désy had been instrumental in encouraging the 
Brazilian composer to continue travelling north. He had initially tried to get the CBC-IS to invite 
Siqueira for a concert that could be broadcast to South America. He had even arranged for Rádio 
MES to relay the performance, but the Canadian broadcaster could not locate the composer who 
eventually contacted Champagne and MacMillan.111 As noted earlier, the former managed to get 
Siqueira on the air in Montreal to the great displeasure of the latter, who thought there just was 
not enough time to organize something in Toronto. Villa-Lobos was an exception since he had 
taken great care to insert a few Canadian dates in his 1944-45 tour of the Americas, which 
Foreign Affairs (the Itamaraty) was keen on supporting. He originally planned to spend two 
weeks in Canada where he hoped to perform four concerts. However, in the end the tour did not 
include Canada.112 Exasperated by the missed opportunity, Désy later confided to MacMillan: “I 
do not understand why Brazilian artists go to Canada and the United States without making 
arrangements a long time in advance through the usual agencies.”113       
Notwithstanding these problems, Brazilian composers managed to have their works heard 
in Canada by exploiting the connections they were making via Désy’s cultural diplomacy. Just as 
Siqueira was pleased to hear that MacMillan had made good on his promise to perform two of 
his “Danças Brasileiras” with the Toronto Symphony Orchestra (TSO), Villa-Lobos was 
encouraged to find out that Wilfrid Pelletier was also disseminating his music after his return 
from Brazil. The two had met in 1946 when the Metropolitan Opera visited Rio de Janeiro. There 
primarily to accompany his wife, singer Rose Bampton, Pelletier made the most of the trip by 
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familiarizing himself with his hosts’ national musical culture and music education system. Back 
in Québec, he used Villa-Lobos’s national oeuvre to nudge Premier Maurice Duplessis into 
paying attention to the work that composers and educators were doing in the province. “J’ai 
appris et non sans joie que vous étiez vraiment un amateur de musique,” he wrote, before 
explaining that the enclosed gift was a record by “un compositeur brésilien qui fait un travail 
considérable pour l’avancement de la musique dans son pays.”114 Pelletier had just premiered 
Villa-Lobos’s “Bachiana Brasileira No. 1” to great acclaim at Montreal’s Plateau Hall. The two-
night concert, held on October 22-23, had been organized under the patronage of Désy and Omer 
Côté, Hector Perrier’s successor as provincial secretary. The Orchestre des concerts 
symphoniques de Montréal (OCSM) program offered the following reassurances regarding the 
Brazilian composer: 
His nature displays a certain primitive quality in keeping with one who was in his youth near 
to the jungles of the Amazon. His music gives evidence of this exotic vastness, yet it is 
couched in terms that conform with western European technique. In spite of his most natural 
leaning towards his native folk music, Villa-Lobos regards J.S. Bach as the one foundation 
on which the entire structure of music should rest.115       
Critics concurred; “Bachiana Brasileira No. 1” was an enthrallingly original yet comprehensible 
work, particularly when tamed and performed under the baton of one of their own.116  
Pelletier was not alone in promoting Villa-Lobos in Canada. One of the Brazilian 
composer’s chief supporters was Montreal-born pianist Ellen Ballon. She was the only woman to 
travel to Brazil as a Canadian impromptu ambassador and she did so mostly out of her own 
initiative. The embassy appears to have provided some logistical support although the evidence – 
or lack thereof – suggests that she was relegated to the margins of Désy’s androcentric musically 
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imagined Canadian-Brazilian community in the 1940s.117 Born in 1898 of Russian parents, 
Ballon was a child prodigy who studied at the McGill Conservatory before continuing her 
training in New York where she also performed. From there, she travelled throughout North 
America until Europe came calling. She settled in London until the outbreak of the Second 
World War. Ballon met Villa-Lobos in the United States in 1945. Recognizing the composer’s 
growing appeal in the context of musical pan-Americanism and taking advantage of Canada’s 
cultural rapprochement with Brazil, she astutely commissioned Villa-Lobos to write a piano 
concerto, which he promptly accepted out of recognition for her talent. After agreeing on the 
terms of the project, Villa-Lobos wrote his “Concerto de Piano e Orquestra No. 1” and dedicated 
it to Ballon.118 He then arranged for his government to invite her to premiere the work in Rio de 
Janeiro on October 11, 1946. The Canadian press enthusiastically framed the event within the 
context of Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations even though it had not been orchestrated by the 
embassy. The Montreal Daily Star noted that although Ballon had become a “cosmopolite” who 
worked mostly “outside the Dominion,” she always kept her “identity as a Canadian.”119 This 
collaboration demonstrated the ability of non-state actors to advance their own agendas by 
interjecting themselves within government-driven international cultural relations. Villa-Lobos, of 
course, understood this very well and he counted on Ballon to promote his name by premiering 
“Concerto de Piano e Orquestra No. 1” in North America. 
The name Villa-Lobos was becoming familiar to music connoisseurs, thanks to Pelletier 
who performed the Brazilian composer’s work in Montreal. Ballon helped further disseminate 
his image as a cosmopolitan yet distinctively singular artist that her compatriots could relate to 
and feel a personal connection with. The October 28, 1947, Canadian premiere of “Concerto de 
Piano e Orquestra No. 1” served as an important precedent for Villa-Lobos’s 1952 concert at 
Plateau Hall; it was the first instance during which all components of Canada’s musical 
diplomacy coalesced to render more tangible the project of a musically imagined Canadian-
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Brazilian community.120 Désiré Defauw, artistic director of the OCSM, directed the orchestra 
with Ballon at the piano. The CBC-IS beamed the concert to Latin American shortwave radio 
listeners with the encouragement of Désy who was looking for ways to reciprocate while still in 
Brazil.121 P.W. Cook, Morrison’s predecessor at the Latin American Section, had written to the 
DEA to see if the Prime Minister would consider either attending the performance or recording a 
short message that could be incorporated in the program. King had politely declined for fear of 
setting a precedent and because he thought it “better to stay out of such things altogether.”122 
Villa-Lobos could not be there either although he did send a message which was relayed on the 
airwaves. In it, he stated that music was “one of the principal elements towards the conclusion of 
an understanding of peace between men.”123 He also saluted “Canada for the splendid initiative 
of using music as an excellent vehicle for an understanding between the nations of the world.”124 
The Montreal Gazette’s Thomas Archer was profoundly impressed by the scope and 
sophistication of the event, noting that it was “a hearing that had definite significance and 
meaning” in the ways it brought audiences together around the shared experience of music.125 He 
was especially invigorated by Defauw and Ballon’s performance, which made accessible the 
“luxuriant, generous music” as well as “extravagant” and “lusty tunes” of Villa-Lobos.126 The 
composer’s exoticism, his ‘otherness,’ was intriguing and inspiring, rather than unsettling or 
threatening, when framed in such a way by the CBC-IS in collaboration with its state and non-
state partners. Brazilian diplomats were evidently pleased, especially since Canadians, 
independent of state sponsorship, were doing propaganda work for them.127     
The 1952 concert should have been received just as enthusiastically considering that it was 
the continuation of these efforts, albeit augmented with the presence of the maestro himself. It 
was also to be the culmination of a decade-long cultural rapprochement. Although the CBC-IS 
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was in the midst of a crisis in 1952, Désy and the diplomatic corps in Brazil believed that the 
institution could continue to play a role in creating a climate conducive to healthy diplomatic and 
economic relations in South America. They saw music as central to these efforts. “Elle offre des 
analogies avec ce qu’on a appelé le grand concert de la nature, l’harmonie des sphères et des 
mondes,” Désy told the students and faculty of École de musique Vincent-d’Indy a few weeks 
prior to the Villa-Lobos concert.128 On December 14, the Brazilian composer had settled in 
Montreal and was ready to speak to the media (figure 4.2). A believer in the mediating potential 
of music, Villa-Lobos lent credence to Désy’s vision of a musically imagined Canadian-
Brazilian community when he described the former ambassador as an “honorary Brazilian.”129 
During the press conference, he emphasized the importance of negotiating the tension between 
patriotism and universalism using the principles of humanism. His music, he explained, was 
rooted in the lived experiences of the people of Brazil as well as in the country’s geography. 
Through the “transfiguration” of folklore, he could transform the nation – perhaps even 
humanity.130 “I am the maestro of the world,” he had said prior to leaving for Canada.131 There 
was some arrogance in his posturing, but it did not offend journalists. Either they thought that it 
was part of his exotic persona or they believed that Canadians had it in themselves to perform a 
somewhat similar role. Expectations were high with many hoping that the concert would 
energize the city’s cultural life and validate the self-image that Canadians had been encouraged 
to embrace through cultural exchanges with Brazil. Pelletier and Ballon having set the stage, 
audiences were expected to find themselves at home in Villa-Lobos’s musical universe.          
The Canadian debut of Villa-Lobos took place at Plateau Hall on December 17. Organized 
under the auspices of the CBC-IS, the concert fell outside the regular programming of the 
OCSM. The Brazilian composer led the orchestra through four compositions: his own 
“Bachianas Brasileiras No. 7” and “Choros No. 6” followed by “La Voz de la Calles de Padro,” a 
Chilean symphonic poem by Humberto Allende, and “Obertura Criolla” by the Argentinian 
composer Ernesto Drangosch. Although Désy framed the event as a gesture of reciprocity, Villa-
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Lobos declined to perform his concerto for piano with Ballon and he seemed to have given no 
thought to performing Canadian works.132 The event thus took the form of a South American 
evening with Villa-Lobos asserting his predominance over his continental counterparts. His 
works took up most of the program and overshadowed – in both colours and sophistication – the 
other two compositions, which critics dismissed as being of little significance. Instead, they 
focused on “Choros No. 6” and “Bachianas Brasileiras No. 7.” Written in 1926, the former was a 
sort of Brasilophonia in that it proposed a musical synthesis of Brazil’s social and cultural 
history; from the jungles of the Amazon to the coasts of Bahia and the streets of Rio de Janeiro. 
The latter borrowed from the Baroque period, most notably Johann Sebastian Bach’s approach to 
counterpoint, to revisit and transfigure an array of Brazilian popular sounds. It was part of a 
series composed to champion Brasilidade during the Vargas era. Bach’s music, Villa-Lobos 
claimed, was a music of mediation that could help bring ‘races’ together.133 It had universal 
appeal, but its inventive use of counterpoint – the interweaving of apparently distinct melodic 
lines – gave it added resonance in Brazil where it could be redeployed to imagine a mosaic-like 
national musical culture. There was an obvious tension, if not a paradox, between Villa-Lobos’s 
universalism and his musical nationalism, noted Le Devoir in its review of the concert.134              
 
Figure 4.2. Heitor Villa-Lobos in the Montreal studios of the Canadian Broadcasting 
Corporation (1952). Source: Heitor Villa-Lobos Collection, Museu Villa-Lobos.   
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The Montreal daily was not alone in expressing skepticism and disappointment in the days 
following the event. Music critics agreed that this had been a subpar performance although they 
stressed that the OCSM was not at fault. It is true that the musicians were unfamiliar with the 
works and that they did not have enough time to rehearse. But the sound at Plateau Hall was 
deficient and the stage could barely hold the orchestra, which had to accommodate additional 
instruments as required by the scores. Music critics regretted that what was supposed to be a 
great event could barely be called an event despite all the publicity surrounding Villa-Lobos.135 
The problem was the music itself. It was colourful and intricate, but it also lacked direction, 
restraint, and finesse. The great length of Villa-Lobos’s works “struck me as a sort of musical 
knitting in which he forgot the normal length of sleeves,” complained Montreal Star’s Eric 
McLean.136 The composer’s works were tiresome and overwhelming for the senses. The music’s 
points of references were foreign and difficult to assimilate if not completely disorienting and 
incomprehensible. Le Canada’s Paul Roussel complained: “On sort repu d’une audition de ce 
genre comme d’une table trop plantureuse.”137 The only favourable review appeared in La 
Patrie. Its music critic had nurtured no illusions of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian 
community; the Brazilian composer was an exotic ‘other’ and his concert had been nothing more 
than a voyage to distant lands.138 Performed under Villa-Lobos’s baton, “Choros No. 6” and 
“Bachianas Brasileiras No. 7” sounded worlds apart from the other works that Canadians had 
discovered through Pelletier, Ballon, and Defauw.       
The consensus, then, was that Villa-Lobos’s difference posed problems. In trying to situate 
the Brazilian composer vis-à-vis his Canadian counterparts, the local press constructed a 
masculine ‘other’ that was more likely to favour emotionality over rationality, primitive ardour 
over enlightened self-command, and flamboyance over humility. If Villa-Lobos had shared with 
Champagne a masculine identity based on bourgeois respectability and patriarchal eminence, he 
was now assumed to be closer to the common peoples of Brazil than the cosmopolites with 
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whom he was known to associate. Music critics were evidently choosing to favour certain 
biographical elements over others, such as Villa-Lobos’s primitivist inclinations and his 
proximity to the musicians who populated Rio de Janeiro’s nightlife or Minas Gerais’ interior. 
Seeking to further emphasize the distance between the composer’s musical world and the 
musical life of their city, they challenged his masculine identity by deploying emasculating 
gendered metaphors. It is revealing that Le Canada and Montreal Star referred to knitting and 
cooking in their respective reviews of the concert. Roussel pressed on by describing Villa-Lobos 
as a chatterbox who “bavarde incessamment” while McLean lamented that this was “not a 
concert to ask a man to.”139 In this context, La Presse’s Jean Hamelin was quick to conclude that 
Canadian composers were superior to their Latin American counterparts.140  
Music critics were not alone in questioning the idea of a musically imagined Canadian-
Brazilian community and the pertinence of investing taxpayer money into musical diplomacy 
initiatives such as these.141 The CBC-IS had its own dissenters who believed that the projection 
of Canada abroad did not need to be complemented by reciprocity efforts that celebrated foreign 
artists at the expense of domestic ones. Patricia FitzGerald, music producer at the Transcription 
Service, did not hesitate to share her thoughts with Désy. She had already given her letter of 
resignation, so this was a “heart-breaking final assignment” for her.142 FitzGerald insisted that 
the event had cost too much, both financially and from a musical nation branding perspective. 
She believed that the venue had been a poor choice, which made it impossible to properly 
capture the performance. This was problematic since the CBC-IS broadcast the concert to Brazil 
and planned to make a transcription record with it. According to her, the OCSM’s less-than-
satisfactory performance and the poor quality of the recording threatened to damage Canada’s 
image. What was worse was that the event monopolized scarce resources that could have been 
used to produce three transcription records by local artists. More importantly, FitzGerald firmly 
opposed the idea of adding a foreign composer to her carefully curated catalogue of transcription 
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albums. Désy might have been an ‘honorary Brazilian,’ but this did not justify placing Villa-
Lobos alongside the dozens of Canadian artists whose music the CBC-IS had engraved on vinyl 
records.143 Ultimately, the event exposed the fact that Canadians – whether they worked at the 
CBC-IS or not – had yet to agree on what constituted an effective and acceptable cultural 
diplomacy. Clearly, better lines of communication were needed between the various parties 
concerned.  
Désy had some explaining to do, especially once it became known that the whole venture 
had cost close to $25,000. The HCSCEA questioned him on this matter while also wondering 
whether broadcasts to South America served tangible purposes. The discussion that ensued 
demonstrated the extent to which Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations were a conduit for the 
performance of middle power aspirations. In his responses, Désy insisted that Canada needed to 
show that it had the means and savoir-faire to reciprocate if it wished to continue accumulating 
goodwill and speak with authority on the international stage. Canadians could not afford to fail 
their test with Brazil, the only country with which they had a cultural agreement at the time, 
since people were listening. The former ambassador brushed aside concerns regarding the budget 
by pointing out that there was nothing abnormal about it since it included a broadcast to South 
America and the production of a transcription record. Brazilians, he noted, had invested far more 
money than Canadians in this cultural rapprochement. They had provided tremendous support to 
touring artists such as Quatuor alouette and MacMillan in addition to hosting various art 
exhibitions. Villa-Lobos himself had been instrumental in making these cultural exchanges 
possible. Quoting from the report of the Massey Commission, Désy emphasized that the 
projection of Canada abroad was “an obligation” that also entailed reciprocating. Canadians’ 
poor performance on that front was “particularly illustrated by our relations with Brazil,” he 
emphasized.144 Reading again from the report, he said: “Exchanges with other nations in the 
fields of the arts and letters will help us make our reasonable contribution to civilized life and 
since these exchanges move in both directions, we ourselves will benefit by what we receive.”145 
Canada, Désy argued, had much to offer the world and it was through interactions and 
comparisons with others that Canadians could assess both their strengths and the true value of 
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their contributions.146 The data he provided suggested that business men, professionals, and 
workers were listening in greater numbers each year in Brazil – three hundred thousand 
synchronized their shortwave receivers daily while more than a million did so for special CBC-
IS broadcasts such as those prepared for Dominion Day, Brazil’s Independence Day, or visits by 
eminent artists like Villa-Lobos.147 His conclusion was that Canada’s image was at stake.  
Shortwave audiences were likely to grow even more since Voice of America and the BBC-
OS planned to significantly reduce their presence in South America. With the crisis plaguing the 
CBC-IS in the early 1950s, Désy and his colleagues in broadcasting (Dilworth) and external 
affairs (Pearson) thought it pertinent to couch their HCSCEA testimonies in Cold War language 
while also highlighting the economic benefits of southbound transmissions, even if non-
quantifiable. The three men further emphasized Canada’s middle power aspirations by depicting 
the CBC-IS as a junior – but also critical – partner in international broadcasting. With the Voice 
of America and the BBC-OS focusing on the ‘war of ideas’ in Europe and the Middle East, the 
CBC-IS could expect to become the voice of liberal democracy and the English-speaking world 
in South America. Pearson stressed that coordination with these Cold War allies was key to 
making sure that “what we do in this field dovetails into a general scheme of propaganda.”148 
Désy reassured the HCSCEA that his team was equipped to deal with the “Niagara of teletypes” 
coming from the United States and Great Britain.149 Both Dilworth and Morrison had argued for 
the continuance of southbound transmissions to counteract potential threats to the political and 
economic stability of the region. Désy concurred and added that service to “friendly countries” 
like Brazil was a cost-effective means of nurturing goodwill and ensuring control of Canada’s 
image and that of its allies.150 He boastfully added: “Listeners will be inclined to attach more 
importance to the Voice of Canada, because our country, although a world power, has no extra-
territorial ambition except international peace and co-operation.”151 Although framed in the 
context of the cultural Cold War, Désy’s latest musical diplomacy initiative was above all about 
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national projection and national self-representation. This is perhaps why it left many unswayed, 
including Progressive Conservative Gordon Graydon, who stated that such a costly initiative 
should not be repeated “sans mûre réflexion.”152 As for The Globe and Mail and The Montreal 
Gazette, they decried this “cultural and artistic splurge” on an “ultra de luxe … program” that 
seemed to offer no evident return on investments.153 
Brazil’s diplomatic corps was neither impressed by Canadians’ response to the whole affair 
nor convinced that they possessed a truly national culture. Notwithstanding Brazilians’ 
willingness to engage with the trope of métissage deployed through Canada’s musical 
diplomacy, the fact is that state actors in Brazil had long been aware of the tensions between 
French-speaking Canadians and their English-speaking counterparts. In 1943, former DIP 
Director Lourival Fontes visited Montreal in his new capacity as Brazilian representative on the 
administrative council of the International Labour Office. In a letter to Vargas, he described 
French Canadians as a “conservative and reactionary [race]” that found itself constantly pitted 
against a heterogeneous English-speaking population whose loyalty lay with either the British 
Empire or the United States.154 Caio de Mello Franco, Brazil’s minister in Canada, concurred 
when he characterized the Canadian politico-cultural landscape as opposing an “ardent English 
mistrust” to a “proud French inferiority complex.”155 As for F.C. de Bittencourt Berenguer, he 
explained in a report prepared for the consular office in Montreal that the “incomprehension 
among Canadians of these two races” was “total” and that neither party seemed willing to work 
towards a common understanding.156 Further reports corroborated these observations, which 
painted an unequivocally bleak picture of Canada in its passage from colony to nation.157        
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Drawing from their experiences with communications and cultural institutions, Brazilian 
state actors demonstrated acuity in their analysis of the Canadian cultural landscape. Far from 
being passive spectators, they complemented their discussion of the “racial-origins” of Canada’s 
population with a series of post-Massey Commission reports that sought to explain the country’s 
“cultural deficiency.”158 The staff at the embassy commended the CBC for trying to connect 
Canadians from coast to coast through the production of broadcasts, the dissemination of 
records, and the organization of music festivals.159  Yet it doubted that the Massey Commission 
would create the necessary momentum for a sustained “cultural recovery” that would see 
Canadians – both francophones and anglophones – come together around a shared national 
culture.160 Raul de Sá Barbosa, third secretary at the embassy, recognized the validity of the 
points raised by the commissioners in their introductory chapter on the forces of geography, 
whether it concerned the need to resist American cultural hegemony or the challenge of bringing 
together a scarce population dispersed over an immense territory.161 However, he insisted that 
the bigger challenge was to address the tension between the two groups that language and history 
had separated. Their concentration in Québec and Ontario made a nationwide culture non-viable, 
which in turn perpetuated a colonial mentality where each group was set in its ways with little 
chance of reconciliation and engagement with the ‘other races’ that populated the rest of the 
country. Brazil, these reports suggested, could teach Canada a thing or two about national unity, 
‘racial democracy,’ as well as cultural autonomy and patriotism.162    
The members of Brazil’s diplomatic corps could have hardly been surprised at the 
reactions to the Villa-Lobos concert. The truth is that the reviews validated the observations that 
they had made over the years and provided an added sense of purpose to the work accomplished 
by the maestro in Canada. Brazilian diplomats perceptively observed that the event had been 
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about projecting Canadian identity more than anything else. They thus saw the controversy 
surrounding it as an opportunity for Canadians to learn something about themselves. In his 
report, Barbosa built on earlier observations regarding French-English tensions and the inchoate 
state of Canadian culture to explain why music critics failed to grasp the social and symbolic 
significance of Villa-Lobos’s music. He began with a dismally depressing portrait of the 
country’s musical landscape: from conservative orchestras playing unimaginative repertoires to 
inadequate government support for the arts, which placed musicians in a situation of precarity 
and kept audiences ignorant. Returning to the negative reviews of the Villa-Lobos concert, he 
asked: “How do we explain this? How do we explain the lack of interest, this neglect, this 
deficiency?”163 In his answer, he referred to the problems of geography and population 
distribution, but also Canadians’ national immaturity and their colonial mentality. More 
importantly, he blamed a “certain Anglo-Saxon” predisposition towards greed and material 
things at the expense of cultural enrichment.164 Barbosa was more sympathetic towards French 
Canadians whom he saw as more inclined towards the “free flowering of arts and humanism,” 
although he thought that they too lacked a modern, long-term vision for their country.165 The 
esteem in which Brazilians held Désy and their exposure to French-Canadian artists over the past 
decade most likely explained this more nuanced assessment of Québec’s cultural life. Ironically, 
the conclusion reached at the embassy was that the Villa-Lobos concert had been a necessary 
cultural shock. It might even have been a transformative experience that could accelerate 
Canadians’ passage to modernity and true nationhood.166   
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 
No doubt, this was not what the Massey Commission had in mind when it claimed that 
Canadians would benefit from the bidirectional flow of culture that the projection of Canada 
abroad encouraged. This also was not the outcome Désy envisioned for an event meant to be 
remembered as the crowning achievement of his decade-long cultural diplomacy with Brazil. 
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Although he succeeded in placing French Canada front and centre in the country’s international 
image, he failed to substantiate the trope of métissage on which he relied to convince Brazilians 
that Canadians shared with them the ideal of ‘racial democracy’ and bonne entente. That 
Brasilidade was a construct did not seem apparent to Canadian observers who underestimated 
Brazilians’ ability to dissect the stories directed at them via music and shortwave transmissions. 
Part of the problem was a lack of reciprocity, but also an insufficient disposition to listening, 
both of which betrayed Canadians’ assumption that their interlocutors would be an easy public. 
Misplaced confidence and a self-serving approach to cultural relations partly explained the 
inability of the two nations to properly synchronize their activities around the project of a 
musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. The CBC-IS simply amplified these non-
aligned signals. Debates regarding the broadcaster’s ostensibly separate functions as an 
instrument of psychological warfare and a nation branding tool only illustrated the extent to 
which Canadians lacked a proper understanding of cultural diplomacy’s multifaceted nature. The 
Massey Commission may have contributed to the conversation, its recommendations – informed 
as they were by the cultural elite’s liberal humanism – had yet to resonate with the common 
Canadian and Désy’s colleagues in the DEA. Evan H. Potter argues that a truly successful 
cultural diplomacy is one that finds widespread public support at home.167 As the latest episode 
in Canadian-Brazilian cultural relations, Villa-Lobos’s visit to Canada was evidence that the 
battle would be fought uphill. 
                                                          




CHAPTER 5: POP INTERFERENCES 
 
[Allan Blye and Jimmy Dale] were splendid informal “ambassadors” and reflected credit on 
Canada in everything they did, thus reaching a wide segment of the Brazilian public perhaps 
previously unaware of Canadian competence or achievement in the field of popular music.1 
– The Canadian embassy, Rio de Janeiro, 1966 
 
Canada’s participation in the Festival Internacional da Canção Popular (FICP) was a departure 
from earlier musical diplomacy endeavours. This was the first time that pop singers were 
travelling to Brazil as official envoys of the Department of External Affairs (DEA) in 
collaboration with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC). It would have been difficult to 
decline invitations to send competitors considering that these were all-expenses-paid trips, 
courtesy of the State of Guanabara. Launched in 1966, the event was the brainchild of journalist 
Augusto Marzagão who – with the help of TV RIO, TV Globo, the state’s Secretaria de Turismo 
[Secretariat of Tourism], and the Ministério das Relações Exteriores (aka the Itamaraty) – 
brought international spotlights on Rio de Janeiro’s Maracanazinho stadium. An astute cultural 
promoter and propagandist, Marzagão declared that the festival was a testament to the city’s 
status as “the world’s capital of popular music.”2 Preceded by a national competition during 
which Brazilians picked their contender, the event gave visibility to local artists while projecting 
a youthful and jubilant image of Brazil. Singer-songwriter Allan Blye and arranger Jimmy Dale 
travelled together to the first edition of the festival to perform “It Never Came to Be,” a song 
they cowrote at the request of the CBC. The two impromptu ambassadors did not make it to the 
finals, but their “warm and attractive personalities” won Canada much goodwill, according to 
embassy staff.3 What the report failed to comment on, however, was the fact that Brazil was no 
longer what it used to be.                
The immediate postwar years had been eventful, but they paled in comparison to the last 
decade of the Second Republic. The country plunged into an unprecedented crisis in 1954 when 
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President Getúlio Vargas, faced with growing opposition from the military, committed suicide 
rather than being ousted from power.4 From August of that year until January of 1956, Brazilians 
stood by as a succession of presidents (Café Filho, Carlos Luz, and Nereu Ramos) sought to 
wrest control of a volatile political environment. The election of Juscelino Kubitschek ultimately 
brought some stability and optimism. His economic plan, branded as fifty years of progress in 
five, called for modernization, diversification, and territorial integration through education, 
energy reforms, and the expansion of the country’s transportation network. His lasting 
contribution was the construction of a new capital: Brasília, a feat of urban design whose skyline 
juxtaposed modern architectural wonders against the surrounding tropical scrubland and 
savannahs. Faced with a creeping national debt, inflation, and a polarizing economy of haves and 
have-nots, Brazilians opted for the left-leaning Jânio Quadros in the 1960 election. In office for 
seven months, he ceded his presidency to the equally Soviet-friendly João Goulart who garnered 
popular support with his nationalization and land redistribution program. Fearing a slide towards 
communism, the military launched a coup with the perceived implicit support of the United 
States on March 31, 1964.5 By 1966, the military had placed Marshal Humberto Castelo Branco 
at the helm of the country, neutralized the official political opposition, suspended civil rights, 
and launched a campaign of repression that would lead to the arrest, imprisonment, torture, and 
exile of so-called enemies of the government.6 In those pivotal moments, Canada refused to 
either denounce or recognize the new regime. Instead, it chose simply to “continue formal 
relations” with the military, thereby acknowledging that it had “effective control of the 
territory.”7 This faint response was a means of asserting autonomy without antagonizing the 
United States. It also indicated that the defence of democratic principles could be set aside for 
the benefit of economic and political stability. Aiming for a reassuring tone, the embassy in Rio 
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de Janeiro reported that the coup aimed to create “the conditions in which a democracy can 
exist.”8        
This, then, was the backdrop for the cultural visit of Blye and Dale, and for those of other 
pop singers who performed in subsequent editions of the FICP; Donald Lautrec (1967), Paul 
Anka (1968), and Marc Gélinas (1969). Like other impromptu ambassadors before them, they 
prioritized projection over engagement while appearing unaware, or perhaps unconcerned, by 
Brazil’s anti-democratic political climate. In all fairness, the news coming out of Brazil was 
heavily censored and their chaperons in Rio de Janeiro ensured that their experience would be a 
festive one. Moreover, political strategists and intelligence agencies insisted that the Cold War 
created extraordinary circumstances that required extraordinary measures. Most Canadians were 
probably unaware of the scope of their own government’s illiberal practices and naively willing 
to tolerate some deviation from democratic principles by perceived partner countries aiming to 
ward off the virus of communism.9 Arguably, this indifference was especially pronounced in 
terms of Canadian attitudes towards Latin American regimes, like Brazil, which existed largely 
on the periphery of the world as Canadians knew it.10  
Canada’s cultural diplomacy did not miss a beat through these successive regime changes 
in Brazil, including the return to dictatorship. Instead, what changed was the recruitment of pop 
singers, as opposed to classically trained musicians, for the next performance of the nation. 
Significantly, the change did not come from inside the Canadian establishment. Rather than the 
DEA or the CBC, it was the Brazilians themselves who sought out Canadian pop stars to 
represent the northern nation. The impetus was a pragmatic domestic response to the growing 
international popularity of local artists who were using Good Neighbor channels to promote the 
distinctive sounds of Brazilian music, in particular the popularity of samba and bossa nova, 
which had exploded onto the North American pop and jazz scenes in the 1940s and 1950s when 
artists such as Carmen Miranda and Antônio Carlos Jobim became global stars. Canadians also 
developed an ear for the new sounds of Brazil with many performers borrowing from their South 
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American counterparts – albeit often filtered through American media – to claim a distinctive 
style. These trends slowly proposed alternate ways of imagining a Canadian-Brazilian 
community using musical forms that were at once more global and hybridized. The DEA and the 
CBC had inexplicably lost control of the cross-cultural messaging and it was now Brazil that was 
setting the agenda for cultural exchange. Notwithstanding its internationalist pretensions, the 
FICP also turned out to be a perfect nation branding spectacle with which to mask the excesses 
of the military dictatorship. This chapter explores these developments by tracing the evolution of 
Brazil’s musicais populares, their intersection with national politics, and the internationalization 
of samba and bossa nova, first in the United States and then in Canada through the works of 
singer Alys Robi and jazz pianist Oscar Peterson. It concludes with a discussion of the Canadian 
singers who participated in the first four editions of the FICP.       
Musicais Populares Intersect with Politics 
The absence of popular music in official Canadian-Brazilian relations prior to the 1960s did not 
mean that the music had no resonance with the urban middle class or that it served no political 
purposes. On the contrary, the history of musicais populares is rooted in cities like Rio de 
Janeiro where there was an abundance of media available to artists, producers, and audiences 
who frequently crossed class and ‘racial’ boundaries. The Vargas regime was quick to pick up on 
music trends in order to disseminate its ideologies and create national symbols. By the time 
Canada opened its legation in 1941, samba had become the national music of Brazil. Although 
tracing its origins to the early colonial period, samba emerged in the middle of the nineteenth 
century among African slaves; notably in the northern region of Bahia. Developing from – and 
morphing with – other forms of music and dance (among others, Candombe, Lundú, and 
Maxíxe), it acquired its own distinctive character once it arrived in Rio de Janeiro, absorbed 
elements of other popular genres, and became an integral component of the city’s pre-Lenten 
Carnival. Samba owed its rise to pre-eminence in part to an Afro-Brazilian musician named 
Ernesto dos Santos (aka Donga) whose “Pelo Telefone” is regarded as the genre’s first recording. 
Not only did he record the work, he registered it with the Biblioteca Nacional and solicited the 
support of ‘white’ journalists to substantiate his claim of authorship. The strategy brought into 




alliances between whites and blacks,” writes Marc A. Hertzman.11 It also revealed the internal 
dynamics of the contest for influence that opposed samba’s practitioners. Bryan McCann 
explains: 
Much of the debate in the samba world concerned questions of the origins and nurturing 
grounds of the genre, with some sambistas claiming that samba was music of the cidade, or 
city, and others contending that it was originally and primarily music of the morro, or hill. 
Both were collective terms, with cidade standing for the various working and middle-class, 
white and mixed-race neighborhoods of downtown Rio as well as for the city’s radio stations 
and recording studios, and morro for the predominantly black favelas. The polemic regarding 
these two vaguely defined locations explicitly treated questions of style, and implicitly 
involved more sensitive questions of class and race.12  
A hybrid and contested malleable genre, samba was ripe for appropriation by the time Vargas 
rose to power.    
The music’s symbolic significance was such that it quickly became one of the key 
soundtracks of the Estado Novo. It was an apt vehicle for promoting and eliciting pride in the 
idea of Brasilidade. Initially supported by municipal governments, samba schools and the 
Carnival fell under state sponsorship with Rádio Nacional acting as the authoritative voice on the 
question of origins. In its search for the constitutive components of the nation’s so-called 
distinctive essence, the broadcaster tended to prioritize morro-esque samba because it was more 
resoundingly anchored in the history and lived experiences of Afro-Brazilians.13 The choice 
served to legitimize the myth of ‘racial democracy’ deployed to foster social cohesion and 
national unity. That said, samba’s presence on government-run airwaves meant that the music 
had to be somewhat tamed. For example, songs with lyrics that romanticized images of 
malandros (nonconformist, law-defying troublemakers) received limited to no airplay. Rádio 
Nacional and the Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda (DIP) did not stop at censoring 
works. They also commissioned songs that “helped popularize and commercialize hyperpatriotic 
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lyrics that complemented the Vargas regime’s goals of civic renewals and social uplift,” notes 
Daryle Williams.14 Sambistas, of course, could not be completely muzzled or co-opted. Their 
music continued to be regarded as a means of collective self-affirmation and resistance in various 
public arenas that lay beyond the gaze of the state apparatus.15 Samba’s potency and resilience 
was such that it could accommodate competing interpretations and purposes while effectively 
linking the past to the present in the national imaginary.     
Emerging in the 1950s, bossa nova also championed hybrid musical forms although it was 
more resolutely turned to the future. In that sense, it echoed the self-confidence that accompanied 
Kubitschek’s presidency. As a genre, it built on samba’s core rhythmic structure while 
incorporating chromatic and harmonic elements of modern jazz. However, bossa nova’s 
affiliation with this Afro-American genre must not be overstated.16 As Gerard Béhague argues, 
the music’s novelty was that it originated from different urban quarters, namely those of urban 
elites “whose aspirations to modernity coincided with post-war progress toward industrialization 
and modernization.”17 With lyrical themes ranging from longing to love and hopefulness, bossa 
nova appealed to middle-class listeners who appreciated its intimate and restrained musical 
register.18 Its escapist undertones reflected above all the optimism of Brazilians who embraced 
Kubitschek’s developmentalism and internationalism.19 Juca Chaves’s “Presidente Bossa Nova” 
best exemplified this new alignment of music and politics: 
This is living as one must, 
It’s to be a bossa nova president. 
Bossa nova, very young, 
Absolutely new, ultra new!20 
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Santuza Cambraia Naves pertinently uses the figure of the “engineer” to describe musicians such 
as João Gilberto, whose “concise and rational style” evoked the idea of the self-made artist able 
to build something new from scratch in the same way that Kubitschek proposed to erect Brasília 
in the country’s hinterland.21 
Bossa nova initially served the official discourse of authorities without needing to be 
appropriated, because it was of its time; it aligned with the urgent need for renewal and 
reinvention that followed the end of the Vargas era. However, the coup of 1964 changed the 
politico-cultural landscape. Criticisms that the music was not authentically Brazilian returned 
with added vigour with the realization that the United States had played some part in the abrupt 
end to the Second Republic. Bossa nova, many argued, had been contaminated by foreign 
influence and its personable, apolitical tone was out of place in post-coup Brazil.22 Whereas 
some musicians carried on undeterred, many others adopted a more militant posture to maintain 
their pertinence and confront the challenges facing their generation. Increasingly, they dealt with 
questions of poverty, repression, and imperialism in their lyrics while experimenting musically to 
challenge established norms. Francisco ‘Chico’ Buarque de Hollanda excelled at evading censors 
by using a type of lyricism that veiled his social commentaries and his attacks on the military.23 
He was not always successful. In 1967, he wrote a satirical play titled Roda Vida, which dealt 
with an artist who commits suicide to free himself from the manipulative schemes of the 
establishment. Buarque’s performance of the theme song during the 1967 edition of the FICP 
went smoothly, but the theatrical work itself was interrupted by the regime’s censors. The singer 
chose to exile himself to Europe the following year as the military clamped down on dissenting 
students, workers, and artists. He did manage to throw another punch at the dictatorship in 1968 
using, once again, the FICP as a platform. Cowritten with Jobim, “Sabiá” is a song of longing 
that evokes one’s exile into an idyllic Brazilian past; an image that stood in sharp contrast with 
the cloud of repression weighting over the country. The song went on to win first place in the 
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international competition. Characteristically, it also earned criticisms from more vocal opponents 
of the regime.24                
Protest music offered rallying cries to large segments of Brazil’s youth in the immediate 
aftermath of the coup. Its widespread appeal assured it a place on the stage of the FICP in the 
early years of the event. Música Popular Brasileira [Brazilian Popular Music] (MPB), a term 
that encompassed a range of post-bossa nova genres, initially called for a nationalist and 
politically engaged posture, which meant a rejection of foreign influence and a revisiting of 
traditional musical styles. Supporters of MPB tended to champion acoustic music over rock-
infused songs that leaned too heavily on American or British trends. They also expected 
performers to be free-spoken, if not bold, in their social commentaries. Audiences in the 1968 
edition of the FICP were therefore upset when Geraldo Vandré’s “Pra Não Dizer Que Não Falei 
de Flores,” a pro-democracy anthem promptly banned by the military, finished second after 
Buarque and Jobim’s “Sabiá.”25 Ironically, audiences were themselves becoming more rigid vis-
à-vis the artists who sought to articulate their generation’s dismay. Caetano Veloso and the group 
Os Mutantes, vanguards of the Tropicália movement, could hardly be surprised when their 
performance at the FICP raised a real hue and cry. Blending traditional Brazilian music with 
psychedelic rock, they provoked the audience with a loud and chaotic performance of “É 
Proibido Proibir” [It is Forbidden to Forbid], a direct reference to the Parisian anti-
authoritarianism protests of May 68, which the musicians directed at both the audience and the 
military regime.26 The ‘tropicalistas’ called for Brazil’s youths to take their place in the “global 
sixties” by rejecting the status quo of their parents while thinking more creatively and self-
confidently about the ways in which they engaged with other cultures.27 “We assumed an 
immediate posture of ‘being-in-the-world,’ we rejected the role of a Third World country living 
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in the shadow of more developed countries,” explained Veloso.28 The FICP had evidently 
become an important stage where performers and audiences defined, performed, resisted, and 
reimagined their collective identity. The authorities, of course, watched and listened attentively. 
Veloso and Gilberto Gil, another key ‘tropicalista,’ were arrested shortly after and forced into 
exile.29   
The fact that musicians were able to voice their opposition up to 1968 did not mean that the 
dictatorship was benign. It did mean, however, that the authorities had perhaps overlooked the 
possibility that dissidence could spread through ostensibly apolitical musical forms popular 
among middle- and upper-class youths. The military caught on by 1968 when it gave up all 
appearances of preparing for an eventual return to democracy. Branco’s successor, former War 
Minister Marshal Artur da Costa e Silva, adopted a hardline approach that translated into 
increased censorship and social control as well as a more aggressive repression of dissent. The 
government’s authoritarian turn failed to alarm most Brazilians since they stood to benefit from 
the political and economic stability that the military regime promised. Its technocrats secured 
huge sums of money from the United States and international agencies to restructure the 
economy. They brought inflation down by sixty-four percent in just a few years and successfully 
renegotiated the country’s foreign debt all the while maintaining a ten percent growth rate  
through a diversified staples export strategy led by coffee, oranges, and soybeans, among other 
products. The dictatorship’s austerity measures hurt the poor and working class the most while 
the middle-class appeared content that an economic collapse had been avoided. As for the 
Brazilian elite and foreigners with investments in Brazil, they reaped significant dividends, 
which helped assuage concerns regarding the illiberal practices of the military. 30 
The Canadian embassy’s responses to these developments were a function of Canada’s 
junior role alongside the United States in South America. They also flowed from the fact that 
Brazil was something of a revolving door for diplomats who were typically stationed there for 
relatively brief postings. Indeed, Canada sent almost as many ambassadors there as Brazil had 
presidents between 1954 and 1969. Sydney Pierce, former Canadian ambassador to Mexico, was 
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in the post when Vargas committed suicide. He had replaced Herbert Coleman who had been in 
Brazil since 1951. Arthur Irwin had his ambassadorial debut in 1957. Returning from Sweden, 
Jean Chapdelaine took over two years later. His former college friend, Paul Beaulieu, succeeded 
him in 1963 after having pioneered diplomatic relations in the Middle East. Yvon Beaulne then 
inherited the post in 1967. He had previously been posted to Venezuela and the Dominican 
Republic, which meant that after Pierce, he was the only senior Canadian diplomat who had any 
sort of connection to the region. In addition, Beaulne was very much cut from the cloth of Jean 
Désy, having previously served under him in Italy and in Montreal as liaison between the DEA 
and the International Service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS). The turnover 
of ambassadors during these pivotal years was an impediment to the development of a sustained 
policy of engagement. It was also a reflection of how little interest the South American giant 
generated among aspiring and emerging diplomats. The lukewarm replies that Irwin and 
Beaulieu sent to the DEA upon learning that they were heading to Brazil are revealing. The 
former did not seem to think much of Brazilians and their country’s geopolitical importance 
when he indicated that he “might be most useful” in another country where there is “substantive 
political work” to be done.31 Beaulieu was no more enthusiastic than Irwin after “five years at 
[an] unhealthy post.”32 “[I] trust assignment will only be for one tour of duty,” he replied to 
Secretary of State for External Affairs Marcel Cadieux.33  
Irwin’s and Beaulieu’s responses were an indication that “Brazilian politics were not easily 
understandable from abroad.”34 Jules Léger, under-secretary of state for External Affairs, was 
willing to admit that much. Seeking to make Irwin’s transition into his new post smoother, he 
prepared a letter of instructions detailing what the DEA considered priorities: keeping abreast of 
communist inroads, generating interest for increased bilateral trade, keeping an eye on domestic 
policies that may affect Canadian business interests in Brazil, providing updates on the country’s 
foreign policy objectives, and collating information regarding the “rather delicate subject” of 
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Canada’s relationship to the Organization of American States (OAS).35 On the latter subject, 
Irwin gained considerable insight on the Itamaraty’s position, which rested on the perception of 
profound affinities between Canadians and Brazilians with respect to their shared middle power 
aspirations and their parallel efforts to offset the hegemonic pull of the United States.36 The 
ambassador found his interlocutors’ arguments so compelling that he recommended that Canada 
join the OAS, but also suggested, ironically and patronizingly, that Brazil was a third-class 
nation in much need of Canadian middlepowerhood.37 Although Prime Minister John 
Diefenbaker flirted with the idea of membership in the OAS at the turn of the 1960s, it would 
take another thirty years before Canada joined the multilateral organization.38 In the end, Irwin 
did warm up to Brazilians, even noting encouragingly that they were destined for a great future 
and that “things both economic and political in Brazil are rarely, if ever, as bad as they look.”39 
He therefore advocated for closer relations, which proved increasingly difficult with the embassy 
having downgraded to the status of a “second or third class Consulate” under Pierce’s leadership, 
or lack thereof, according to a former staffer.40 Chapdelaine concurred with both observations: 
Brazil was the country of the future and the DEA’s “piecemeal” efforts there were insufficient.41 
Prospects, however, took a turn for the worse in 1963 as the staff at the Canadian embassy 
watched Brazil slide towards an imminent political crisis.42             
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In Brazil during the military coup that ended Goulart’s presidency, Beaulieu lived through 
“troublesome, but historic days.”43 Reports coming out of the embassy demonstrate the extent to 
which democratic principles were expendable in the search for economic stability and the fight 
against perceived communist threats in the distant and foreign Global South. Canadian diplomats 
noted approvingly that the military had dealt a near-fatal blow to one of Vargas’s legacies, 
populist politics, but they showed little concern with the authoritarianism of successive regimes. 
Their reports praised the military for showing “commendable restraint” in pursuing subversive 
elements although they noted that authorities had room to be slightly more aggressive in hunting 
down communists.44 According to Beaulieu, Brazilians valued their new government’s ability to 
manage the economy even if they were not particularly inspired by it. The ambassador described 
the new regime as a “government of good progressive administrators” who deserved praise for 
attempting to put their house in order and for aligning their country, economically and 
ideologically, with its North American Cold War allies.45 The “literate classes” who “feel they 
have been cheated” by the rise of populism and self-serving politicians could therefore be 
forgiven for turning a blind eye to the military regime’s illiberal practices.46 Canada, these 
reports suggested, should do the same and acknowledge that Brazil was a less advanced society 
where different standards could be tolerated if they served the interests of the normative 
international order. Beaulne concurred with this elitist and neo-colonial worldview: “[T]he 
people that count, for want of a better word the middle class of functionaries, military officers, 
intellectuals, the business and industrial community in particular, have their minds focused on 
the material challenges before them and the quest for economic betterment.”47 Canadians should 
seize the moment to “expand and diversify” their relations with Brazilians, he added.48    
Although neither Beaulieu nor Beaulne managed to replicate the close bonds of contact 
that Désy had developed with the ‘literate classes,’ they both insisted that greater efforts were 
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needed to engage Brazilian elites. They argued that culture was a potent means of providing 
substance and resonance to Canada’s presence in Brazil and projecting Canadian values. This, it 
was assumed, would presumably make it easier to champion the economic interests of companies 
such as Brazilian Traction, Light, and Power Company (aka The Light). But additionally, it was 
important to convince Brazilians that Canada was a trustworthy interlocutor and capable 
mediator, particularly when it came to coping with the power asymmetry associated with both 
countries’ proximity to the United States.49 Although none of the ambassadors posted in Brazil 
from 1947 onward succeeded in launching any bold new initiatives, they all recognized that 
Désy’s pioneering efforts had generated goodwill for Canada and that cultural diplomacy 
provided an exceptional stage for the performance of middle power aspirations.50 Nevertheless, 
for many of their colleagues in Ottawa, cultural diplomacy continued to remain an elusive 
concept, even with the creation of a Cultural Affairs Division in the DEA in 1966.  
Since 1947, the DEA’s experience with the projection of Canada abroad had for the most 
part been the purview of the Information Division which handled press enquiries and took care 
of disseminating press releases and reference material to foreign outlets or other interested 
parties.51 Its employees were not particularly imaginative and their efforts were often impeded by 
defective liaison with the Department of Trade and Commerce (DTC), the National Film Board 
of Canada (NFB), and the CBC-IS. The recommendations of the Royal Commission on National 
Development in the Arts, Letters, and Sciences (aka the Massey Commission) had offered food 
for thought and enough incentives for the establishment of the Canada Council for the Arts as an 
arms-length agency of the federal government. Despite this progress, Canadians’ cultural 
relations with other nations remained limited to ad hoc, discontinuous, uncoordinated, and 
shortsighted initiatives by decentralized agencies often working at cross-purposes.52 The Quiet 
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Revolution provided the spark that propelled the DEA into action. The 1961 opening of the 
Maison du Québec in Paris, with the explicit support of the French government, constituted a 
direct challenge to Ottawa’s prerogatives in the realm of international relations. It was founded 
on the notion that a province’s domestic areas of jurisdiction (specifically culture and education) 
should extend to the global arena. The doctrine found its clearest expression in a speech given by 
neo-nationalist Vice-Premier Paul Gérin-Lajoie in 1965.53 What the DEA had sought to prevent 
when it signed its cultural agreement with Brazil in 1944 had finally happened: a province had 
made “cultural working arrangements abroad on the basis of [its] educational powers.”54 Ottawa 
responded by signing a cultural agreement with France in 1965, which led to the creation of the 
Cultural Affairs Division the following year. Yet the road ahead promised to be a long one since 
the DEA’s efforts in that area had been “less than inspired and less than effective” up to that 
point.55 
From his post in Rio de Janeiro, Beaulieu was hopeful that these developments would spur 
the DEA into revisiting the 1944 Canada-Brazil cultural agreement and allocating more 
resources to “cultural cooperation between the two countries.”56 He was told that both were 
unlikely since the creation of the new division did not come with an additional budgetary 
envelope; it was therefore best to let non-state actors such as “private concert managers” take the 
lead.57 Moreover, the DEA intended to prioritize Europe where Cold War tensions remained 
acute, and in particular, “the countries from where the largest ethnic groups of Canada 
originate.”58 Beaulne added his voice to the chorus. In the spring of 1968, he wrote to the under-
secretary of state for External Affairs: “I am becoming more and more convinced that my late 
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predecessor … was right in advocating the cultural agreement of 1944 between Canada and 
Brazil … and I should hope that it will not continue to remain at the very bottom of the 
Department’s priorities.”59 Alas, it appeared destined to remain there because of other Cold War 
priorities and Québec’s increasingly frequent forays into the international arena. “[T]here is thus 
little immediate prospect of increased activity in this area,” the DEA told Beaulne on July 4, 
1968.60 As if to prove the point, Anka, one of Canada’s most acclaimed pop singers, had just 
been confirmed to perform in the third edition of the FICP later that year, but he would travel as 
a guest of Marzagão and the Brazilian government, rather than as an envoy for Canada. 
Brazilian Pop Travels North 
The FICP saw private cultural workers, the Itamaraty, and a variety of state actors collaborate to 
project an image of Brazil as a modern country with a dynamic culture founded on the twin 
pillars of Brasilidade and ‘racial democracy.’ The idea that the country’s musicais populares 
were effective tools of diplomacy was somewhat new. In fact, the northbound dissemination of 
popular music did not pick up until the Good Neighbor era, a period during which the State 
Department used cultural exchanges to counter anti-Americanism and promote liberal 
developmentalism in Brazil while encouraging the country’s decision makers to align their 
domestic and international policies with those of the United States. The Americanization of 
Brazil continued with the advent of the Cold War.61 From the 1930s through the 1960s, state and 
non-state actors mobilized the power of entertainment media to engage Brazilians and get 
American audiences, on whose support they counted, excited about the South American giant. 
Recording and radio technologies were integral to this process. Already in the 1930s, 
Columbia’s Wallace Downey and RCA Victor’s Leslie Evans were helping shape the Brazilian 
music industry using production and marketing methods developed in the United States. 
Although not ‘Americanizers’ per se, Downey and Evans nonetheless laid the foundations upon 
which Nelson Rockefeller’s Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA) 
established part of its cultural diplomacy at the turn of the 1940s.62 Broadcasting from Rio de 
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Janeiro on April 14, 1942, the goodwill ambassador George Orson Welles put samba on the 
airwaves for his compatriots up north. He had been working on a film about the Carnival at the 
request of the OCIAA.63 Back in New York later that fall, he opened Hello Americans, his new 
radio series, with a feature on Brazil set to the sound and narrative rhythm of samba.64 His guest 
on the show was Carmen Miranda, a Brazilian singer and dancer who recorded with RCA Victor 
in the 1930s before achieving stardom on stage and on the big screen in the United States.  
Miranda had just turned twenty when she recorded “Prá Você Gostar de Mim,” her second 
single and the one that catapulted her to fame in Brazil in 1930. Her domestic popularity grew as 
her appearances on radio and in movies multiplied. By the end of the decade, she had performed 
in four Brazilian musical films and earned an invitation to perform on Broadway in The Streets 
of Paris. At her request, the producer Lee Shubert agreed to hire her musicians. Because he 
refused to pay their travelling expenses, Miranda got the Brazilian government to cover the fares 
from Rio de Janeiro to New York.65 A goodwill ambassador in her own right, Miranda’s stage 
performances soon inspired Hollywood’s Twentieth Century Fox to recruit her for a series of 
lucrative films. These productions capitalized on her exotic image, which centred on her 
expressive features, foreign accent, and colourful clothing, including her signature fruit hat and 
beaded jewelry. Although she continued to record singles, musical films were the vehicles 
through which she promoted her samba-inspired tunes. By the end of 1945, she had acted in nine 
feature films, one of which – That Night in Rio (Irving Cummings, 1941) – was set in Brazil 
while another – Springtime in the Rockies (Irving Cummings, 1942) – took place in Canada. The 
“Brazilian Bombshell” had arrived north of the 49th parallel.66  
Miranda’s informal ambassadorial work left some of her compatriots perplexed, if not 
embarrassed. They disapproved of her complicit role in essentializing South Americans and 
propagating damaging stereotypes that were at odds with the sophisticated image that Brazilian 
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elites wished to foreground. More problematically, they saw her as an embodied image of a 
colonized Brazil. On her first trip back to Rio de Janeiro in 1940, she was greeted by a hostile 
crowd who disapproved of her Americanized rendition of their national music. The experience 
taught her that each visit to her homeland would be a “test of nationalist commitment,” which 
was an experience she wished to avoid.67 Yet she retained agency while in the United States. 
McCann argues that Miranda was “systematically Brazilianizing her material” through (often 
improvised) coded messages meant to assert her independence and communicate her attachment 
to Brazil.68 Despite these acts of resistance, she “symbolically embodied the image of a mestiço 
Brazil” in ways that proved non-threatening to North American audiences.69 Darlene J. Sadlier 
explains: 
Carmen Miranda overturned earlier Hollywood stereotypes of Latin Americans by playing a 
charismatic, talented, and “good-willed” Latin who enchants everyone around her. However, 
by repeatedly playing that role, she became another kind of stereotype—a hybrid created by 
Hollywood of its image of Latin America on the order of the indigenous, exotic Other 
depicted in colonial texts.70  
The spectacle served Good Neighbor objectives while selling movie tickets and singles. It also 
brought samba to the United States – and subsequently, Canada – even if not all Brazilians felt at 
ease with the paths taken and the images conveyed.   
Bossa nova followed a similar route to North America. The first recordings made their way 
there through a chance encounter between Rio de Janeiro radio host Paulo Santos and his 
Washington counterpart Félix Grant. The Brazilian jazzophile was in the United States to attend 
the Newport Jazz Festival. The two men began exchanging records, which turned Grant into an 
avid promoter of bossa nova. He later introduced the guitarist Charlie Lee Byrd to the music. A 
goodwill ambassador for the State Department, Byrd travelled to South America with bassist 
Keter Betts and percussionist Buddy Deppenschmidt in 1961. The trio spent two weeks in Brazil, 
familiarizing themselves with the bossa nova genre.71 Back in Washington, Byrd played Gilberto 
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and Jobim albums for jazz saxophonist Stan Getz, which led to the pair recording Jazz Samba for 
Verve Records in 1962. Except for Byrd’s “Samba Dees Days,” the album featured only 
Brazilian compositions. The recording proved a runaway success and the bossa nova craze had 
begun. Getz went on to record two collaborative albums with Brazilian composers the following 
year: Jazz Samba Encore! And Getz/Gilberto. In 1964, he recorded the iconic “The Girl from 
Ipanema” with Brazilian singer Astrud Gilberto. Her appearance in the United States followed in 
the footsteps of a government-sponsored delegation of bossa nova artists who had performed at 
New York’s Carnegie Hall two years earlier and which included her husband (João), Jobim, Luíz 
Bonfa, and Sérgio Mendes, to name but a few.72 The appropriation and crass commercialization 
of the music, which critics decried as “industrial bossa-nova-ization,” promptly followed with 
the genre finding itself readily “exploited for quick turnaround in hastily conceived jazz albums 
and in thoughtless pop renditions.”73 
The Itamaraty was reactive more than proactive during most of this period. Its reluctance to 
use musicais populares for diplomatic and nation branding purposes resulted from the need to 
find a balance between projecting an image of Brazil as a modern ‘racial democracy’ and 
avoiding bringing attention to domestic tensions that could reveal how fragile the construct of 
Brasilidade was. In the 1940s, the Vargas regime “tried to seduce and discipline the foreign 
imagination of Brazilian culture against significant internal debate over the look and meaning of 
Brazilianness.”74 This did not preclude supporting Miranda and her musicians although 
government support for their New York debut was the exception rather than the rule. That 
Vargas purportedly told them to “display musical honesty” was an indication that samba had the 
potential to disrupt Brazil’s image overseas.75 The connection between the Itamaraty’s musical 
diplomacy and the ‘Golden Age of Samba’ was therefore a loose one that probably rested more 
on Vargas’s personal relationship to Miranda than it did on the government’s efforts to boost 
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coffee exports.76 The Itamaraty’s cultural divisions were slowly articulating their vision of 
musical diplomacy in the early 1940s. Their library featured mostly records of ‘serious music.’ 
They nonetheless fulfilled requests by foreign embassies and radio stations, including the CBC, 
for records of musicais populares.77 By the end of the 1950s, samba and bossa nova were 
integrated into the Itamaraty’s arsenal of cultural diplomacy. The two genres offered a means of 
attracting investments and tourists by providing the experience of “terra brasilis” to foreigners.78 
However, the American entertainment industry had – to a great extent – already stolen the show.    
New Musically Imagined Communities in the Making 
Brazilian popular music thus arrived in Canada filtered primarily through the United States. It 
incidentally disrupted the musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community championed 
through Désy’s musical diplomacy. Canadians could not have missed the phenomena of samba 
and bossa nova if they tuned in to the stations broadcasting over the border or if they lived near 
or in a city that had a dance hall, a concert venue, or a movie theatre in the 1940s. In Canada, the 
age of modernity, with its radio airwaves and silver screens, combined with the ease of cross-
border movement and the shared language reality for much of the population, had accelerated a 
massive degree of American cultural penetration that had begun shortly after the First World 
War.79 Because of the ready access that Canadians had to cultural products pouring in from the 
United States, the State Department did not expend any energy or resources northward during the 
Good Neighbor era.80 While some members of the Canadian cultural elite were reticent about 
growing American cultural domination, few resisted it initially. Furthermore, many Canadian 
commentators overtly welcomed the support for cultural and intellectual life sponsored by 
prestigious organizations such as the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation.81 By 
the turn of the 1950s, the cultural pull of the United States, not to mention its economic 
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importance, had reached dramatic heights while the influence of Great Britain was in sharp 
decline. Liberal humanists turned to the Massey Commission to map their distinctive cultural 
nationalist project, but not all Canadians embraced the binary vision that pitted Canada versus 
the United States, and popular against middlebrow or highbrow culture. Robert Teigrob 
pertinently notes that “hegemonic confrontations operate both within and across national 
borders.”82 This was certainly true of Canadian popular musicians who resisted both the 
paternalism of their country’s cultural elite and American cultural imperialism. Artists such as 
Robi and Peterson listened to new sounds coming from the United States to provide alternate 
means of thinking about the Canadian experience. If, as Ryan Edwardson argues, the 
“proliferation of communicative commodities in the wake of modernity … furthered the ability 
of individuals to mediate a connection to the nation,” then popular music could also mediate new 
connections to the world.83 
Born Alice Robitaille in a working-class family, Alys Robi was seven years old when she 
performed in Ten Nights in a Bar Room, a professional stage adaptation of an American novel 
from the mid-nineteenth century. Her father’s investment in singing and dancing classes were 
evidently yielding results. She soon began winning numerous contests and making a growing 
number of appearances on radio. In 1935, Robi relocated to Montreal where she performed 
alongside Rose Ouellette (aka La Poune) at Montreal’s Théâtre national before moving on to 
bigger and better opportunities, notably on the road with promoter Jean Grimaldi. Significantly, 
she rose to fame in the rest of Canada in 1944 thanks to her performances on Latin American 
Serenade, a CBC show of which she was the star. French Canadians had long been interested in 
the music of South America, which they discovered through sheet music, dance manuals, and 
early recordings.84 The O’Leary brothers’ Union culturelle des Latins d’Amérique (UCLA), an 
organization of which Robi was a member, did its part by regularly organizing cultural events.85 
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However, arguably the most decisive factor that brought Latin American music in the limelight 
in Canada was the popularity of Miranda’s Hollywood film performances. It was these 
productions that inspired Robi to incorporate Brazilian songs into her repertoire.86 In December 
of 1944, she travelled to New York for her first studio session with RCA Victor. She intended to 
record English-language versions of some of the works that were helping her conquer new 
publics, including the Brazilian choro song “Tico-Tico No Fubá,” but the label thought it 
preferable to prioritize French-language versions. The market for such material had quickly 
become saturated so RCA Victor was most likely trying to capitalize on Robi’s difference as a 
French Canadian. The song had first been popularized through the Walt Disney animation film 
Saludos Amigos (Wilfred Jackson et al., 1942). In 1944, Ethel Smith’s rendition of the song, 
which was featured in Bathing Beauty (George Sidney, 1944), climbed through American pop 
charts. It was followed shortly after by the Andrews Sisters’ jazzed-up version. Because Miranda 
had yet to record her own single of “Tico-Tico No Fubá,” Robi’s French-language rendition 
fulfilled listeners’ desire for the exotic.87      
In the mid-to-late 1940s, Robi found herself in the ambivalent position of performing three 
roles simultaneously: transcultural mediator, cultural appropriator, and exotic ‘other.’ Regarding 
the first, she introduced North American audiences to Latin American works. Many of those 
either originated from Brazil or were inspired by samba: among others, “Tico-Tico No Fubá,” 
“Aquarela do Brasil,” “Samba Samba,” and That Night in Rio’s “Chica Chica Boom Chic.” 
Robi’s genuine interest in the music was evidenced by her travels to Mexico and her membership 
in the UCLA as well as by her correspondence with Brazilian composer Ary Barroso whose 
permission she sought before translating some of his songs into French.88 According to her 
biographer, she also intended to bring Canada’s “deux solitudes autour d’une samba 
brésilienne.”89 At the same time, she participated uncritically in the process of essentialization 
that accompanied the appropriation of Brazilian popular music by emphasizing its infectious, 
exhilarating, and sensual qualities.90 Yet Robi’s difference marked her as an exotic ‘other’ in 
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ways that ostensibly legitimized – and rendered authentic – her performance of this material. The 
American entertainer Jack Benny, with whom she shared the stage in 1943, referred to her as 
‘Canada’s Carmen Miranda.’ The moniker was misleading since Robi never wore extravagant 
attire, yet it proved an effective shorthand for introducing her to audiences in the early 1940s.91 It 
may have even contributed to her being invited to Hollywood to discuss potential projects with 
film executives. There, Robi met Miranda who was both friendly and, it turned out, 
francophile.92 The French-Canadian singer did not take the place of her Brazilian counterpart on 
the big screen, nor did she ever tour Brazil.93 Although her music did chart briefly there, 
Brazilians seemed unaware of Robi’s reputation as ‘Canada’s Carmen Miranda,’ with one critic 
for Diario da Noite comparing her instead to a lesser version of the famous Wisconsin-born 
cabaret singer Hildegarde.94  
Oscar Peterson fared better than Robi in Brazil, both as an Afro-Canadian and a jazz 
musician, which was a genre widely popular within certain sectors of Brazilian society. Born in 
Montreal in 1925, Peterson first learned the trumpet before settling on the piano. His father, an 
amateur musician and porter for the Canadian Pacific Railway (CPR), nurtured his children’s 
musical inclinations. Peterson soon distinguished himself from his four siblings during 
performances at local community halls and at Church. Before long, he earned a spot on the 
airwaves of Montreal’s CKAC on the show Fifteen Minutes of Piano Rambling. He was fifteen. 
Five years later, he performed live on CBC Radio and became a regular fixture of the Montreal 
jazz scene where RCA Victor talent scouts noticed him. He thus began a long and prolific 
recording career, which received a major boost following an unannounced performance at 
Carnegie Hall on September 18, 1949. Peterson’s New York debut, as part of promoter Norman 
Granz’s Jazz at the Philharmonic, made him an immediate star in the United States. He 
“returned to Montreal a conquering hero,” writes John Gilmore.95 With Granz as his manager, 
Peterson recorded and performed throughout the world, notably with the Jazz at the 
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Philharmonic troupe in the early 1950s. Increasingly associated with American jazz, the 
Montreal musician contributed nonetheless to the consolidation of the Canadian jazz scene, 
which traced its origins to the 1910s. Mark Miller notes how Peterson’s distinctive playing style 
placed Canadian jazz on the map while elevating the music from an imported ‘low’ art to a 
domestic ‘high’ art through cross-country broadcasts that helped “transcend the regionalism of 
the Canadian jazz scene.”96  
A fast-rising superstar on the global jazz scene, Peterson travelled to Brazil in 1969, but he 
did so through the non-official channel of private concert promoters. As if to underscore the 
missed opportunity for Canadian cultural diplomacy, Brazilian critics described him as “one of 
the United States’ most famous jazzmen,” no doubt because of his seminal recordings for 
Granz’s Verve and Clef Records or the Chicago-based Mercury Records, which included 
Peterson’s own appropriation of bossa nova.97 His We Get Request and Soul Español, released in 
1964 and 1966 respectively, participated in the commercialization of the music by revisiting 
Brazilian classics with a touch of swing and exotic exuberance. The former included an original 
interpretation of Jobim’s “Quiet Nights of Quiet Stars,” known in Portuguese as “Corcovado,” 
and yet another version of “The Girl from Ipanema.” The music critic Oswaldo Miranda 
responded favourably to the record, which he saw as evidence of Jobim’s great ambassadorial 
role in the United States. Yet he noted that its “low dosage of Brasilidade” betrayed the trio’s 
‘North Americanness,’ which signalled that authentic bossa nova could only come from Brazil.98  
Peterson carried on with an album conceived as a sort of musical homage to Brazilian 
composers, which unfortunately was released with a title – Soul Español – that demonstrated a 
profound misunderstanding of, or flagrant indifference to, the cultural specificities of South 
America. Although nine of the ten songs were either based on Brazilian themes and written by or 
cowritten with Brazilian composers, Mercury Records staffers and executives decided to package 
the album in ways that obliterated the national focus and instead sought to capitalize on a more 
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generic ‘latinophilia’ in the United States.99 The cover itself featured a photo of Karyn Calabrese, 
a Chicago-born model who the producers hoped could pass as Latin American despite her 
African-American and Italian heritage (figure 5.1).100 Destined for the North American market, 
the album, perhaps fortunately, was not distributed in Brazil. 
 
Figure 5.1. Oscar Peterson’s Soul Español foregrounding ‘latinophilia’ (1966). Source: 
author’s personal collection. 
On another level, however, it is equally likely that the confusion around Peterson’s national 
identity went beyond his musical affiliations. If they had been paying any attention at all to 
Canada’s official projection of its international identity in Brazil, local audiences and critics 
might well have assumed that Peterson was American given the fact that Désy and his successors 
had so deeply centred their representations of Canadians on ‘whiteness.’ The pianist’s trajectory 
may have mirrored that of Canada in its passage from colony to nation in the eyes of jazzophiles, 
but it did not guarantee acceptance from those who found the music morally suspect and un-
Canadian. The diplomatic corps’ disinterest in the power of jazz as a cultural tool stemmed in 
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part from an elitist preference for ‘serious music’ as ‘high’ culture. During his travels, Peterson 
was often dismayed by the indifference of Canadian embassy staff abroad.101 He criticized the 
mainstream media for not providing more support for jazz; a lamentable situation, which he 
attributed to “bigotry” and to Canadians’ “smugness about race relations.”102 Although 
Peterson’s international reputation as a jazz musician was firmly established by the 1960s, his 
takes on Latin American music, much like Robi’s Americanized Afro-Brazilian samba tunes, 
were not considered an appropriate vehicle for the projection of Canada in Brazil. 
However problematic were parts of Robi’s and Peterson’s Brazil-inflected repertoires, their 
successes revealed that popular music could indeed be a legitimate vehicle for capitalizing on the 
hegemonic pull of the American entertainment industry despite the biases and assumptions of the 
Canadian cultural elite. By engaging with a musical ‘other,’ both artists – each of whom was to 
some degree themselves an ‘other’ – championed their own approach to ‘being-in-the-world.’ 
Holding steadfast to their Canadian identity, Robi and Peterson both turned to hybridized 
musical forms to negotiate the tension between difference and sameness in an increasingly 
globalized cultural environment. Through their music, they mediated new connections to the 
nation and to the world, even if the Brazilian sounds that inspired them came filtered – and thus 
somewhat distorted and essentialized – through American media. In other words, they staged 
alternate means of musically imagining a Canadian-Brazilian community. That said, ‘race’ and 
gender, in addition to the cultural and political elite’s contempt for popular music, meant that 
there was no place for Robi and Peterson in Canada’s musical diplomacy.      
Canada Sings at the Festival Internacional da Canção Popular  
International music festivals constitute an exceptional platform where audience members and 
performers develop their individual and social identities, both of which are key to establishing a 
sense of place and a sense of citizenship; through either identification with or opposition to 
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others.103 They are effective entry points into the cultural public sphere. As Jim McGuigan 
explains, the “concept of a cultural public sphere refers to the articulation of politics, public and 
personal, as a contested terrain through affective (aesthetic and emotional) modes of 
communication.”104 Taking place amid the “global sixties ” – a period of “growing 
dissatisfaction with the existing political, socioeconomic, and cultural status quo” – the FICP 
served as a test for both civil society and the military regime.105 It provided Brazilians with the 
unprecedented opportunity to articulate new narratives regarding their country’s domestic 
politics and its international image. At the same time, it was a contested terrain where divergent 
views and competing agendas collided and where new solidarities emerged through cultural 
transfers.106 The FICP thus offered a mediated stage for dynamic interactions among a variety of 
state and non-state actors from Brazil and elsewhere in the world. It was a risky endeavour in 
that it had the potential to expose to the world the tensions unravelling within the Brazilian 
cultural public sphere.  
Considering the above, international festivals can hardly be described as apolitical events. 
They are “nation-builders,” writes Jean-Louis Fabiani.107 States embrace them as “political 
devices” for national self-representation and national projection purposes.108 Festivals make it 
possible to circumscribe – in one place or in a series of adjoining sites – the multitude of 
discourses and practices deployed within the cultural public sphere. This facilitates the 
hierarchization – and thus marginalization or exclusion – of those who challenge normative 
individual and social identities.109 Festivals foster solidarities through a self-reflective process 
whereby performers and audiences recognize themselves in the cultural values and canons 
around which consensus exists while evolving in conjunction with the interplay between local 
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circumstances and global dynamics.110 What follows is a contest for influence over the 
sociopolitical and symbolic meanings of these events. Illiberal states have a vested interest in 
controlling the outcomes of that contest. They also have the means. To describe international 
festivals as exuberant moments of collective self-affirmation and openness to the world is thus to 
overlook the fact that they often represent “internal political devices.”111 Neil Ravenscroft and 
Xavier Matteucci contend that the liminal zones that festivals create are ephemeral since they 
ultimately serve to contain and defuse disruptive discourses and practices. They write that this 
“temporary liberation offer[s] the possibility of excitement and entertainment, but also … the 
potential to develop the new forms of regulation required to maintain social control.”112 The 
FICP is a case in point.   
Brazil’s popular music festival was a contested site. It constituted a venue for the 
expression of dissent although it also created conditions for the delimitation and suppression of 
oppositional voices. It thus provided a stage to create consensus around a state-sanctioned 
national musical culture while projecting a positive and engaging image of Brazil overseas. 
Anaïs Fléchet emphasizes the tensions between the international and domestic aspects of this 
project when she depicts the FICP as both a “true diplomatic success” for the Itamaraty and a 
battleground for civil society.113 This double binary – domestic versus international as well as 
civil society versus the military regime and its Itaramaty – fails to underline the festival’s 
multifunction as an internal political device. Nor does it account for the complicity of non-state 
actors. Marzagão, founder and director of the FICP, was au fait regarding Brazilian politics due 
to his background in journalism and his work on the campaign trail for Negrão de Lima, Brazil’s 
ambassador to Portugal who went on to win the governorship of the State of Guanabara in 1965. 
Initial support for the FICP came from the newly elected governor and the state’s Secretaria de 
Turismo, not the Itamaraty. Other key partners included TV Rio and TV Globo, as well record 
labels Cudil and Philips, which produced compilation albums, along with the Secretaria de 
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Turismo, for commercial sale or for distribution to embassies and consular offices.114 Marzagão 
secured support for his festival by indicating that it would engage Brazil’s youth and help them 
cope with the changing politico-cultural landscape. He added that it would also benefit the 
country’s international image by displaying order and stability, public participation and popular 
contentment, economic strength, and goodwill.115 With the explicit support of the Itamaraty, 
Marzagão sold the FICP to the world by using the trope of internationalism. In a letter to the 
DEA, Minister Carlos Rocha Mafra de Laet explained that the festival “did not and does not 
have commercial characteristics, seeking exclusively to assemble in Rio the music of every 
country without discrimination, honouring its composers and performers and thereby promoting 
greater understanding among the peoples.”116 There was evidently more than that to the FICP, 
but such messaging made for good branding.   
The first four editions of the FICP (1966-69) encompass the arc formed by the festival’s 
seven-year history, capturing the essence of its evolution from a site of multiple discourses and 
practices to one of consensus under the shadow of the military regime. It follows the trajectory of 
the country’s political history from democracy to crisis and dictatorship. The festival’s highs and 
lows were many during these four years. They ranged from inadequate budgets to poor acoustics, 
controversies regarding the jury selection process, disagreement with broadcasting partners, 
subversive performers and discontented audiences, as well as growing censorship and repression. 
A few months after the closing of the fourth edition, a fire caused serious damages to the 
Maracanazinho’s structure and dome. The stadium and the FICP survived the turn of the 1970s, 
but the ambiance had changed once the military regime was firmly in place. 1968 was a pivotal 
year with some performers and large segments of the audience openly taking positions against 
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capitalism and authoritarianism in the spirit of the ‘global sixties.’117 Buarque had already exiled 
himself to Italy when “Sabiá” was chosen as the winner of both the national and international 
competitions.118 Vandré, the audience choice for national contender, saw his “Pra Não Dizer Que 
Não Falei de Flores” promptly banned by the authorities. He left for Paraguay the following 
year.119 The ‘tropicalistas’ Veloso and Gil also went into exile in 1969. Discordant voices were 
thus expurgated from the FICP in the closing year of the decade. Zuza Homen de Mello notes 
how the fourth edition provided an apt metaphor – or mise en scène – of Brazilian society: a 
well-lit and colourful stage, which served as a distraction to star-stricken and bedazzled 
audiences who failed to see the violence deployed by the authorities backstage.120 Singers from 
all over the world, including Canada, were needed to keep the spectacle afloat.   
An analysis of the contender selection process in Canada reveals that the DEA and the 
CBC lacked both the vision and the means to mobilize popular musicians. Moreover, the 
correspondence dealing with Canadian participation in the FICP indicates that Marzagão actively 
interfered in this process in his efforts to enhance the visibility and resonance of the festival. The 
DEA learned about the event in March of 1966, but it failed to seize the opportunity, instead 
inviting the organizers to solicit the help of private organizations to find a suitable Canadian 
candidate. The embassy in Brazil proposed the chansonnier Gilles Vigneault, but the suggestion 
went nowhere because, as per competition rules, the selection had to come from Canada.121 Nor 
did the Canada Council for the Arts offer any help since it had no expertise in the “largely self-
supporting” realm of popular music.122 Pressed by Marzagão and the diplomatic corps in Brazil, 
the Cultural Affairs Division reached out to the CBC who agreed to find a representative song 
and select an appropriate singer. By mid-August, the broadcaster had yet to make progress on 
either front, which led the FICP to take matters in its own hands by contacting Anka who 
declined for family reasons.123 At that point, the DEA told Marzagão to print the program and 
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leave the name for Canada’s entry blank. With less than three weeks to go before the 
competition, the Secretaria de Turismo shamed Canadian diplomats in Rio de Janeiro by 
reminding them that they were the “only participating country without [a] singer nominated.”124 
At least the CBC had picked the song it wanted to feature, “It Never Came to Be” by Blye and 
Dale, and on the basis of this the broadcaster decided a week later that it would send the two very 
talented, but largely unknown, artists to Brazil.125  
The following year, perhaps chastened by the diplomatic embarrassment associated with 
the inaugural festival, the CBC designed an elaborate scheme to find a contender for the FICP. 
Taking its cues from Brazil, it planned to launch a national competition that would culminate 
with a special program during which the winner would be announced. But even this strategy did 
not sit well with the Brazilians. Concerned that things were moving too slowly, the incredulous 
Marzagão violated his own rules by reaching out to the wildly popular Lautrec without 
consulting either the CBC or the DEA. Offended by this breach of protocol, Canadian authorities 
believed that “some form of protest” would be in order, but it was too late: Lautrec had accepted 
the invitation.126 Amazingly, despite reassurances that the FICP would not again undermine the 
Canadian selection process through unilateral and arbitrary actions, Marzagão repeated the same 
scenario the following year when he persuaded Anka to accept his invitation rather than working 
with Canadian authorities.127 When Marzagão finally held to his promise in 1969, the comedy of 
selection errors took another turn when the CBC, now in full control of the process, was 
embarrassingly unable to find a suitable candidate.128  
It is easy to understand why Marzagão was so determined to have Paul Anka compete in 
Brazil. The Ottawa-born singer was one of the most widely acclaimed Canadian pop artists at the 
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time. Having previously performed in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo in 1960, audiences were 
anxiously awaiting the return of the former teen idol whose stage, radio, and television 
performances had caused quite a commotion in both cities.129 Having him on the stage of the 
FICP would be a great coup for Marzagão as well as his state and non-state partners. Born in 
1941, Anka masterfully used his music education to propel himself to stardom as a singer-
songwriter. In 1957, he travelled on his own to New York to audition for ABC-Paramount 
Records. With contract in hand, he recorded “Diana,” which peaked in music charts throughout 
North America. By the end of the decade, he had recorded several other major hits – including 
“It’s Time to Cry,” “Lonely Boy,” and “(All of a Sudden) My Heart Sings” – in addition to 
writing for acclaimed performer Buddy Holly and touring throughout the world. At the turn of 
the 1960s, he appeared in four feature films while also starring in the pioneering cinéma verité 
NFB film Lonely Boy (Wolf Koenig and Roman Kroitor, 1962). Anka then successfully 
reinvented himself as an easy-listening pop performer by joining the likes of Frank Sinatra in Las 
Vegas. Although it was a different singer who would be returning to Brazil, Marzagão did not 
doubt that his presence would still be an asset for the FICP. 
Canada’s other FICP participants were about the same age as Anka, which meant that they 
were a generation younger than the cultural ambassadors who had preceded them to Brazil. 
Reaching their teens in the prosperous late 1940s and early 1950s, they grew up in the golden 
age of television as well as with the rhythms of jazz and rock-and-roll. Born in London, Jimmy 
Dale arrived in Canada in 1947. Schooled in music theory and composition, he performed in 
various dance bands and orchestras throughout Toronto before securing a job at the CBC. There, 
he met singer-songwriter Allan Blye who had started working for the broadcaster while still 
living in his home town of Winnipeg. The two men were respected artists despite being relatively 
unknown beyond Toronto and the CBC. Donald Lautrec, on the other hand, was an international 
star in the French-speaking world. Born in Jonquière, north of Quebec City, he started off as a 
touring acrobat and had his first taste of stardom as the bodyguard of crooner Michel Louvain. In 
1961, he decided to try his hand at singing. His success was near-instantaneous. By 1967, he had 
recorded several hit records, including “Manon, vient danser le ska,” had starred in the musical 
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film Pas de vacances pour les idoles (Denis Héroux, 1965), toured in France, finished in third 
place at the 1967 edition of the Sopot International Song Festival, and recorded the theme song 
for Expo 67; “Un jour, un jour.” Marc Gélinas, who was a last-minute selection when the CBC 
dropped the ball in 1969, was a respected Montreal-based artist, but not one that could compete 
with either Lautrec or Anka. A singer with a limited range, he was more successful as a 
songwriter and a television actor. It was his song “Avec une chanson” that would feature in the 
fourth edition of the FICP and be performed by Guy Boucher, an aspiring artist who had a 
modest success in Québec and was also a last-minute choice for the competition.  
Apart from age, the artists who made up Canada’s uneven talent delegation from 1966 to 
1969 shared an important trait in that they were all ‘white’ male performers. Although Anka’s 
classmates called him “the black Syrian” because of his Middle Eastern heritage, his Christianity 
and cultural standing in Canada and in the United States alongside Holly and Sinatra marked him 
as resolutely ‘white’ in the 1960s.130 There was no shortage of talent in Canada, both men and 
women, including the Afro-Canadian award-winning vocalist Shirley Matthews, the acclaimed 
indigenous singer-songwriter Buffy Sainte-Marie, and Shirley Harmer who had graduated from 
the broadcaster’s Four for the Show to the Johnny Carson Tonight Show in the United States. 
Although Matthews and Sainte-Marie were no doubt disqualified on ‘racial’ grounds, the CBC 
had considered sending Harmer to Brazil in 1966; however, she declined when she learned that 
no funds were available to cover her husband’s travel expenses.131 Ironically, the big hit of the 
Canadian delegation that year was Dale’s wife, Irene, who was not a singer but who earned the 
FICP’s “Golden Rooster Award for top elegance” and was interviewed by O Globo about 
fashion, shopping, and housekeeping.132 This unforeseen moment of fashion diplomacy was 
noteworthy enough for the embassy to mention in its report that Dale’s wife had “created an 
excellent impression, particularly attracting favourable attention for her fashionable 
wardrobe.”133 By contrast, Lautrec’s status as one of the most elegant and most handsome men 
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of the festival was rewarded with articles that celebrated his masculinity, from his tall and 
imposing body to his love of sports and women.134 Photos showed him towering over his fans, 
garotas [young women], when not seductively wrapping his arms around one of the festival’s 
hostesses in the garden of the Canadian embassy (figure 5.2).135 Likewise, Anka’s charm and 
fearlessness in sports were presented as masculine attributes that complemented his iconic stage 
personae.136 The exuberant and alluring performances of Canada’s impromptu ambassadors 
marked a departure from the more formal and restrained performances of their predecessors, 
which was not altogether surprising considering that the 1960s delegations and their Brazilian 
supporters were increasingly drawn into the cultural habits of American popular culture.  
 
Figure 5.2. Donald Lautrec exploring the grounds of the Canadian embassy with one of the 
festival’s hostesses (1967). Source: O Cruzeiro, Biblioteca Nacional. 
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That said, it is revealing that Canadian representation at the FICP alternated between 
English and French as it shifted from one year to the next between Blye and Dale’s “It Never 
Came to Be” to Lautrec’s “Je ne t’en veux pas,” Anka’s “This Crazy World,” and Gélinas’s 
“Avec une chanson.” From the onset, Désy’s early musical diplomacy initiatives had placed 
French-Canadian culture at the heart of Canada’s international image for a number of reasons. It 
had been a way to capitalize on Brazilians’ francophilia, but it also allowed him to elevate his 
status within Montreal’s elite cultural circles and advance his vision that a bicultural federal state 
was the best approach to protecting, enriching, and broadening the reach of French-Canadian 
culture. The Massey Commission had put forward a similar defence of biculturalism in its efforts 
to rally support for its recommendations in Québec.137 And beginning in 1963, the Royal 
Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism had further pursued that project by seeking ways 
to enlighten the path towards “equal partnership between the two founding races” to offset the 
rise of nationalism in Québec.138 As state broadcasters, the CBC and its French-language 
counterpart, Radio-Canada, were expected to champion a similar vision although the latter 
tended to sympathize with the more autonomist, and subsequently separatist, tone of ‘québécois’ 
politics in the 1960s.139 However, Marzagão’s interference with the selection process meant that 
neither the CBC nor the DEA could take credit for alternating between English and French as a 
means of giving equal voice to the country’s ‘two founding races.’ Although La Presse’s Pierre 
Vincent hypothesized that it was the “politique (avouée ou inavouée) des organisateurs du 
festival,” that assertion was not correct either since Marzagão had not chosen the candidates for 
1966 and 1969.140 At the end of the day, however, whether by accident or design, the sequence 
of participants revealed how easy and convenient it was to fall back on the androcentric, settler 
narrative of ‘two founding races.’ 
Marzagão’s meddling in the internal process of the CBC, the broadcaster’s handling of the 
situation, and the DEA’s detached role meant that the artists who were selected to perform did 
not necessarily understand that they were to act as impromptu ambassadors. Although it was 
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obvious that they had been selected to represent Canada, they did not know to whom they were 
accountable in the performance of the nation.141 While the embassy in Rio de Janeiro reported 
positively on the socializing skills of Blye, Dale, and Lautrec, it seems that, as singers and 
songwriters, the musicians saw themselves primarily as performers operating in the globalizing 
realm of pop culture.142 They were therefore inclined to think in transnational rather than 
national terms, particularly since the process of ‘canadianizing’ popular music in Canada was 
still in its early stages.143 Nor did it bolster their sense of patriotism that the Canadian delegations 
were smaller compared with other countries who sent reporters to cover the achievements of 
their artists. Reflecting back on his experience, many years later, Lautrec acknowledged that he 
never saw himself as needing to carry out ambassadorial duties on behalf of Canadian culture 
and treated the festival much as he treated every performance with his image and identity as a 
singer predominating above all else.144 A possible exception was Blye who, “thrust in the 
situation,” at least felt some loyalty to his employer, the CBC, for having selected him even if he 
did not clearly understand his role as an ‘informal ambassador’ for Canada.145 
The DEA and the diplomatic corps were largely to blame for this gap in understanding 
since they failed to brief the artists or provide them with any context about the decades-long 
history of cultural relations between the two countries. Instead, the perception of Brazil held by 
contenders at the FICP came primarily from the musicais populares that they had discovered 
courtesy of their familiarity with the United States’ entertainment industry. In an interview with 
Correio da Manhã, Dale confided that Canadians are seeking their own voice and they are “tired 
of always being the little brothers” of their American neighbours.146 What he and Blye heard in 
bossa nova was a music of resistance and collective self-affirmation that could dynamize 
Canada’s cultural landscape. Lautrec also saw potential in that music, but his appropriation of it 
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was first and foremost opportunistic. The sounds, dance steps, and essentialized symbolic 
representations of musical ‘others’ sold albums, which is why he had recorded French-language 
versions of Billy Strange’s “Limbo Bossa” and Elvis Presley’s “Bossa Nova Baby.” As for 
Anka, he followed the lead of Sinatra who started the year 1967 in the studio with Jobim. That 
summer, the Canadian singer recorded a live album that featured three works by the Brazilian 
composer: “Insesatez,” “Meditação,” and “Corcovado.” If either Lautrec and Anka imagined that 
they could find their own voice by seeking inspiration in Brazil’s musicais populares, they were 
misguided, because the bossa nova they listened to was not authentic having been filtered 
through the American media. Although neither Lautrec nor Anka thought of their performance in 
terms of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community, they did demonstrate that popular 
music could help mediate new connections to the world. 
The Canadians who stood on the stage of the FICP were for the most part oblivious to the 
internal politics of Brazil. They were reminded by embassy staff that the country was ruled by 
the military, but did not necessarily grasp the full extent of its powers in civil society, including 
its treatment of artists. Lautrec’s experience is revealing of how successful the FICP was as a 
public relations campaign. The singer’s stay in Rio de Janeiro and his visit to Bahia were 
carefully scripted to foreground Brasilidade while substantiating the idea that Brazil was a 
‘racial democracy’ run by a benign regime. Lautrec was chaperoned for most of his trip. In 
addition to visiting key tourist attractions, he toured the cities’ embassies, attended a voodoo-like 
ceremony, and witnessed a capoeira performance, all of which left a deep impression on him. 
The concentration of contenders from all over the world at Copacabana Beach and the energizing 
atmosphere of Maracanazinho stadium made Lautrec forget that Brazil had taken an authoritarian 
turn. The military did its part by entertaining the performers with motorcycle acrobatics on their 
way from their hotel to the festival site. It was only when he visited the country as a tourist later 
in his life that he began to realize how naïve he had been in 1967, and how artful and delusive 
his hosts had been in projecting Brazil through the festival scene.147 
Staging Brazil in its domestic context was a sound decision. Hosting an international event 
rather than going to one made it easier to control the messaging and the parameters. It was also 
more viable financially since existing infrastructure could be used and public-private 
                                                          




partnerships secured without having to worry about the fluctuating value of the country’s 
currency in the global arena. Besides, it was more expedient to bring the world – its delegations 
of artists and journalists – to Brazil rather than the other way around. São Paulo’s Bienal 
Internacional de Arte [International Art Biennial], which was in its ninth year in 1967, had 
proven the success of this approach, which is why the Itamaraty continued to support it.148 
Canadians had been among the first to participate in the biennial when it was launched in 1951, 
albeit with some reservation due to scheduling and space allocation issues.149 These problems 
had been ironed out by the mid-1960s. Beaulieu could therefore report positively on Brazilian 
accomplishments in the arts and the increased possibilities for reciprocal exchanges between the 
two countries.150 The management group of the Canadian Corporation for the 1967 World 
Exhibition was therefore perplexed by the South American giant’s reluctance to participate in 
what was to be the highlight of Canada’s Centennial, particularly since Expo 67 centred so much 
on culture. The group and the DEA sent delegations to Brazil in an effort to cultivate interest in 
the event. They proposed strategies that ranged from helping finance the Brazilian pavilion in 
exchange for assistance in the construction of the new embassy in Brasília, to luring Brazilian 
participation with the promise that an international soccer tournament would be held in parallel 
to Expo 67.151 And when these proposals failed, the DEA contemplated bringing the Centennial 
to Brazil by using unexpended funds to send Canada’s delegate to the FICP on a countrywide 
tour.152 But that plan fell through when Marzagão reached out directly to Lautrec instead of 
letting the Canadian selection process run its course. It was clear that the Brazilian authorities 
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felt they would have more success in pursuing their own interests and contacts rather than 
waiting for Canadian leadership on the transnational file.         
1968 was the year when politics were front and centre at the FICP. The international 
delegations missed most of the action, which took place earlier during the national competition. 
Anka did try to place himself in the ‘global sixties’ when he claimed that his song was in 
response to the troubled state of the world.153 Had “This Crazy World” been written by a 
Brazilian artist, it is possible that the song would have raised concerns among censors, but Anka 
had the privilege of being an English-speaking performer from Canada with a distinguished 
career in the United States. That said, the song’s musical form and lament-like lyrics were far 
from constituting an anti-war or an anti-authoritarianism anthem. A more militant stance would 
have been out of character for Anka considering his reluctance to openly discuss his political 
views. When asked to comment on the Vietnam War, he politely replied that he could not discuss 
the topic as a Canadian living in the United States. He added, however, that he was a pacifist and 
that card-carrying, flag-waving protesters would not change the world.154 Anka’s political 
posturing sounded hollow in the context of late 1960s Brazil. A case in point was his response to 
the audience members who booed Jobim in the final moments of the FICP. Many in attendance 
were still bitter that Vandré’s “Pra Não Dizer Que Não Falei de Flores” had been withdrawn in 
favour of “Sabiá” during the national competition. They promptly manifested their 
dissatisfaction upon learning that Jobim and Buarque’s song had won first place in the 
international phase. Anka, who finished second, concurred with the jury and lamented the 
disrespect shown to his Brazilian counterparts. But his position was inevitably informed by his 
personal connection to the composer’s music rather than his understanding of domestic politics. 
As if to unintentionally underline how ill-attuned he was to the politico-cultural climate in Rio de 
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Janeiro, Anka risked further upsetting disgruntled festivalgoers when he stated that Jobim should 
be named “world ambassador for Brazilian music.”155  
The controversies and confrontations that had exploded in 1968 were largely subsided by 
the time Marzagão launched the fourth edition of the FICP. However, the less volatile climate 
was due in no small part to a hardening of the military regime’s hold on authority and its more 
aggressive position vis-à-vis urban subversives and guerilla groups in the countryside. Dissenting 
artists had been silenced, if not imprisoned or forced into exile, by the authorities by the time the 
1969 edition of the FICP came around. Moreover, the spectacles of the festival itself had also 
been fine-tuned to ensure consensus and discipline. By the time Gélinas landed in Rio de Janeiro 
as a hastily chosen emissary to represent Canada, the military junta had taken complete control 
of government. There was no Canadian ambassador on hand to greet the songwriter because 
Beaulne had recently left his post and his successor, Christian Hardy, had yet to present his 
credentials. Equally important, Gélinas had another crisis of his own to deal with because 
Boucher, who was supposed to sing “Avec une chanson,” had failed to join him on the flight 
from New York to Rio de Janeiro. After days passed with no news from or about Boucher, who 
was in an American hospital recovering from a car accident, Gélinas realized that he would have 
to sing in order to save face. So as to accommodate his limited vocal range, he decided to 
substitute “Consuelo” for “Avec une chanson,” but was disqualified by the organizers who 
nonetheless allowed him to perform to avoid further humiliation.156 In a supreme irony, Gélinas, 
who had never signed on to participate in the FICP as a singer, let alone as an ambassador, left 
Brazil in a state of political angst, certain he had inadvertently damaged Canada’s image through 
this trying episode.157 The country’s musical diplomacy had indeed seen better days.  
□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ 
During the first four-year run of the FICP, Canadian government and cultural officials 
completely failed to understand, let alone value, popular music’s ability to mediate new 
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connections to the world. Caught up in their own elitist version of cultural nationalism, they had 
yet to fully comprehend how music styles so deeply anchored in American or Latin American 
popular cultural tastes and so highly commercialized could be coded as ‘national’ and rendered 
“ideologically valuable” in the Centennial decade.158 Canadian artists had already been exploring 
more global and hybridized musical forms in their efforts to negotiate their way through the 
hegemonic confrontation taking place between the United States’ cultural industry and Canada’s 
cultural elite. They had already established new solidarities to develop their creative and 
commercial potential, most notably by exploiting the symbolic weight of samba and bossa nova. 
The FICP offered up an exceptional stage for such cultural transfers and for the performance of 
nation. By engaging with Brazil’s musicais populares, these artists, as individuals, inadvertently 
proposed alternate ways of musically imagining a Canadian-Brazilian community while 
advancing their own careers. They did not, however, displace the markers of identity that had 
been – and continued to be – foregrounded in the official cultural relations between the two 
countries. In the past, projection had taken precedence over engagement. The same was true with 
this latest musical nation branding episode, except that as an exercise in musical diplomacy, it 
was more tepid to the point of incompetence than ever before, and more complicit with the 
interests of Brazil’s military regime to value spectacle over cultural authenticity in the 
geopolitical realm. 
   
                                                          






On May 30, 2018, the University of Southern California public diplomacy scholar Nicholas J. 
Cull travelled to Ottawa to testify in front of the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs 
and International Trade (SSCFAIT). He had been invited to bring his expertise to a recently 
launched study on the “impact and utilization of Canadian culture and arts in Canadian foreign 
policy and diplomacy.”1 The initiative followed the federal Liberals’ return to power and their 
stated commitment to rebrand Canada and retune the country’s soft power.2 “I see four core 
approaches to cultural diplomacy,” explained Cull.3 The first, ‘cultural gift,’ consists of selecting 
a valued cultural element that is representative of Canada and offering it to foreign audiences in 
an effort to solicit their attention and earn their admiration. ‘Cultural information’ is the 
dissemination of lesser-known works and practices to provide depth and nuance to Canada’s 
image in countries where there is either a lack of information or an abundance of misinformation. 
Third, ‘cultural capacity building’ is the allocation of resources to help foreign audiences fulfill 
needs that they may have in the realm of culture. Finally, ‘cultural dialogue’ aims to promote 
person-to-person interactions through various forums. Cull told the senate committee that a 
“well-planned piece of cultural diplomacy can actually hit all four of these marks.”4 He added, 
however, that productive dialogue is based on humility and a willingness to consider 
interlocutors as equals. More importantly, a truly engaging cultural diplomacy is one that is 
attuned to the needs and realities of others: “It isn’t enough to think who Canada would like to be 
in the world.”5 Listening, he seemed to suggest, is the sine qua non of successful cultural 
relations on the international stage.          
What Cull no doubt understood implicitly, but omitted to mention explicitly, is that it is 
also important to listen to the past. A critical examination of the history of Canadian cultural 
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diplomacy is key to understanding the interplay between the country’s use of soft power and the 
values it puts forward. In this regard, the silences in the literature surrounding the pioneering 
efforts undertaken in Brazil are striking. This state of affairs is partly a function of the sustained 
attention accorded to Québec in the aftermath of the 1961 opening of the Maison du Québec in 
Paris, a move that signalled the province’s determination to develop an international identity in 
accordance with its jurisdictional authority in the fields of education and culture. Scholars tend to 
focus on that decade by depicting Québec’s challenges to federal jurisdiction in international 
relations as the founding moment of Canadian cultural diplomacy.6 Their neglect of the 
precedents set in Brazil echoes that of L.A.D. Stephens who failed to mention Jean Désy and the 
Canada-Brazil Acordo Cultural in his 1977 report on the history of government information 
abroad.7 The same oversight in a study prepared by Stephens a decade earlier is especially 
difficult to explain.8 If the 1944 agreement and its supporting documentation had been 
disregarded by the mid-1960s, they certainly had not been lost. A case in point are the minutes of 
the November 1943 meeting during which the decision was made to go ahead with the proposed 
cultural agreement with Brazil for fear that inaction would lead provinces to enter into cultural 
agreements of their own on the basis of their jurisdictional powers.9 An unattributed note in the 
margin of the above minutes reads: “So true now in 1965.”10 Not only were textual records 
handy, Paul Beaulieu and Yvon Beaulne, Canadian ambassadors to Brazil between 1963 and 
1969, had brought up – albeit uncompellingly – the question of Canadian-Brazilian cultural 
relations with their colleagues in the Department of External Affairs (DEA) where Stephens 
worked. It is likely that Brazil was seen as too peripheral – in terms of geopolitics – to warrant 
attention in the context of the contest with Québec. Regardless, the DEA’s inability to examine 
and reflect on the southbound projection of a bicultural image of Canada may inadvertently have 
lent credence to claims that Ottawa lacked the means and vision to adequately represent French 
Canadians overseas.     
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Stephens’s 1967 and 1977 reports point to another problem in the study of the history of 
Canada’s cultural diplomacy: the inclination to focus almost exclusively on top-down, 
government-sanctioned initiatives that aligned with liberal nationalist narratives and spoke to the 
country’s middle power aspirations in the North Atlantic Triangle. Brazil’s place on the 
periphery of the world as Canadians knew it at the time thus constituted a blind spot. 
Furthermore, on a more prosaic level, the paper trails left by the DEA, the International Service 
of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC-IS), and other government departments or 
agencies are much easier to collate and track than those of non-state actors and independent-
minded diplomats such as Désy.11 Operating without much oversight, the protagonists on the 
ground in Brazil exercised considerable agency, often in ways that were difficult to align or 
reconcile with high-level policy priorities established in Ottawa. The apparent disassociation 
between the Canada-Brazil cultural rapprochement and the DEA’s North Atlantic orientation did 
not make the former less significant as a formative moment in the projection of Canada abroad. 
To understand this, one requires a different theoretical outlook to make sense of what was 
happening, how, and why. Among other things, this entails a willingness to go beyond 
government archives in the search for insights on the breadth and scope of Canadian cultural 
diplomacy in order to consider concert promoters, artists, journalists, and audiences as legitimate 
actors in international relations. Even Stephens seemed to acknowledge as much when he 
conceded that the early history of the DEA’s information programs “is not a brilliant record but 
[it] is marked by a great deal of conscientious endeavour by employees … who worked with a 
bare minimum of government policy to guide them, in the face of frequent indifference from 
their own departmental leadership and almost always with a level of resources which permitted 
only threshold operations.”12 While some officials were no doubt demoralized or, at best, less 
than inspired by such indifference, others, such as Désy, saw it as an opportunity to experiment 
and operate under the radar.  
If Désy occupies centre stage in this story, it is because of his pioneering role in the history 
of Canadian cultural diplomacy and the anomalous, if timely moment of his tenure at the head of 
the CBC-IS when many observers doubted the former ambassador had the credentials to reinvent 
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himself as a broadcast administrator.13 Désy’s overshadowing presence from the 1940s onward 
provides a unique longitudinal window into the deployment of bilateral cultural relations over a 
period of several decades when the DEA had yet to fully equip itself in the sphere of cultural 
diplomacy. Operating both within the power apparatus and somewhat parallel to it, Désy as a 
foreign affairs diplomat and a bureaucrat was single-minded in his devotion to the idea of culture 
as a force for mutual understanding between peoples and as an expression of national 
authenticity. An ambitious French-speaking Catholic with intimate ties to Montreal’s intellectual 
and cultural elite, he held a liberal humanist vision of Canadian culture and championed the 
image of Canada as a bicultural/bilingual federal state rooted in the ‘exceptional’ histories of two 
‘white’ settler societies. His personal and social identities were relational as well as malleable, 
particularly when juxtaposed against those of his counterparts in Brazil. A multifaceted 
protagonist pursuing several agendas simultaneously, Désy modulated his performance of nation 
to make it correspond with his evolving sense of self.14 From this perspective, he was no 
different than the other informal ambassadors who provided impetus to Canada’s musical nation 
branding in Brazil. These included artists such as the Dansereau couple and Quatuor alouette 
whom he promoted together with Claude Champagne and Ernest MacMillan, but also Allan 
Blye, Jimmy Dale, Donald Lautrec, Paul Anka, and Marc Gélinas with whom Désy was not 
associated and of whose music he may not have approved. Similar in some respects and different 
in many others, each and every one of these individuals represent a point of entry, of mediation, 
in the emergence of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community.  
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of Canada until the end of his diplomatic career. His lobbying of Duplessis might have been an effort to stay in Paris 
since his posting there was coming to an end. After all, he had begun his academic and diplomatic careers there. He 
had also declined the offer to be the first French Canadian to occupy the post of under-secretary of state for External 
Affairs, because he preferred raising his children in a city that had good and affordable French-language schools. He 
had also indicated that he wished to stop moving to provide a more stable environment for his family. Personal and 
professional imperatives defined his trajectory as a diplomat. Jean Désy to Louis Saint-Laurent, October 1, 1948, 
MG26-L, Vol. 89, Louis St. Laurent Fonds, LAC; “Le bilinguisme, facteur d’unité et de culture,” La Presse, April 7, 




Looked at through the prism of Georgina Born’s ‘four planes of social mediation,’ this cast 
of protagonists revealed the extent to which Canada’s musical diplomacy in Brazil was first and 
foremost about national self-representation and national projection. The assemblage opens a 
window into the mechanics of musical nation branding. It brings into focus the markers of 
identity that delineated the project of a musically imagined Canadian-Brazilian community. It 
was a largely improvised androcentric project that foregrounded ‘whiteness’ and revolved 
around the tropes of Latinity, Catholicism, métissage, and family. Brazil served as a distant stage 
to mediate old and new connections to the nation. It provided a venue where identity politics 
played themselves out through aesthetic modes of communication. In their interaction with 
musical ‘others,’ Canada’s informal ambassadors negotiated the tension between difference and 
sameness – as well as between nationalism and universalism – using channels first opened by the 
embassy in Rio de Janeiro and the CBC-IS. Mediated events added resonance to this effort. They 
also amplified the dissonance between the discourses deployed to sell the idea of a Canadian-
Brazilian cultural rapprochement and their reception in Canada. Notwithstanding its incongruity, 
this exercise in musical nation branding demonstrated that Canadians’ search for an international 
identity could not be dissociated from their search for a national identity. It also underlined the 
important role that artists could play in this process.    
Going back to what Cull told the SSCFAIT, it is obvious that musical diplomacy efforts in 
Brazil were too focused on “who Canada would like to be” and not enough on “listening to the 
foreign public, finding out what the world needs, and then thinking how Canada’s interests 
intersect with this need.”15 It is also evident that Brazilian interlocutors were not treated entirely 
as equals if we consider how certain sounds (i.e. samba and bossa nova) were kept on the 
sideline or off the airwaves; or if we examine the response of critics and audience to Heitor 
Villa-Lobos’s 1952 performance in Montreal. That said, the protagonists of this story did 
demonstrate remarkable ingenuity with their strategies, particularly in cases where they were 
able to hit the four marks that Cull identified. For example, Champagne’s “Quadrilha Brasileira,” 
an homage to Brazil written for Dominion Day celebrations in Rio de Janeiro, was a splendid 
‘cultural gift.’ The composer’s performance in Brazil of works infused with French-Canadian 
folkloric elements conveyed ‘cultural information’ about Québec and its relationship to the rest 
                                                          




of Canada. The courses that Champagne taught at the Escola Nacional de Música constituted a 
form of ‘cultural capacity building,’ which doubled as ‘cultural dialogue’ if we consider the 
extracurricular activities that accompanied his teaching duties; notably as a guest of Villa-Lobos 
at various events. Although these efforts did not suffice to secure widespread popular support at 
home, they did call attention to the mediating potential of music in international relations.    
As constructs, musically imagined communities are complex assemblages that put 
individuals and collectivities in relation with one another in ways that either support or contest, 
reinforce or transgress, existing boundaries. Their dynamic nature and scaleability make them 
rich and resonant objects of study in international relations. Not only does music travel, it is also 
both a means of negotiating hegemony and a means of “bounding identity and providing 
continuity or homogeneity, perhaps with the past, perhaps with a community elsewhere.”16 Its 
social and symbolic significance thus reaches beyond the producer-performer-audience 
relationship. Born explains: 
Music … produces its own varied social relations – in performance, in musical associations 
and ensembles, in the musical division of labour. It inflects existing social relations, from the 
most concrete and intimate to the most abstract of collectivities – music’s embodiment of the 
nation, of social hierarchies, and of the structures of class, race, gender and sexuality. But 
music is bound up also in the broader institutional forces that provide the basis of its 
production and reproduction, whether élite or religious patronage, market exchange, the 
arena of public and subsidized cultural institutions, or late capitalism’s multi-polar cultural 
economy.17 
Analyzed through this constellation of mediations, the discourses and practices of both state and 
non-state actors in Brazil reveal the competing sets of values, attitudes, and perceptions with 
which Canadians approached ‘others,’ musical or otherwise, at home and abroad. In other words, 
the study of music in Canadian-Brazilian relations makes audible the structuring power of ‘race’ 
and empire as well as religion and gender in Canadian international history. Simply put, it 
uncovers the biases embedded in representations of Canada by tracing one of Canadians’ earliest 
                                                          
16 Beverley Diamond, “Introduction: Issues of Hegemony and Identity in Canadian Music,” in Canadian Music: 
Issues of Hegemony and Identity, eds. Beverley Diamond and Robert Witmer (Toronto: Canadian Scholars’ Press, 
1998), 16. 
17 Georgina Born, “On Musical Mediation: Ontology, Technology, and Creativity,” Twentieth-Century Music 2, 




self-conscious efforts to activate music as an instrument of diplomacy. To the extent that all 
international relations are intercultural relations, musicking is socially and politically 
consequential; even if only for how it reflects and shapes people’s self-perception and sense of 
belonging in the world.18 Hence the need to tune in and listen.  
 
                                                          
18 Akira Iriye writes: “A nation is a culture in that its inhabitants share certain consciousness – of their land, of 
their history, and of who they are. Since all nations are in this sense cultures, international relations become inter-
cultural relations.” Akira Iriye, “Culture and International History,” in Explaining the History of American Foreign 
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